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Essays on Information Economics and Monotone Comparative Statics
Daniel Rappoport
This dissertation studies communication in a variety of contexts and attempts to derive general
comparative statics results and equilibrium characterizations. The main goal is to understand how
usual comparative statics predictions extend to realistic but previously intractable frameworks.
These range from examining communication when outcomes are lotteries, to disclosure games when
the evidence structure can be arbitrarily complex.
Chapter 1 studies verifiable disclosure games, that is, a sender communicating with a receiver
using hard evidence in order to influence his action choice. The main goal is to understand how
prior beliefs about the evidence environment affect which actions are chosen in equilibrium. More
specifically, the goal is to understand which beliefs will be less preferred by the sender: I say that
a prior belief is more skeptical than another if it induces less preferred equilibrium actions for the
sender regardless of his type or the receiver’s preferences. The main contribution is to show that
this equilibrium order, which is difficult to check. is equivalent to when the sender is expected
to have more evidence, a more straightforward order over the primitives. This equivalence has
application to any disclosure game in which the sender can affect or choose the receiver that he
faces. Examples include jury selection and dynamic disclosure. In addition, the methodology of
the paper provides an explicit expression for equilibrium actions, and a novel comparative statics
result.
Chapter 2 studies when choice over lotteries is monotonic given any choice set. A central predic-
tion of the signaling literature is monotone comparative statics (MCS) or that higher types choose
higher outcomes. The driving behavioral assumption behind MCS is the single crossing property
on preferences. However, this property is only sufficient when the outcome is non-random. More
realistically, choices correspond to lotteries over outcomes: a student choosing her education level
is not certain about her lifetime salary. Motivated by this observation we characterize preferences
that admit an analogous single crossing property over lotteries. We show that this property is
necessary and sufficient to maintain MCS in many signaling applications when noise is introduced
after the choice has been made.
Chapter 3 studies how a principal incentivizes costly information acquisition from a disinterested
agent through monetary transfers. The main focus is the moral hazard that arises when the principal
can observe the results of the investigation but not the entire research process. More specifically,
we assume that the principal can contract on the realized posterior belief but not on the posterior
beliefs that could have been realized or on their probability. We find that, unlike in standard moral
hazard problems, under either limited liability or risk aversion the principal implements his first best
experiment at first best cost. However, under risk aversion and limited liability the principal suffers
efficiency loss. More specifically, if the principal plans to implement an asymmetric experiment,
one which seeks certainty with low probability and is uninformative otherwise, the second best
experiment will be distorted toward less asymmetric experiments and provide the agent with a
positive rent.
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A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: to the extent possible, a re-
ceiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence.
The degree of skepticism depends on how much evidence the sender is expected to possess.
I characterize when a change in the prior distribution of evidence induces more skepticism, i.e.
induces any receiver to take an equilibrium action that is less favorable to the sender follow-
ing every message. I formalize an increase in the sender’s (ex-ante) amount of evidence and
show that this is equivalent to inducing more skepticism. My analysis provides a method to
solve general verifiable disclosure games, including an expression for equilibrium actions. I
apply these results to a dynamic disclosure problem in which the sender obtains and discloses
evidence over time. I identify the necessary and sufficient condition on the evidence structure
such that the receiver can benefit from early inspections.
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1. Introduction
A fundamental question in communication with misaligned interests is ”what are you not
telling me?” Auditors will be suspicious about missing line items, and juries are less likely to
convict on purely circumstantial cases. This skepticism in response to incomplete disclosures is a
shared feature of communication with evidence. Seen from the perspective of prosecutors and
firms, jurors and corporate auditors who hold less skeptical beliefs will be preferred. Identifying
beliefs that induce more skepticism is therefore important in understanding how jurors or cor-
porate auditors are selected, or more generally, any situation in which the ”sender” can affect or
select the beliefs of the ”receiver”.
The degree of skepticism depends on beliefs about the availability of evidence: a circumstantial
case provoked less suspicion thirty years ago than it does currently. The criminal justice literature
terms this the ”CSI effect”: Shelton et al. (2009) find that jurors who are more informed about
forensics expect more hard evidence to be available to the prosecutor, and as a consequence are
less likely to convict for every evidence profile. This suggests that prosecutors will try to avoid
jurors who expect more evidence to be available. However, in criminal trials, or corporate disclo-
sures, there are potentially multiple dimensions over which one can be informed. In these general
evidence environments, what does it mean for there to be more available evidence? And, to what
extent is this associated with inducing more skepticism?
Model and Main Results I address these questions in a general verifiable disclosure framework.
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver in order to influence his action
choice. While the receiver’s preferences over actions depend on the private information or ”type”
of the sender, the sender always prefers higher actions.1 Following Hart et al. (2017), and Ben-
Porath et al. (2017), I model the structure of hard evidence as a partial order: type t dominates
type s according to the ”disclosure order”, or t d s, if type t can mimic type s. For example, a
suspect with an alibi dominates a suspect without one, as the former can simply conceal his alibi.
Importantly, there is no assumed relationship between whether a type is ”high value” (commands
a favorable best response from the receiver) and whether that type is dominant according to the
1 The receiver chooses the action from a subset of R.
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disclosure order (has a large feasible message set).
The main goal of this paper is to characterize changes in the prior distribution of evidence (or
types) that induce greater skepticism. One prior distribution induces more skepticism than another
if equilibrium actions are lower following any message, regardless of the receiver’s preferences.2
To characterize this equilibrium notion I formalize an increase in the amount of evidence: one
prior distribution f has more evidence than another prior distribution g if whenever t d t′, the
likelihood ratio fg is greater at t than at t
′. That is, whenever type t can mimic t′, type t is relatively
more likely than t′ under the distribution with more evidence.
The main result, Theorem 1, shows that the more skepticism and more evidence orders are
equivalent. That is, (i) if the sender has more evidence, then any receiver takes a lower action for
every type (in fact, after every message) and (ii) if the sender does not have more evidence then
there exists a receiver that will strictly increase his action following some message. The key to
establishing Theorem 1 is characterizing equilibrium: Theorem 3 provides an explicit expression
for the associated mapping from types to actions.
The characterization of more skepticism is important for understanding which prior beliefs
the sender wants to induce in the receiver. The sender’s ex-ante payoff depends on both his and
the receiver’s prior beliefs over evidence. Theorem 1 identifies the more evidence order as the
preference over receiver prior beliefs that is common to all senders. That is, a sender with any
ex-ante distribution over evidence prefers to induce one prior belief over another if and only if it
has less evidence. This illustrates how the ”CSI effect” can shape jury selection: the prosecutor
will try to avoid jurors who believe he has more evidence.
Why More Evidence Induces More Skepticism Any equilibrium partitions the sender types
into pooled sets that obtain the same equilibrium action. The central insight to Theorem 1 is that in
the receiver optimal equilibrium, the value of these pooled sets decreases under a more evidence
shift. The analysis proceeds by first characterizing these pooled sets, and then using this and novel
comparative statics techniques to establish the above claim.
Intuitively, pooled sets ”cannot be separated” because they involve low value types that are
2 There are multiple equilibria. I focus on the receiver optimal equilibrium.
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more dominant in the disclosure order mimicking high value types that are less dominant. For
example, the set of job applicants that present no references include experienced applicants with
bad references mimicking higher quality fresh applicants who actually have no references. Def-
inition 5 formalizes this intuition. Pooled sets are those over which the receiver’s best response
is downward biased: any subset of types that cannot mimic their complement (i.e. a lower contour
subset according to d) has higher value than the set as a whole.3 The receiver optimal equilib-
rium is uniquely characterized by the receiver’s best response being downward biased on each
pooled set.4
This observation underlies two novel solution methods for receiver optimal equilibria: (i) an
algorithm to find the equilibrium partition; and (ii) an explicit expression for the equilibrium
actions. The pooled set containing type t forms through the following two step process: first, t
chooses to mimic a set of types with higher value, and second, some set of types chooses to mimic
t if t has higher value. The former serves to maximize the action for type t while the latter serves
to minimize it. The result is the familiar ”minmax” form of the expression for equilibrium actions
in Theorem 3.
I next analyze how the value of pooled sets changes under a more evidence shift. Proposition 3
establishes that the value of a set decreases under any more evidence shift if and only if the down-
ward biased property holds. This means that the downward biased property characterizes both
equilibrium pooled sets and monotone comparative statics (MCS) under any more evidence shift.
This connection between MCS under any more evidence shift and pooled sets is not implied by
known results concerning monotone likelihood ratio shifts in the distribution. For instance, the
well known result that a monotone likelihood ratio increase lowers the expectation of a decreasing
function cannot be directly applied. The reason is that the downward biased condition does not
imply that the value is decreasing in the disclosure order. That is, within a pooled set, it is not
necessarily true that if t can mimic t′, the value of t is lower than that of t′. This means that the
effect of a more evidence change on the value of a pooled set, which shifts probability to mimicking
types, is unclear.
3 A lower contour subset S of a partially ordered set (X,≥) is all the elements dominated by elements in S, i.e.
{s ∈ X : ∃s′ ∈ S, s′ ≥ s}.
4 Some additional constraints on the partition are required and made precise in Proposition 1.
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Section 5 develops novel results to deal with downward biased sets. The main contribution is
Algorithm 2 which iteratively pools larger and larger subsets based on incentives to mimic. At
each stage, one subset only mimics another if the value of the latter subset is higher. This means
that at every stage the value of each ”currently pooled subset” is lower under the more evidence
distribution. Forming the equilibrium partition through this process shows that the value of a
pooled set decreases under a more evidence shift. Subsection 1.1 illustrates this algorithm in a
specific example.
Application to Dynamic Disclosure The relationship between more skepticism and the sender’s
ex-ante preferences over receiver prior beliefs also has applications to dynamic disclosure. In a
pre-play communication stage the sender will never signal to the receiver that he expects more
evidence.
I apply this observation to a game in which the sender obtains and discloses evidence over two
periods. I examine whether the receiver can benefit from ”early inspections” relative to the game
in which communication only occurs in period 2. The sender’s distribution over period 2 evi-
dence depends on his period 1 evidence, so there is potential for informative signaling. However,
because evidence accumulates over time, period 1 disclosures can reveal to the receiver that the
sender expects more evidence in period 2, and thereby induce more skepticism in the receiver.
I show that the receiver does not benefit from early inspections regardless of his preferences or
prior beliefs if and only if the evidence structure satisfies the ”Unique Evidence Path Property”
(UEPP). The UEPP holds, if for any two types that cannot mimic each other in period 1, the types
that they can possibly become in period 2 also cannot mimic each other. Broadly, This ensures that
any ”potential for separation” created in period 1 is preserved in period 2. Without this property,
the receiver can benefit from early inspections by separating period 1 evidence realizations that
could otherwise lead to inseparable realizations in period 2. In contrast, under the UEPP any
”informative signaling” in period 1 will violate sender incentive compatibility. More specifically,
the receiver’s beliefs following any two different period 1 disclosures will be ordered by the more
evidence relation from the perspective of some type.
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Implications and Extensions Theorem 1 unifies some existing results from the verifiable disclo-
sure literature. Seemingly different changes in the distribution considered in Jung & Kwon (1988),
Guttman et al. (2014), and Dziuda (2011) imply decreases in equilibrium actions for specific re-
ceiver preferences and evidence structures. This paper identifies the more evidence relation as the
common thread between these changes. While examples like Guttman et al. (2014), who consider
adding evidence types to the Dye model, are consistent with the interpretation of the main result,
Theorem 1 also applies to seemingly less related changes in the distribution of evidence. I gen-
eralize the result from Dziuda (2011) that decreasing the probability of honest types (types who
must fully reveal themselves) decreases the equilibrium actions for all messages by showing that
this change corresponds to a more evidence shift.
The full characterization of receiver optimal equilibrium also allows for new insights when the
assumptions on the sender’s preferences are relaxed. First, I consider introducing some proba-
bility of senders who are ”unbiased”, i.e. have the same preferences as the receiver. I show that
unlike in cheap talk games (Kim & Pogach (2014)) the receiver optimal equilibrium is equivalent
to that in a game with the same probability of honest senders. The actions in this equilibrium
are the same as one without unbiased senders, but where the receiver has a higher best response
to any subset of evidence types. Moreover, I show that a decrease in the probability of unbiased
types can be seen as a more evidence change, and thereby induces more skepticism.
Second, I consider a game in which the receiver does not know whether the sender prefers
higher or lower actions. I construct a disclosure game in which the sender has known preferences
toward higher actions that has the same receiver optimal equilibrium. In this equilibrium there
exists exactly one message that does not credibly convey the sender’s direction of bias. I use
Theorem 1 to show that the sender always wants to convince the receiver that his bias is the
opposite of his own.
Layout The paper proceeds as follows. Subsection 1.1 previews the model, characterization ap-
proach, and comparative statics result in a simple example. Subsection 1.2 discusses the related
literature. Section 2 lays out the model and lists examples that fit my framework. Section 3 defines
the more skepticism and more evidence orders and states the main result that they are equivalent.
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The analysis proceeds by first characterizing the receiver optimal equilibrium in Section 4, and
then introducing and using the comparative statics techniques in Section 5. I then move on to
two applications. Section 6 considers two extensions based on the sender’s preferences, and Sec-
tion 7 discusses a dynamic disclosure framework. Section 8 concludes. Unless noted otherwise,
all proofs are in the appendix.
1.1. An Example of the Model and a More Evidence Shift
Consider an entrepreneur (the sender) who instructs his engineers to run a beta test for a new
software. There are four different outcomes. The software could perform above expectations
garnering positive reviews from its users. The reviews could also reveal that software is inacces-
sible to non-scientific users. Having realized that the software is inaccessible, the engineers could
partially salvage the problem by adding a useful tutorial. Lastly, the beta test could yield no evi-
dence, perhaps because the users were not a representative sample or because there was a bug in
the software.
The entrepreneur reports to his investor (the receiver), and attempts to extract the most fund-
ing possible. However, communication is not ”cheap talk” and some of the above outcomes can
be certified. If the product performs above expectations, or if the software is inaccessible, the re-
views can confirm this. In addition, if the software is inaccessible and a tutorial is developed the
entrepreneur can credibly present this new tutorial. Although, in this case it will be apparent that
the software was inaccessible to begin with. Finally, the entrepreneur can always claim that the
test results were unusable.
The entrepreneur can be one of four ”types”- no evidence (NE), above expectations (AE), inac-
cessible (I), and Tutorial (T ). The problem is illustrated in Figure 1. The directed graph illustrates
the disclosure order: each vertex represents a type, and the available messages to each type are the
set of vertices accessible via a directed path. For example, T can declare {T, I,NE} but not {AE}.
The investor’s type dependent value for the product is displayed above each vertex. Suppose that
the investor’s prior over entrepreneur types is uniform and the investor chooses an amount of
funding equal to the expected value of the product.5














Figure 1: Investor with Uniform Prior
The unique equilibrium involves the pure strategies represented by the dotted arrows in the
right panel of Figure 1. Types in {NE, I, T} all claim to have no evidence, and obtain funding
equal to a(NE) = 4/3. The AE type truthfully reveals and obtains funding a(AE) = 5.6 The
interpretation is that an entrepreneur will only reveal positive test results, and will claim the test
was faulty otherwise. The investor anticipates this, and is skeptical upon receiving NE, i.e. he
forms a lower expectation of the value of the product than if he were certain that the test were
faulty.
The above equilibrium can also be seen as a partition of the types into sets who obtain the
6 There are many ways to set the actions for the off path declarations I and T . The analysis in the main text does this
according to the truth leaning refinement by HKP, which in this case dictates that a(I) = 0 and a(T ) = 1.
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same equilibrium action, or pooled sets. This partition is (P1, P2) where P1 = {NE, I, T} and
P2 = {AE}. The most important feature of this partition is that the investor’s expected value is
downward biased on each pooled set: the lower contour subsets of P1, i.e. subsets who cannot
mimic their complement, induce a higher investor expected value than P1 as a whole. To verify,
note that the expected values of NE and {NE, I}, (the two (strict) lower contour subsets) are 3
and 3/2 respectively, which are both greater than 4/3. In Proposition 1, I show that the downward
biased property characterizes pooled sets in the receiver optimal equilibrium.
Suppose that the investor learns that the beta test and engineers are of higher quality, and
therefore provide the entrepreneur with more evidence about his product. Specifically, the in-
vestor now believes there is a 112 probability of NE, a
1
6 probability of I , a
1
4 probability of T , and a
1
2 probability of AE. This means the entrepreneur is both more likely to get a test result and more
likely to develop a tutorial. This distribution and the original uniform distribution are compared
by the more evidence relation: the likelihood ratio between any type and some type that can be
mimicked has increased. For example, the T type can mimic the I type, and the likelihood ratio
between T and I has increased from 1 to 3/2. Does the entrepreneur benefit or suffer from this
change in the investor’s beliefs (assuming that his true distribution over evidence remains fixed)?
The receiver optimal equilibrium involves the same pooled sets as under the uniform prior.
Thus, the answer to the above question depends on how the investor’s value for the set {NE, I, T}
changes when the entrepreneur is believed to have more evidence (the funding for AE remains
at 5). While in this case, one can simply calculate that it decreases, a({NE, I, T}) = 6/5, it is not
apparent whether this is general for more evidence shifts in the investor’s prior. Probability is
shifted from NE to I which tends to decrease the investor’s value, but probability is also shifted
from I to T which increases the investor’s value.7 Theorem 1 shows that despite this ambigu-
ity, the fact that these types pool together ensures that the investor’s value decreases under any
more evidence shift. Furthermore, the decrease in equilibrium funding would hold regardless of
how the investor values different realizations of the beta test. In the language of this paper, the
investor’s new prior induces more skepticism than the uniform prior.
7 One could also see this change as moving probability from both NE and I to T . The same comment applies
because the former change decreases the investor’s value while the latter increases it.
9
To see why this is true consider pooling the {NE, I, T} set iteratively as follows. Notice that
whatever the prior, the I type will pool with the NE type because v(I) < v(NE). This means
that one can treat the {NE, I} set as a single type with an expected value (under the uniform
distribution) of 3/2. Therefore, type T will also pool with {NE, I} because v(T ) < 3/2. The
key observation is that any more evidence shift can be decomposed in a similar way. Probability
is shifted first from NE to I , and second from the set {NE, I} to T . Since each shift decreases
the investors value, one can conclude that the overall effect is negative. Section 5 generalizes
this argument to show that the downward biased property characterizes monotone comparative
statics under any more evidence shift.
1.2. Related Literature
The first verifiable disclosure models were introduced by Milgrom (1981), Grossman (1981),
and Grossman & Hart (1980). The sender, who knows the state and is biased towards higher
actions, can be vague but not lie, i.e. he can declare any subset of states that contains the true
state. The main finding is the ”unraveling” result that in any equilibrium the sender fully reveals
his information. There are multiple ways in which unraveling can fail: if the sender’s direction
of bias depends on his type (e.g. Seidmann & Winter (1997)), if the sender pays a cost to disclose
information (e.g. Verrecchia (1983)), or if it is unknown whether the sender knows the state (e.g.
Dye (1985) and Jung & Kwon (1988)).8,9
The Dye (1985) model in which the sender has the possibility to be uninformed has been ex-
tended to incorporate more complex evidence structures. Shin (2003) and Dziuda (2011) consider
multidimensional versions of this model in which the sender obtains potentially multiple pieces
of either good or bad evidence and can disclose any subset. Dziuda (2011) and Einhorn (2007) also
consider uncertainty over the preferences of the sender and over whether he is honest or strategic.
There have also been a number of dynamic extensions. Guttman et al. (2014) and Acharya
et al. (2011) consider dynamic frameworks in which the receiver is also uncertain about when the
sender has obtained evidence. Einhorn & Ziv (2008) consider a repeated dye model in which the
8 Hagenbach et al. (2014) and Mathis (2008) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for unraveling in a general
framework.
9 For surveys of the verifiable disclosure literature see Milgrom (2008) and Dranove & Jin (2010).
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sender wants to achieve a reputation of having less evidence. These dynamic models develop or
use seemingly different changes in the distribution that induce lower equilibrium actions. I show
that these changes are examples of more evidence shifts.
Another strand of literature shows that the receiver’s utility in some equilibrium of the ver-
ifiable disclosure game is the same as that in which the receiver can commit to a best response
before learning the sender’s message. This equivalence was first introduced in Glazer & Rubin-
stein (2004) and further explored by Sher (2011), and Ben-Porath et al. (2017). Hart et al. (2017)
identifies the equilibrium that achieves this equivalence through the ”truth leaning refinement”. I
focus on this receiver optimal equilibrium and my model is the same as that in Hart et al. (2017)
and Sher (2011).
In addition to the above equivalence results, Glazer & Rubinstein (2004) and Sher (2014) derive
methods to find the receiver optimal equilibrium. However, their models involve a binary action
choice and only two types of senders - acceptable and unacceptable. My algorithm for solving for
equilibrium bears similarities to that in Bertomeu & Cianciaruso (2016) which characterizes equi-
librium in disclosure games when pure strategy equilibria exist. I focus on equilibrium outcomes
which also allows for a tractable characterization in games with only mixed strategy equilibria
such as that in Dziuda (2011).
To my knowledge there is no other study that examines monotone likelihood ratio shifts over
a partially ordered set. The more evidence shift involves the monotone likelihood ratio order be-
cause my methodology requires that first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) hold on any subset
of types. Milgrom (1981) showed that such a change in the distribution must be a monotone like-
lihood ratio shift. I iteratively apply the well known result that an FOSD shift in the distribution
lowers the expectation of a decreasing function.
2. Model
The setting involves a single sender and a single receiver. The sender observes his type t ∈ T ,
where |T | = n, and sends a message from his feasible set. The receiver observes this message and
then chooses an action a ∈ A, where A is a compact convex subset of R.
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The receiver has a prior belief h ∈ ∆T over the sender’s type. In order to investigate the
sender’s preferences over inducing different receiver prior beliefs, I allow the sender to have a
potentially different prior, η ∈ ∆T . However, the set of equilibria does not depend on the sender’s
prior because the sender chooses his message after realizing his type. Unless otherwise noted, I
assume that η and h have common and full support over T . Appendix G extends the results to
general distributions.
2.1. Preferences
The receiver’s utility, UR : A × T → R, depends on both the action and the sender’s private
information. The sender always prefers higher actions and so it is without loss of generality to let
US(a, t) = a. I assume that UR is strictly concave and differentiable in a. Denote the set of all such
receiver utilities Υ. The strict concavity ensures that the receiver has a unique optimal action for
all distributions over sender types.10
The preference assumptions ensure the ”in-betweenness” property from Hart et al. (2017).
Lemma 1. For any distribution over types q ∈ ∆T , define a∗(q) ≡ arg maxa E[UR(a, t)|t ∼ q]. Consider
two distributions q1, q2 ∈ ∆T such that a∗(q1) < a∗(q2). For any λ ∈ (0, 1),
a∗(q1) < a∗(λq1 + (1− λ)q2) < a∗(q2).
This says that the optimal action for the mixture of two distributions is between the optimal
actions in response to each individual distribution.11 Lemma 1 ensures that whenever two types
pool together (declare the same message), one type would like to credibly reveal himself to the
receiver, while the other type would like to remain pooled. Thus in order for the former type to
separate in equilibrium he must have access to a message that the latter type does not.
Denote the receiver’s unique best response to type t by v(t) ≡ arg maxa UR(a, t). Similarly,
define Vh(S) ≡ arg maxa E[UR(a, t)|t ∈ S, t ∼ h] to be the receiver’s best response conditional on
10 Making the same weaker assumptions as in Hart et al. (2017) would not change the results, i.e. E[UR(a, t)|t ∼ q] is
strictly quasi-concave in a, ∀q ∈ ∆T .
11 One could abstract from the action choice, and alternatively model the sender and receiver preferences over in-
duced receiver beliefs given by US , UR : ∆T → R. In this framework Lemma 1 is a necessary assumption for my
results. The two following assumptions would also be required: (i) ∀µ, µ′ ∈ ∆T, US(µ) = US(µ′) =⇒ UR(µ) =
UR(µ′), and (ii) US(µ) is continuous in µ.
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the sender’s type being in S and distributed according to h. I refer to sets of types with relatively
high (low) optimal actions, as ”high (low) value”.
The leading example for the receiver’s utility will be quadratic loss defined by UR(a, t) = −(a−
v(t))2 for any function v : T → R. In this case Vh(S) = E[v(t)|t ∈ S, t ∼ h] is the expectation of the
receiver’s value for each type.
2.2. Messaging Technology
I assume that the message space is the type space and interpret type t sending message t′ as
type t ”mimicking” t′. In addition, there is a partial order d over T , such that t d t′ means that
t can mimic t′. The set of available messages to each type t is given by M(t) ≡ {s : t d s}. The
partial order assumption imposes reflexivity and transitivity. That is, (i) every type can truthfully
reveal (send their corresponding message) and (ii) if t can mimic t′ and t′ can mimic t′′, then t can
mimic t′′.12 I refer to d as the ”disclosure order”.
Remark 1. One can add additional messages, by adding zero probability types.
The verifiable disclosure literature sometimes uses a more general messaging structure. There
is an arbitrary message space C and each type has access to some subset E(t) ⊂ C. However,
these papers often assume a normality (Bull & Watson (2004)) or nested range condition (Green
& Laffont (1986)) which make the two sets of assumptions ”equivalent”. That is, given a message
space C and message sets E : T → 2C , there exists a (T,d) such that the set of equilibria are the
same under both messaging structures.13,14
Two generalities of the model are worth emphasis. First, the disclosure order is arbitrary. And
second, there is no assumed relationship between the disclosure order and the receiver’s prefer-
ences. Common examples that fit the framework are described below. I represent (T,d) as a
directed graph with vertices representing types and directed paths between types representing
dominance in the disclosure order.
12 The partial order also imposes antisymmetry but this is without loss of generality. Types within an equivalence
class cannot induce different equilibrium actions, because the sender always prefers higher actions.
13 A message structure is normal if ∀t ∈ T , there exists et ⊂ E(t), such that ∀t, t′ ∈ T , et ∈ E(t′) =⇒ E(t) ⊂ E(t′).
The following disclosure ordered type space (T,d) has the same equilibrium set. T ≡ M with pr(et) ≡ pr(t) and
pr(m) = 0 otherwise, and et d m if m ∈ E(t).
14 For examples of disclosure games without normality, see Sher (2014) and Rubinstein & Glazer (2006).
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2.3. Examples
Dye Evidence The type space is T = {t1, ..., tn−1, t∅}. With probability (1−p) the sender is ”unin-
formed”, t∅, and with probability p the sender draws an ”evidence type” from h ∈ ∆{t1, ..., tn−1}.
Denote the total probability distribution hp ∈ ∆T . The disclosure order is given by M(ti) =
{ti, t∅}, ∀i < n, and M(t∅) = {t∅}. The interpretation is that the evidence types can certify their
type or pretend to be uninformed, while the uninformed type cannot certify his lack of evidence.
This model was first introduced by Dye (1985), and Jung & Kwon (1988), and has been widely used
in the verifiable disclosure literature, e.g. by Grubb (2011), Acharya et al. (2011), and Bhattacharya
& Mukherjee (2013).
Vagueness The sender learns the state x ∈ X drawn from h ∈ ∆X . The type space is all non-
empty subsets of X : T = 2X \ ∅. The disclosure order is given by M(t) = {t′ ∈ T, t ⊂ t′}, ∀t ∈ T .
The interpretation is that each type t can credibly reveal himself or be ”vague”. For example,
in Figure 2, X = {0, 1}, and type {0} can either truthfully report {0}, or be vague and report
{0, 1}, however she cannot ”lie” and report {1}. This description uses zero probability types to
model additional messaging options for positive probability types. Any non-singleton type t is
zero probability, but represents a feasible message for types t′ ⊂ t. These message structures were






(a) Dye Model (b) Vagueness
Figure 2: Common Examples
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Multidimensional Evidence The agent draws an integer m from some g ∈ ∆{0, 1, ..., k}. The
agent then draws a sample of size m from some distribution h ∈ ∆X where X is a finite set. Each
type is a sample of size m, i.e. t = {x1, .., xm}, and the type space is T = {t ∈ 2X : |t| ≤ k}.
The disclosure order is given by M(t) = {t′ : t′ ⊂ t} ∀t ∈ T . The interpretation is that each type
can report any combination of pieces of evidence in his possession. Examples of multidimensional
evidence models include Guttman et al. (2014), Dziuda (2011), and Shin (2003). Figure 3 illustrates







Figure 3: Mutlidimensional Evidence
Honest Types In addition to obtaining evidence from some T ′, the sender can either be strate-
gic, S, with probability p, or honest, H , with probability 1 − p. Strategic types can disclose evi-
dence according to some disclosure order ′d, while honest types must truthfully reveal. The total
type space and disclosure order are given by (T,d) defined as follows: T = T ′ × {S,H}, with
M(t, S) = M′d × {S,H} and M(t,H) = (t,H). Figure 4 displays the multidimensional example
from Figure 3 with the addition of honest types.
Complete Order and Empty Order The cases in which the disclosure order is complete or empty
serve as illustrative examples. A completely disclosure ordered type space is given by (T,d),
with T = {t1, ..., tn}, and i ≥ j ⇐⇒ ti d tj . That is, types with higher indices can report all types
with lower indices. An empty disclosure ordered type space (T,d) is given by t d t′ ⇐⇒ t = t′.
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Figure 4: Honest Types
Since no type dominates any other in the disclosure order, each type is forced to truthfully reveal.
2.4. Strategies and Equilbrium
A strategy for the sender is σ : T → ∆T where Supp(σt) ⊂ M(t), ∀ t. σt(s) refers to the proba-
bility that type t declares type s. Because the receiver’s utility is strictly concave, it is without loss
to restrict the receiver to use a pure strategy, a : T → A, which specifies an action choice in re-
sponse to each message. A perfect Bayes equilibrium (PBE) is a pair of strategies for the sender and
receiver such that σt(s) > 0 =⇒ s ∈ arg maxs′∈M(t) a(s′), a(s) = arg maxa E[UR(a, t)|σ, s], ∀s ∈
Supp(σ), and a(s) = a∗(q) for some q ∈ ∆{t : t d s}, ∀s ∈ T .
I focus on the receiver optimal PBE. A number of studies have provided justifications for this
selection. Hart et al. (2017) has shown that the truth leaning refinement, in which the receiver
interprets each off path message credulously, selects the receiver optimal equilibrium. Relatedly,
Bertomeu & Cianciaruso (2016) shows that the receiver optimal equilibrium is also the unique
equilibrium without ”self signaling sets”.
My methodology focuses on the equilibrium outcomes, i.e. the equilibrium mapping from types
to actions. Denote pih(t|UR) as the receiver optimal equilibrium action for type t facing a receiver
with preferences UR and prior beliefs h ∈ ∆T .
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3. Characterizing Increased Skepticism
The main goal is to explore how the receiver optimal equilibrium actions, pih(t|UR), depend on
the receiver’s prior distribution, h.
3.1. The More Skepticism Order
Definition 1. Let f, g ∈ ∆T . f induces more skepticism than g, also expressed as f ≥MS g, if
pif (t|UR) ≤ pig(t|UR), ∀t ∈ T, ∀UR ∈ Υ. (1)
One prior belief induces more skepticism than another if it leads any receiver to take a lower
equilibrium action for every type.
Remark 2. Definition 1 identifies the preference order over receiver prior beliefs that is common
to any sender. That is, ex-ante, the sender would like to induce the receiver to hold less skeptical
beliefs regardless of his actual distribution over evidence, η, or the receiver’s preferences, UR.
Also, any distribution that does not induce more skepticism is preferred by the sender for some
η. This means that if the sender can signal to the receiver prior to realizing his type, he will never
send signals that make the receiver more skeptical.15
One basic question concerns whether ≥MS is empty. Alternatively, does one’s level of skepti-
cism always depend on their preferences? To see that it does not, consider the following simple
example.
Example 1. Let the type space be T ≡ {t1, t2} with t2 d t1. The prior distribution is given by
p ≡ pr(t2). The equilibrium structure has two cases based on UR: (i) v(t1) ≥ v(t2), t1 and t2 both
declare t1, and obtain the ”average action” Vp(T ); and (ii) v(t1) < v(t2), t1 and t2 separate, and
obtain actions v(t1) and v(t2) respectively.
Now consider two such prior distributions p′ > p′′. In case (ii), the equilibrium actions do
not depend on the prior, so pip′(·|UR) = pip′′(·|UR). In case (i), p′ shifts probability to the lower
15 This statement will not be true if the prior belief of the sender and receiver are identical and one considers changing
both simultaneously. That is, it is possible that despite the decrease in utility ”type by type”, the sender that induces
more skepticism has a higher probability of being higher valued types, and therefore a higher ex-ante utility.
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value type t2 relative to p′′, and so Vp′(T ) ≤ Vp′′(T ). This means that for all receiver preferences
pip′(·|UR) ≤ pip′′(·|UR), i.e. p′ ≥MS p′′. 4
Example 1 shows that shifting probability to types that are more dominant in the disclosure
order can induce more skepticism. More specifically, the relative probability of the mimicking
type- t2, to the mimicked type- t1, is higher under the more skeptical prior. The next definition
extends this notion to more complex disclosure orders.
3.2. The More Evidence Order
Definition 2. Let f, g ∈ ∆T . f has more evidence than g with respect to d, also expressed as
f ≥ME g, if






The more evidence relation depends only on the disclosure order (a dependence I often omit).
For any type t that can mimic t′, t is relatively more likely than t′ under a prior distribution with
more evidence. If d were a complete order, then f ≥ME g would be equivalent to f monotone
likelihood ratio (MLR) dominates g on (T,d). Definition 2 is an extension of MLR dominance
to a partially ordered set that only imposes the likelihood ratio inequality on comparable pairs of
types.
Natural changes in the prior distribution are more evidence shifts. To preview now, recall
the examples from Subsection 2.3. In the multidimensional evidence model, performing an MLR
increase in the distribution g (the distribution over the number of pieces of evidence the sender
obtains), while leaving h (the distribution of each piece of evidence) constant is a more evidence
shift. In the honest types model, Increasing the probability of strategic types, p, is a more evidence
shift.
While Definition 2 concerns changes in the distribution, by allowing for zero probability types,
more evidence changes can also capture changes in the disclosure order or ”evidence structure”.
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For distributions without full support, f ≥ME g with respect to d if
∀t, t′ ∈ T, t d t′ =⇒ f(t)g(t′) ≥ f(t′)g(t). (3)
Thus, adding a ”no evidence type” which cannot mimic any other type is a less evidence change.
Similarly, adding a type which cannot be mimicked is a more evidence change.
3.3. The Equivalence Result
Theorem 1. Let f, g ∈ ∆T . The more skepticism and more evidence relations are equivalent, that is
f ≥ME g ⇐⇒ f ≥MS g.
The result says that If f has more evidence than g, all types obtain a lower action under f than
g for any receiver preferences. The converse also holds: if f does not have more evidence than g,
then there will exist a receiver that treats some type strictly more favorably under f than under g.
In light of Remark 2, one can restate Theorem 1 as follows: the sender prefers to induce one belief
over another in any receiver, regardless of his ex-ante distribution over evidence, if and only if it
has less evidence.
The inequality in (1) is weak (vs. strict) partly because changes in the distribution do not affect
outcomes for types that completely separate in equilibrium. However, Appendix I provides a
strict counterpart to Theorem 1: if the likelihood ratio inequality in Definition 2 is strict, then
every type that is ”pooled” will experience a strict decrease in their equilibrium action under a
more evidence shift.
The fact that more skepticism implies more evidence is relatively straightforward. If the likeli-
hood ratio inequality in (2) does not hold for some pair of ordered types, t d t′, one can consider
receiver preferences such that these types pool together, while all other types separate. Since t
only pools with t′ if it has lower value, the receiver’s best response to this set is higher under f
than g.
The broad intuition for why more evidence implies more skepticism is as follows. Any equi-
librium is a partition of the type space into sets of types that ”pool together” or obtain the same
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equilibrium action. These pooled sets involve types with higher value that are less dominant in
the disclosure order being mimicked by types with lower value that are more dominant in the
disclosure order. A more evidence change shifts probability ”up the disclosure order” on each of
these pooled sets to the types with relatively lower value. This tends to reduce the receiver’s best
response to each pooled set, i.e. induce more skepticism.
The intuition above echoes Example 1 in which the more dominant type t2 pools with the
less dominant type t1 because it has lower value. This case is simple because the receiver’s best
response is decreasing in the disclosure order (which is complete) on each pooled set. If this were
true in general then Theorem 1 would follow from: (i) the result in Milgrom (1981) that MLR
dominance induces FOSD on subsets, and (ii) that the expected value of a decreasing function is
lower under an FOSD shift. However, Figure 1 exemplifies a pooled set over which the receiver’s
best response is non-monotonic: the NE, I , and T types pool together in equilibrium, but T d
I d NE, while v(NE) > v(T ) > v(I). In addition, pooled sets are not always completely ordered
by d.
The analysis deals with these issues in two steps. First, Section 4 characterizes pooled sets in
terms of the disclosure order and the receiver’s best response. Second, Section 5 shows that this
condition is equivalent to the expected value decreasing under a more evidence shift. Before mov-
ing onto these two steps, I briefly illustrate Theorem 1, and discuss its extensions and limitations.
I next show how Theorem 1 can reconcile different comparative statics results in the Dye ev-
idence model from Subsection 2.3. For two distributions in f, g ∈ ∆(t1, ..., tn−1, t∅) in the Dye








Jung & Kwon (1988) consider increasing p, the probability of evidence types while holding con-
stant, h, the distribution over evidence types. They find that the non-disclosure action decreases.
In this case, the inequality in (4) reduces to 1−p21−p1 ≤
p2
p1
, which holds for p2 > p1. For any probability
of evidence p, let hp ∈ ∆T denote the receiver’s prior belief over the sender’s type.
Corollary 1. In the Dye Model, if p2 > p1, then hp2 ≥ME hp1 , and hp2 ≥MS hp1 .
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Guttman et al. (2014) consider a different change in the prior distribution but also find that
the non-disclosure action decreases. Their change involves augmenting the Dye model with ad-
ditional evidence types. For any two nested subsets of evidence types S ⊂ S′ ⊂ {t1, ..., tn−1}, they
find that the non-disclosure action is lower when the distribution is conditioned on the larger set




H(S∪{t∅}) if t ∈ S ∪ {t∅}
0 otherwise
.
To see that hS′ ≥ME hS note that (4) is an equality for ti ∈ S, and the RHS is ”infinite” for
ti ∈ S′ \ S.16
Corollary 2. In the Dye Model, if S ⊂ S′, then hS′ ≥ME hS , and hS′ ≥MS hS .
3.3.1. Skepticism with Restricted Receiver Preferences
A more skeptical distribution induces lower equilibrium actions for all types, regardless of the
receiver’s preferences. The latter condition may be overly demanding in scenarios in which it is
known that the receiver will value certain types higher than others. For example, an entrepreneur
with positive customer reviews will have a higher value according to any investor than one with
negative customer reviews. This section generalizes Theorem 1 to characterize a version of more
skepticism in which the inequality in (1) need only hold for certain receiver utilities.
Consider an arbitrary partial order v on T . Define the restricted set of receiver utilities,
Υv ≡ {UR ∈ Υ : t v t′, t 6= t′ =⇒ v(t) ≥ v(t′)}.
Definition 3. A prior distribution f is more skeptical than g for receivers who agree on v if,
pif (t|UR) ≤ pig(t|UR), ∀t ∈ T, ∀UR ∈ Υv .
f is more skeptical than g for receivers who agree on v if it induces all receivers who share
16 More formally, one would use the definition of more evidence in Equation 3.
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rankings according to v to take a lower equilibrium action for all types. Thus, Definition 1 corre-
sponds to the above definition with an empty v.
Define the limited disclosure order, d,v, over T as the transitive closure of the relation given by
t d t′ and t 6v t′.17 The interpretation is that t d,v t′, if t not only has the ability to mimic t′, but
also the incentive, for some receiver preferences in Υv .
Theorem 2. f is more skeptical than g for receivers who agree on v if and only if f ≥ME g with respect
to d,v.
The interpretation of the result is as follows. In order to ensure that equilibrium actions de-
crease for every type, the likelihood ratio inequality must only hold for the mimicking relation-
ships ”that will be used” in equilibrium. The broad intuition is that if t d t′ and v(t) ≥ v(t′)
there exist receiver optimal equilibrium strategies in which t does not mimic t′. Thus, shifting
probability between t and t′ does not affect the receiver’s best response.
Theorem 2 is useful in comparing different information structures when the evidence is a signal
about an unknown payoff relevant state. Let the state space be X with prior distribution h ∈ ∆X .
The receiver has utility given by UR : A × X → R. The sender obtains evidence in T ′ drawn
according to the information structure, pr(t|x) ≡ qx(t), which can be disclosed according to ′d.
This information structure framework fits into the basic model by defining




R(a, x)qx(t). However, this means that a change in the prior distri-
bution over T ′ does not necessarily correspond to a change in the sender’s information structure
and vice-versa. A change in the prior distribution over T assumes that the value of each type or
signal stays constant which excludes certain changes in the information structure. Conversely, a
change in the prior distribution over T can change the ”expected value” of the sender’s evidence
which cannot occur under a change in the information structure.
By incorporating the state space into the type space and applying Theorem 2, one can character-
ize the changes in the information structure that induce more skepticism. LabelX = (x1, ..., xm) so
that the receiver prefers higher actions in higher states, i.e. v(x1) < ... < v(xm). Let the new type
space be T×X . A prior distribution, f ∈ ∆(T×X) is an information structure if the total probabil-
17 the transitive closure of a binary relation, is the coarsest transitive refinement.
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ity of each state accords with the prior, i.e.
∑
t f((t, x)) = h(x), ∀x ∈ X . Since the sender cannot
credibly reveal the state, messaging is given by the preorder, d, defined by (t, x) d (t′, x′) if
t ′d t′. However, the receiver’s best response to states will not change with the information struc-
ture, so define v as (t, xi) v (t′, xj) if i ≥ j. Thus if f and g are two information structures, f
induces lower equilibrium actions than g if and only if f ≥ME g with respect to d,v.
This is illustrated in the the Dye evidence model with a ”good” and ”bad” state, i.e. X =
{G,B}, in Figure 5. The receiver’s value is higher for the good state than the bad state and does
not depend on the evidence, so (t, G) v (t′, B), ∀t, t′ ∈ T . Equivalently, one can eliminate the







Figure 5: d,v with a Good and Bad state
4. Equilibrium Characterization
The equivalence between more skepticism and more evidence relies on the structure of the
receiver optimal equilibrium. This section characterizes this structure and provides two ways to
find the corresponding equilibrium actions.
The following notation for upper and lower contour sets will be useful. For S ⊂ T , let W (S) ≡
{s ∈ T : ∃t ∈ S, t d s} be the lower contour set of S according to d. These are the types that are
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worse than some type in S by d, or equivalently, the set of types that can be mimicked by some
type in S. Similarly, for any subset S ⊂ T , letB(S) ≡ {s ∈ T : ∃t ∈ S, s d t} be the upper contour
set of S according to d. This is the set of types that are better than some type in S by d, or
equivalently, the set of types that can mimic some type in S. This notation omits the dependence
on the disclosure order. When dealing with other ordered sets– (X,≥), I refer to the lower and
upper contour sets as W≥ and B≥ respectively.
4.1. Equilibria as Partitions
Because the sender’s payoff is strictly increasing in the action, in equilibrium no type can mix
over declarations that induce different actions. Thus, any equilibrium is associated with a partition
of the type space, P = {P1, ..., Pm},18 into pooled sets that obtain the same action, where each type
only mimics other types in his associated pooled set. I call this the equilibrium partition.
Every equilibrium has an associated partition, but when does an arbitrary partition P represent
the payoff equivalence classes of an equilibrium? Receiver incentive compatibility imposes that
the action for each part Pi must be Vh(Pi). That is, the receiver best responds to the prior belief
conditioned on t ∈ Pi. I conventionalize that higher indices correspond to parts with higher
actions, i.e. Vh(Pi) is increasing in i. Thus, sender incentive compatibility implies that no type
t ∈ Pj should be able to declare any type s ∈ Pk when j < k. Otherwise, t would deviate to the
strategy of s and obtain a strictly higher action. I call a partition that satisfies this property an
interval partition which is formalized below in the context of arbitrary partial orders.
Definition 4. Let (X,≥) be a partially ordered set. An interval partition of (X,≥) isP = (P1, ..., Pm)
such that W≥(Pk) ∩ Pj = ∅, ∀j > k.19
Since higher indices correspond to higher actions, P being an interval partition means that the
disclosure order is ”consistent” with the order on the receiver’s best responses. The interval par-
tition condition roughly characterizes when a partition represents the payoff equivalence classes
of an equilibrium.20
18 I omit the dependence of P on the prior h and receiver utility UR.
19 The term ”interval partition” is used because for any interval partition P = (P1, ..., Pm) of the reals (R,≥), each
part is an interval, i.e. Pi = [a, b], ∀i, for some (extended) real numbers a ≤ b.
20 One other technical condition is required: for each Pi, there exists a feasible sender strategy σ : Pi → ∆Pi, such
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In the receiver optimal equilibrium, pooled sets have the additional property that they cannot
be further ”separated”. Intuitively, this means that within a pooled set, types that are dominant
in the disclosure order must have lower value than types that are less dominant. Otherwise, the
receiver would prefer an equilibrium that separated these more dominant types by giving them
a higher action. The next definition formalizes this property which turns out to be necessary and
sufficient for the pooled sets of the receiver optimal equilibrium.
Definition 5. The set function H : 2X → R is downward biased on an ordered subset (X,≥) if
H(W≥(X˜) ∩X) ≥ H(X), ∀X˜ ⊂ X. (5)
Proposition 1. Let P be a partition of T , where Vh(Pi) is increasing in i. P is the receiver optimal
equilibrium partition ⇐⇒
Vh is downward biased on (Pi,d), ∀i, (6)
(P1, ..., Pm) is an interval partition of (T,d). (7)
The receiver’s best response is downward biased on S if all lower contour subsets, subsets that
cannot mimic their complement in S, have higher value than the set as a whole. Note that due to
Lemma 1, an equivalent version of the receiver’s best response being downward biased is
Vh(B(S˜) ∩ S) ≤ Vh(S), ∀S˜ ⊂ S. (8)
That is, all upper contour subsets of S, subsets of S that cannot be mimicked by their complement,
have lower value than the set as a whole. As a shorthand I also refer to sets over which Vh is
downward biased as downward biased sets. The next two examples illustrate the downward
biased condition by showing its implications for empty and complete disclosure orders.
Example 2. Consider that the disclosure order is the empty order as in Subsection 2.3. In this case,
any subset of S is a lower contour subset. Because W ({s}) = {s}, ∀s ∈ S, Vh is downward biased
that the best response of the receiver is to choose the same action for all on path declarations in Pi. This property is
characterized in terms of the primitives of the model in Appendix J.
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on (S,d) implies that v(s) ≤ Vh(S), ∀s ∈ S. By Lemma 1, this implies that v(s) = Vh(S), ∀s ∈ S.
That is, when no type can mimic another, all types pool together only if the receiver’s best response
is constant across types. 4
Example 3. Let (S,d) be completely ordered as in Subsection 2.3. If Vh is downward biased on
(S,d), then ∀i = 1, ...,m, Vh({s1, ..., si}) ≥ Vh(S). A specific example is illustrated in Figure 6. In
this case the receiver’s utility is quadratic loss, S ≡ (s1, ..., s8), and h is the uniform distribution.
The left panel shows the receiver’s best response to each type and the right panel shows the re-
ceiver’s best response to lower contour subsets. This demonstrates that on a completely ordered
set, Vh being downward biased on (S,d) is weaker than v being decreasing on (S,d). 4
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(a) Best response to types in S
Vh(S)
⪰d






Vh ({s1, ..., si})
(b) Best response to lower contour sets
Figure 6: Vh is downward biased on (S,d)
Remark 3. These examples illustrate that refining the disclosure order makes the condition that Vh
26
ALGORITHM 1: Partition into Pooled Sets
Input: (T,d)
Output: Equilibrium partition
i = 1; S1 = T ;
while Si 6= ∅ do
P i = arg minS˜i⊂Si Vh(W (S˜i) ∩ Si);
Pi = ∪S∈P iS;
i = i+ 1;
Si = Si−1 \ Pi−1;
end
is downward biased on (S,d) less restrictive. Consider two disclosure orders, d and ′d on S,
such that ′d is a refinement of d.21 Any lower contour subset of (S,′d) is also a lower contour
subset of (S,d). Therefore Vh is downward biased on (S,d) implies Vh is also downward biased
on (S,′d).
4.2. Solving for Equilibrium
This section uses Proposition 1 to develop two methods to find receiver optimal equilibria.
Lemma 2. For any subset S ⊂ T , let J ⊂ arg minS˜⊂S Vh(W (S˜) ∩ S). ∪Sˆ∈JW (Sˆ) ∩ S is a downward
biased set.
Lemma 2 says that Vh is downward biased on the minimal valued lower contour subset. Sym-
metrically, Vh is downward biased on the maximal valued upper contour subset.
The ability to find downward biased sets is useful in finding the equilibrium partition. Con-
sider applying the above result as follows. Begin with the entire type set T and use Lemma 2 to
find a downward biased P1. Next remove P1 and apply Lemma 2 to T \ P1 to find another down-
ward biased set P2. Repeat this process, until the type space is exhausted. This algorithm, which
I call partition into pooled sets, generates the receiver optimal equilibrium partition.
21′d is a refinement of d if ∀t, t′ ∈ S, t d t′ =⇒ t ′d t′.
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Proposition 2. The output of ”Partition into Pooled Sets” (P1, ..., Pm) is the receiver optimal equilibrium
partition with t ∈ Pi =⇒ pih(t|UR) = Vh(Pi).
The algorithm constructs the equilibrium partition from the ”bottom-up”, i.e. starting with the
lowest payoff part. If the minimization were replaced with a maximization, the algorithm would
construct the same equilibrium partition from the ”top-down”, i.e. starting from the highest payoff
part. This means that the payoff of very dominant types will correspond to that for a maximal
valued upper contour subset, and the payoff for non-dominant types will correspond to that for
a minimal valued lower contour subset. The next result extends this description showing that the
payoff for any type can be expressed as a ”minmax” expression.
Theorem 3. Let pih : T → R be the equilibrium payoff vector.
pih(t|UR) = min{Sa:t∈Sa} max{Sb:t∈Sb}Vh(W (Sa) ∩B(Sb)). (9)
The expression in (9) corresponds to the equilibrium utility (and thereby obtained action) of
the sender of type t.22 To elucidate the result, consider that (T,d) is completely ordered as in
Subsection 2.3, and fix any type ti. For any feasible Sa, W (Sa) = {t1, ..., ti, ..., ta} for some a ≥ i.
Similarly, for any feasible Sb, B(Sb) = {tb, ..., ti, ..., tn} for some b ≤ k. Thus B(Sb) ∩ W (Sa) =
{tb, ..., ti, ..., ta}. In this case, the above problem reduces to choosing sets of types {ti, ..., ta} and






Vh({tb, ..., ta}). (10)
The problem in (10) suggests that each pooled set forms through the following process. Given a
set of types that pool with ti from above, ti will choose to pool with a set of lower types in order
to maximize his value. Similarly, types that pool from above will only do so if it increases their
value. This second process serves to minimize the expression in (10).
The next section uses these characterization results to show that the equilibrium actions de-
22 For solutions Sa and Sb to (9), W (Sa) ∩B(Sb) is the part of the equilibrium partition that contains t
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crease under a more evidence shift, i.e. that more evidence implies more skepticism.
5. Why More Evidence implies More Skepticism
Consider two distributions f, g ∈ ∆T , such that f ≥ME g, and where f is only a ”small pertur-
bation” from g.23 Generically, the equilibrium partition will be the same under f and g. To prove
Theorem 1 in this case, it suffices to prove that the value of each pooled subset decreases when the
sender has more evidence. In light of Proposition 1, I prove the following.
Proposition 3. Fix f ∈ ∆T . Vf (S) ≤ Vg(S), ∀g ∈ ∆T : f ≥ME g ⇐⇒ Vf is downward biased on
(S,d).
The result says that the condition that characterizes pooled sets in the receiver optimal equilib-
rium also characterizes monotone comparative statics (MCS) under any more evidence shift. The
fact that MCS under any more evidence shift implies that the set is downward biased is relatively
straightforward. If Vh is not downward biased on (S,d), there is a lower contour subset with
lower value than S. Moving probability from this subset to its complement is a more evidence
shift and increases the value of S.
As mentioned, the reverse direction in Proposition 3 is complicated by the fact that the down-
ward biased condition is weaker than the receiver’s best response being decreasing in the disclo-
sure order. This section introduces an algorithm that deals with this issue by iteratively pooling
larger and larger subsets based on incentives to mimic.
5.1. Iteratively Pooling Subsets
For any two distributions f, g ∈ ∆S, define the induced f − g likelihood ratio order, ≥f/g, as







(S,≥f/g) is a completely ordered set of types, in which more dominant types are relatively more
likely under f than under g. Notice that the definition of more evidence can be restated as the f−g
23 For example, consider f˜ ≥ME g and let f(t) ≡ αf˜(t) + (1− α)g(t) ; ∀t, for some small α ∈ (0, 1].
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ALGORITHM 2: Monotonic Coarsening
Input: Distributions f, g ∈ ∆S.
Output: An interval partition of (S,≥f/g).
i = 1; m(1) = m; P 1 = ({t1}, ..., {tm});
while i = 1 or P i 6= P i−1 do
I0 = 0;
k = 0;
while Ik < m(i) do
k = k + 1;
Ik = max{j > Ik−1 : Vf (P iIk−1+1) ≥ ... ≥ Vf (P ij )}
end
i = i+ 1;
P i = (∪I0<j≤I1P i−1j , ...,∪Ik−1<j≤IkP i−1j );
m(i) = k;
end
likelihood ratio order is a refinement of the disclosure order. This means that if Vf is downward
biased on (S,d), then by Remark 3, Vf is also downward biased on (S,≥f/g).
To ease exposition, I focus on the quadratic loss case in which Vf is a conditional expectation
and leave the case of general receiver utilities to the appendix. The following algorithm is used to
establish that if Vf is downward biased on (S,≥f/g), then Vf (S) ≤ Vg(S).
Description of Algorithm 2 The algorithm begins with the complete interval partition of
(S,≥f/g), P 1 = ({t1}, {t2}, ..., {tm}). Beginning with t1, the algorithm repeatedly forms the largest
sequence of elements such that v(tj) is decreasing in j. That is, the first sequence is {t1, t2, ..., tI1}
such that v(t1) ≥ ... ≥ v(tI1) and v(tI1) < v(tI1+1), the second sequence is {tI1+1, ..., tI2} such that
v(tI1+1) ≥ ... ≥ v(tI2) and v(tI2) < v(tI2+1), and so on until all types in S are exhausted. Next, a
coarser interval partition P 2 is formed by pooling all the elements of each decreasing sequence into
an associated single part. That is, P 21 ≡ {t1, ..., tI1}, P 22 = {tI1+1, ..., tI2}, and so on. This process
is repeated: at each stage, P i is coarsened into P i+1 where each part of P i+1 pools a consecutive
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sequence of P ij over which Vf (P
i
j ) is decreasing in j. The algorithm concludes when P
T = P T+1.
The interpretation of this algorithm is that each stage pools two subsets P1 and P2 only if they
would mimic each other for any distribution that preserves their value. That is, only if P2 is
”adjacently more dominant” in the disclosure order and has lower value than P1.
Implications for Downward Biased Sets There are two key features of this algorithm. First, if
Vf is downward biased on (S,≥f/g), then the algorithm concludes with the trivial partition, i.e.
P T = (S). To see this, note that P T = P T+1 only if Vf (P Ti ) is strictly increasing in i. If P
T were
non-trivial, then by iterated expectations, Vf (P T1 ) < Vf (S). But this contradicts the downward
biased condition as P T1 is a lower contour subset. The second key feature uses the following well
known result.
Remark 4. Let v : S → R, and f, g ∈ ∆S. If v is decreasing on (S,≥f/g), then Vf (S) ≤ Vg(S).
Each P ij is composed of a sequence of parts from P
i−1 over which Vf is decreasing. Thus, one











F (P ij )
∑





l ) = Vf (P
i
j ), ∀P ij . (11)
Since the process ends with the trivial partition, using a sequence of these inequalities gives
Vf (S) ≤ Vg(S). While the details are left to the appendix, I illustrate the algorithm in the fol-
lowing example.
Example 4. Recall the example in Figure 6 in which Vf is downward biased on (S,d). Specifi-
cally, the disclosure order is complete on S = (s1, ..., s8), f is the uniform distribution on S, and
(v(s1), ..., v(s8)) = (6, 4, 5, 3, 4, 2, 3, 1). Let g ∈ ∆S such that f ≥ME g. Since the disclosure order
is complete, ≥f/g=d. The goal is to show that Vf (S) ≤ Vg(S) establishing MCS under any more
evidence shift in this case. However as v is not decreasing, one cannot directly apply Remark 4. In-
stead Algorithm 2 pools types iteratively such that at each stage the value of the currently pooled
subset is lower under the more evidence distribution.
Since v(s1) > v(s2), s2 will pool with s1 regardless of the distribution. Thus, the algorithm
pools {s1, s2} into a ”single type” with value given by Vf ({s1, s2}). Similar logic also pools {s3, s4},
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{s5, s6}, and {s7, s8}. The result is the partition P2 illustrated in the left panel of Figure 7. Notice
that since v(s) is decreasing on each P 2i , Remark 4 implies that Vf (P
2
i ) ≤ Vg(P 2i ), ∀i = 1, ..., 4.
Next, note that since Vf (Pi) is decreasing in i, these sets will all pool together in equilibrium.
Thus, the algorithm pools {P 21 , ...P 24 } into a single pooled set with value Vf (S). The result is a
coarser (trivial) partition P 3 illustrated in the right panel of Figure 7. As before, since Vf (P 2i ) is









































Figure 7: Applying Algorithm 2
4
5.2. Changes in the Equilibrium Partition
The preceding analysis is only sufficient for Theorem 1 in the case when the equilibrium par-
tition is constant across distributions f and g. This section provides some intuition for how this
result extends to cases in which the equilibrium partition changes when the sender has more evi-
dence.
Consider that f ≥ME g. For simplicity let P g = (P g1 , P g2 ) have two elements, while P f =
(P f1 ), has only one. Define the combination distribution, hα ≡ αf + (1 − α)g with corresponding
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equilibrium partition Pα ≡ (Pα1 , ..., Pαmα). First, since the equilibrium action is increasing in the
disclosure order, Vg(P
g
1 ) < Vg(P
g
2 ), and second, since the receiver’s best response is downward
biased on each part, Vf (P
g
1 ) ≥ Vf (P g2 ). Thus, because the receiver’s best response to these subsets
is continuous in α, there must exist some α∗ after which the equilibrium partition changes from
P g to P f and Vhα∗ (P
g
1 ) = Vhα∗ (P
g
2 ). For simplicity, suppose that this is the only change in the












Vhα* Pg1 = Vhα* Pg2
Increaseα
Increaseα
Figure 8: More Evidence Changes the Equilibrium Partition
Notice that f ≥ME hα∗ ≥ME g, ∀α ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, Proposition 3 completes the argument in
this case. The idea is that each equilibrium part, P g1 , P
g
2 decreases in value as α increases until
equalizing at α = α∗. For α > α∗, all types pool together and so again by Proposition 3, the value
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Figure 9: Equilibrium Actions under Changes in the Equilibrium Partition
6. Application 1: Extensions of the Sender’s Preferences
This section uses the characterization results from Section 4 to extend the model beyond one
with sender’s who always prefer higher actions. I solve for equilibrium in games with unbiased
senders, and senders who have unknown bias. Then I use Theorem 1 to obtain new comparative
statics predictions.
6.1. Unbiased vs. Honest Senders
In many communication environments the sender does not always attempt to induce the high-
est action from the receiver. For example, criminal investigations are sometimes carried out by
”good cops” whose goal is to find out the truth rather than to always convict the suspect. Does
this goodness originate from a compulsion to be honest or from preferences that are aligned with
the court, and do these two explanations lead to different outcomes? More specifically, does a
game with some probability of honest senders have different equilibria than one with the same
probability of unbiased senders? Kim & Pogach (2014) show that the answer to this question is
yes in a cheap talk setting: depending on the specification the receiver can prefer either honest or
unbiased senders. I show that in the disclosure setting, unbiased and honest senders lead to the
same receiver optimal equilibrium outcomes.
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Consider two games, H˜ , and U˜B, defined as follows. In both games there is probability p
that the sender prefers higher actions (S type). These senders have evidence from T ′ distributed
according to f ∈ ∆T ′, and can disclose according tod. In both H˜ and U˜B, there is probability 1−p
of ”non-strategic types” (NS type), who has evidence from T ′ distributed according to g ∈ ∆T ′.
In H˜ , the non-strategic sender is honest (H type) in that he can only declare truthfully. In U˜B,
the non-strategic sender can disclose according to d, but is unbiased (UB type) in that he has the
same utility as the receiver. In both games, the receiver’s utility is dependent only on the evidence:
UR : T ′ ×A→ R.
H˜ fits the basic framework (it is an example from Subsection 2.3), while U˜B does not. The total
type space for U˜B is T ′ × {S,UB} with messaging given by the disclosure order UBd defined as
follows:
(t, UB) ∼UBd (t, S), ∀t ∈ T ′,
(t, S) UBd (t, S) if t d t′.
The definition of UBd captures that both UB and S types have the same disclosure opportunities,
and can make cheap talk declarations about their preference type.
6.1.1. Characterization
Since H˜ is in the form of the basic model,24 its receiver optimal equilibrium is given by Theo-
rem 3. The following definition further refines this characterization in honest type games.
For any R ⊂ T ′, define











This is the receiver’s best response to the biased senders in R and the honest or unbiased senders
in some subset R′ ⊂ R. R′ is the set of types in R who have higher value than V˜ (R), i.e. R′ ≡ {s ∈
R : v(s) ≥ V˜ (R)}. Mechanically, V˜ (R) ≥ Vf (R), ∀R ⊂ T ′.
24 It is without loss to assume that honest senders prefer higher actions. In general their preferences are irrelevant to
the equilibrium because they only have one message available.
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Proposition 4. Let the receiver optimal equilibrium allocation (actions to types) in H˜ and U˜B be given
by piH , piUB respectively. The receiver optimal equilibrium allocations are the same, i.e. piH(t, S) =
piUB(t, S) ≡ pi∗(t, S), ∀t ∈ T ′ and piH(t,H) = piUB(t, UB) ≡ pi∗(t,NS), ∀t ∈ T ′. Moreover,




V˜ (W (Sa) ∩B(Sb)), ∀t ∈ T ′,
pi∗((t,NS)) = min{pi∗((t, S)), v(t)}, ∀t ∈ T ′. (12)
The equilibrium actions for strategic types in a game with honest senders (or unbiased senders)
are the same as one without honest senders but where the receiver has ”more favorable” prefer-
ences to the sender: his best response to all subsets shift up from Vf to V˜ . On the other hand the
receiver obtains his bliss point for any honest sender with value less than the equilibrium action
of his strategic counterpart.
The reason why pi∗ is the receiver optimal equilibrium allocation of U˜B is as follows. First, re-
ceiver and strategic sender incentive compatibility are directly transferred from that in H˜ . Second,
unbiased sender’s who obtain v(t) are at their bliss point. And third, unbiased senders who obtain
pi∗((t,NS)) < v(t) must only be able to deviate to lower actions which are further from their bliss
point. Otherwise their strategic counterparts would deviate in H˜ . The reason why pi∗ is receiver
optimal in U˜B is that the receiver can always separate unbiased senders who have value less than
their equilibrium action by making these sender’s truthfully reveal.
6.1.2. Comparative Statics
Since H˜ and U˜B can be seen as standard disclosure games, Theorem 1 applies. In either game,
an increase in p, the probability of strategic types, can be seen as a more evidence shift. This
is apparent in Figure 4, as increasing p corresponds to shifting probability ”up the disclosure
order” from the red honest types to the blue strategic types. By Theorem 1 this change induces
more skepticism. Dziuda (2011) establishes this conclusion for honest types in a specific disclosure
framework, however the next corollary shows that the result is general to any disclosure structure.
For any p, denote the prior over T as hp.
Corollary 3. Let p ≥ p′, then hp ≥ME hp′ and hp ≥MS hp′ in both U˜B and H˜ .
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6.2. Senders with Unknown Bias
There are other reasons why the sender may not always prefer higher actions. The sender may
be biased but in an unknown direction. For example, a police officer may want to exonerate a
suspect with whom he has a relationship. When will the sender credibly convey the direction of
his bias to the receiver? What beliefs about his preferences does the sender want to induce in the
receiver?
The sender prefers higher actions (is type H ; note that H types no longer refers to honest
senders), US(a) = a, with probability p, and prefers lower actions (is type L), US(a) = −a, with
probability 1 − p. In addition to private information about his preferences, the sender obtains
disclosable evidence from (T ′,′d). The total type space is given by T ′ × {H,L}. The distribution
over evidence can depend on the preference of the sender: let fH , fL ∈ ∆T ′ be the marginal
distributions forH and L preferences respectively. Denote the unconditional distribution, g ∈ ∆T .
The receiver’s preferences can also depend on the senders preferences as well as the evidence, i.e.
UR : T ×A→ R.
In addition to disclosing evidence, the sender can make a cheap talk declaration of his pref-
erence type. The set of available messages to each type t is {s : t ′d s} × {H,L}. Call this
communication game C˜, and let piC˜ : T → R be the corresponding receiver optimal equilibrium
allocation of actions to types. Note that C˜ does not fit into the basic framework.
Unlike in the original model, the inclusion of cheap talk messages can alter the set of equilibria.
When it is known that the sender prefers high actions, two on path cheap talk messages cannot
induce different actions, otherwise all sender types would deviate to the one that induces the
higher action. With both H and L senders, two on-path cheap talk messages can lead to different
actions: H senders induce the high action and L senders induce the low action. For this reason, I
include the possibility of cheap talk about preferences.
6.2.1. An Equivalent Disclosure Game
Consider a related disclosure game, in which the sender has known preferences towards higher
actions. The disclosure ordered type space is (T,d), where T ≡ T ′ × {H,L} remains unchanged
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and d is defined as follows:
(t,H) d (t′, H) ⇐⇒ t ′d t′,
(t, L) d (t′, L) ⇐⇒ t′ ′d t,
(t,H) d (t′, L) ⇐⇒ ∃s : t ′d s, and t′ ′d s.
The disclosure order d (i) maintains ′d when comparing two H types, (ii) reverses ′d when
comparing two L types, And (iii) ranks an H type above an L when both types can mimic some
common evidence type s ∈ T ′. The distribution over types, g ∈ ∆T remains unchanged. Call the
associated game D˜ and let piD˜ : T → R be the receiver optimal equilibrium allocation of actions to
types. I illustrate the construction of D˜ in Figure 10. Panel (a) illustrates the evidence space T ′ and
the associated disclosure order ′d in C˜. Panel (b) illustrates the disclosure order in the associated
D˜.
Proposition 5. piD˜(t) = piC˜(t), ∀t ∈ T.
Since D˜ fits into the framework of Section 2, Theorem 1 applies to piD˜ and therefore piC˜(t). In
D˜, increasing p constitutes a more evidence change in the distribution over (T,d).
Corollary 4. Let p > p′ with gp, gp′ ∈ ∆T as the corresponding prior distributions. gp ≥ME gp′ on
(T,d) so gp ≥MS gp′ .
Note that more skepticism, a decrease in equilibrium actions, no longer corresponds to a de-
crease in utility. Indeed, the L type senders are better off facing a receiver with a more skeptical
prior. Thus L types benefit from the presence of H types and vice versa. If L and H types pool
together, the H types that are misreporting will tend to have lower value than the receiver’s best
response to the pooled set. Thus, increasing the probability of H types decreases the receiver’s
best response, which benefits the L types. The construction of D˜ also provides some insights into
the structure of the receiver optimal equilibrium in C˜.
Proposition 6. Let (T ′,′d) have a lower bound s, fH = fL, and UR(a, (t,H)) = UR(a, (t, L)), ∀t ∈
T ′. Then there exists exactly one on path receiver optimal equilibrium action at which H and L types pool.






[1 /4, 1 /2)
[1 /2, 3 /4)
[3 /4, 1]
(a) (T ′,′d) in C˜
H types prefer high actions.
Distributed according to p fH .
L types prefer low actions.
Distributed according to 1-p fL.
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([1 /2, 3 /4), L)
([0, 1 /4], L)
([0, 1 /2], L)
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([1 /2, 1], L)
([3 /4, 1], L)
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([1 /4, 1 /2), L)
([1 /2, 3 /4), L)
([3 /4, 1], H)
(b) (T,d) in D˜
Figure 10: Construction of D˜ from C˜
The result says that there is exactly one message in which the sender does not credibly reveal
his preference type. The latter two assumptions impose that the receiver’s utility and the distribu-
tion over evidence are independent of the sender’s preference type. The first assumption is that
there exists some type s in which all other evidence types can mimic. s need not have positive
probability, so the assumption only ensures its availability as a message. The presence of s can be
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justified by noting that the sender can always choose to present nothing. Note that unlike in the
original model, the presence of zero probability types does affect the receiver optimal equilibrium,
as it can change the disclosure order d in D˜.25
The reason why there is at most one equilibrium action in which H and L types pool is that by
incentive compatibility all L types must obtain lower actions than s, and all H types must obtain
higher actions than s. Alternatively, it is immediate from Figure 10 that at most one interval can
intersect both the H and L ”sides” of the directed graph, and that this interval must contain s.
To see why there is exactly one equilibrium action in which H and L types pool, suppose that the
(s,H) type obtains a different equilibrium action from (s, L). Incentive compatibility implies that,
piC˜((t,H) ≥ piC˜((s,H) > piC˜((s, L) ≥ piC˜((t, L), ∀t ∈ T ′.
But this implies that the receiver’s action for all L types is lower than that for all H types. Since by
assumption, the distribution of payoff relevant types T ′ is the same across H and L senders, this
violates Lemma 1. This means that there is always positive probability that the sender does not
reveal his preference type.
7. Application 2: Dynamic Disclosure
7.1. Dynamic Arrival and Inspection
The static arrival of evidence can be unrealistic. Consider an entrepreneur strategically disclos-
ing the consumer reviews of his product to an investor. It is likely that the customer reviews arrive
gradually. Thus, the investor could also request to see the reviews at some intermediate stage be-
fore the actual investment decision. The question is whether the investor could benefit from these
additional early inspections, as compared to the situation in which he only communicates with
the entrepreneur after all reviews have come in.
This comes down to whether the sender can disclose evidence acquired early in order to induce
a more favorable impression from the receiver in a later period. But intuitively, a sender who
25 This point relates to Seidmann & Winter (1997) who study a vagueness model in which the sender’s direction of
bias is also unknown. Even though the sender is ”informed” with probability 1,The ability to be vague, i.e. mimic zero
probability types destroys the truthful revelation equilibrium.
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obtains more evidence early on is more likely to have more evidence tomorrow: the entrepreneur
that has one customer review today is more likely to have two customer reviews by tomorrow than
an entrepreneur that has zero customer reviews today. Combined with Theorem 1, this suggests
that disclosing evidence early is not beneficial for the sender since it will induce more skepticism
in the receiver. I introduce a model in which the sender obtains and can disclose information over
multiple periods and identify the conditions on the evidence structure so that there is no benefit
to early inspections.
7.1.1. Model
The evidence space and messaging are still given by (T,d). There are two periods over which
the sender can obtain evidence. The period 1 probability distribution of evidence is given by
g1 ∈ ∆T which is assumed to have full support. The probability of obtaining t2 in period 2 given





if t2 ∈ B(t1)
0 otherwise
,
for some g2 ∈ ∆T . This implies that possessing more evidence in period 1 makes one more likely
to have more evidence in period 2. Indeed, if ft ∈ ∆T represents the probability distribution
over period 2 evidence after acquiring t in period 1, t′ d t′′ =⇒ ft′ ≥ME ft′′ . Note that for
t1 d t2, there is a zero probability of obtaining t2 in period 2 having possessed t1 in period 1,
i.e. the sender does not lose evidence over time. In addition, the distribution of period 2 evidence
depends on period 1 evidence only through its upper contour subset. That is, if two types, s, s′,
both have positive probability in period 2 after two different period 1 realizations, then the relative
probability of s to s′ will be the same after both period 1 realizations. At the end of the section I
discuss the implications of relaxing the assumptions on the evolution of evidence.
In each period the sender can declare any type s such that his current evidence t satisfies t d
s. This means that in period 2, the sender cannot credibly convey his period 1 evidence. The
receiver, having observed the declarations in periods 1 and 2 takes an action a ∈ A. The receiver’s
utility, UR(t2, a), depends on the action and the sender’s final type. Thus, period 1 disclosures are
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only potentially useful as signals for future evidence. The sender still prefers higher actions, i.e.
US(a) = a.
I maintain that the equilibrium in period 2 is receiver optimal given the receiver’s beliefs. This
can be justified in a setting where the receiver has commitment power within each period but not
inter-temporally as in Skreta (2006). Because the receiver only takes an action in the last period,
this means that the receiver can commit at time 2 to an action plan, a : T → A, but not before. This
justification uses the fact that the receiver optimal equilibrium is also the commitment solution.
For a given equilibrium of this dynamic disclosure game, denote p˜i : T → ∆A as the distribu-
tion of actions given to the sender with period 2 type t.26 The potential randomness in p˜i arises
due to different period 1 disclosures leading to the same period 2 disclosure, rather than due to
action randomization by the receiver.
I say that the receiver ”benefits from early inspections” if his expected utility in some equilib-
rium of the dynamic disclosure game is higher than that if the receiver were to only communicate


















7.1.2. The Unique Evidence Path Property
I next introduce the pivotal feature of a disclosure order that will determine whether the re-
ceiver can benefit from early insepctions. Define t ⊥d t′ if t and t′ are not comparable under d.
Definition 6. A disclosure ordered type space (T,d) has the unique evidence path property
(UEPP) if ∀s′, s′′ ∈ T, s′ ⊥d s′′ =⇒ B(s′) ∩B(s′′) = ∅.
The UEPP says there is a unique ”path” in the disclosure order to each type. This can be
26 As this is the only payoff relevant information for both parties, I exclude any description of how p˜i : T → ∆A
depends on period 1 disclosures.
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summarized by two properties: (i) the sender type can always report nothing or ”no evidence”
and (ii) the directed graph representation of d has no cycles. Many classic examples fit this
property such as the Dye model of Subsection 2.3. A more interesting example from the dynamic
disclosure perspective is the following extended version of the vagueness model.
Example 5. Consider a sequence of partitions of some setX ,R1 = (R11, ..., R
1
m1), ..., Rn = (R
n
1 , ..., R
n
mn)
with Ri finer than Ri−1 for every i. The type space, T ≡ ∪i,jRji , is the set of all parts of the par-
titions. The disclosure order is given by R′ d R′′ ⇐⇒ R′ ⊂ R′′, with the interpretation that
obtaining evidence Rji is learning that the ”state” is in R
j
i , and one can be vague about his knowl-
edge. R′ ⊥d R′′ =⇒ R′∩R′′ = ∅ since the different partitions are ordered. This means that R˜ ⊂ R′
=⇒ R˜ ∩ R′′ = ∅ which confirms that the UEPP holds. In fact, every disclosure order in which
the UEPP holds can be interpreted as above. Figure 11 displays an example of such a disclosure
order with three increasingly fine partitions of [0, 1]: R1 = ([0, 1]), R2 = ([0, 1/2), [1/2, 1]), and






[1 /4, 1 /2)
[1 /2, 3 /4)
[3 /4, 1]
Figure 11: Extended Vagueness Model Satisfies the UEPP
Notice that under the UEPP, any two period 1 types that cannot mimic each other lead to period
2 type realizations that also cannot mimic each other. In this sense, any potential for separation
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in period 1 is maintained in period 2. To illustrate why this is important for signaling consider
a sender who obtains a sample of unknown size from the set {0, 1} and can disclose any subset.
This does not satisfy the UEPP as 01 d 0 and 01 d 1, but 0 ⊥d 1. If the receiver waits until
period 2 to communicate with the sender, he could miss out on the opportunity to separate period
1 realizations of 0 and 1, because these two paths to the period 2 type 01 are indistinguishable in
period 2.






and the receiver does not benefit from early inspections. Moreover, if (T,d) does not satisfy the UEPP,
then there exists g1, g2, and UR such that the receiver benefits from early inspections.
The result is somewhat surprising as different period 1 evidence induces different distributions
over period 2 evidence and thereby different preferences over receiver beliefs. The idea is that
under the UEPP, for any sender strategies, two different period 1 disclosures will induce beliefs
that are ranked by the more evidence relation from the perspective of some type.
To see this, consider that T = (t1, ..., tn) is completely ordered as in Subsection 2.3, and an
equilibrium in which there are only two on path period 1 disclosures s′ and s′′ that induce receiver
beliefs, fs′ , fs′′ . Suppose that, in contradiction to Proposition 7, these beliefs admit different period
2 action profiles, pifs′ , pifs′′ .
The most dominant type, tn, according to the disclosure order, is in the highest payoff part
under both s′ and s′′. Because the sender can only gain evidence as time goes on, a sender with
type tn in period 1 is certain that he will pool with this highest payoff part in period 2. Thus, if in
period 2, s′ induces a lower payoff for tn than s′′, then tn will not disclose s′ in period 1 and neither
will any type that pools with tn under s′′. The main observation is that in this case, fs′′ ≥ME fs′ on
the pooled set containing tn. But this means that fs′′ ≥MS fs′ on this pooled set. This contradicts
the fact that s′′ induced a higher payoff for tn.
This means that pifs′ (tn) = pifs′′ (tn). But similarly, a sender with type tn−1 in period 1 can only
realize types tn−1 or tn in period 2. Thus, the sender with tn−1, chooses his period 1 declaration
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based only on the comparison between pifs′ (tn−1) and pifs′′ (tn−1). One can repeat the previous
argument to obtain that these two quantities are equal. Continually applying this argument leads
any informative dynamic signaling to ”unravel” (reminiscent of the original argument in Milgrom
(1981)), and so pifs′ = pifs′′ .
To see how the receiver can benefit from early inspections when the UEPP does not hold, con-
sider the following example.
Example 6. The type space is {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}with UR as quadratic loss, and with the value of each
type vi and d both illustrated in the left panel of Figure 12. Notice that the UEPP does not hold
as types 3 and 2 are not ordered but are both dominated by type 5. The right panel shows the
equilibrium partition over types under any distribution in period 2. More specifically, types 1, 3, 6
declare 1, types 2, 5 declare 2, and type 4 declares 4.
Consider also using this strategy in the right panel of Figure 12 in period 1. Note that 4 truth-
fully reveals under all period 1 declarations and is thereby indifferent across them. Thus, the only
incentive to check is that types 2 and 5 do not want to deviate to declare type 1 in period 1. Let
fi be the receiver’s period 2 belief in ∆T following declaration i in period 1. Types 2 and 5 do
not want to deviate if Vf1({2, 5} ≥ Vf2({2, 5}). This comes down to comparing the likelihood ratio












An example thatr satisfies this inequality is when g1 and g2 are the uniform distribution. Since
the receiver’s behavior is sequentially optimal and the period 2 equilibrium vector is different
following the two on path messages in period 1, the receiver benefits from early inspections. 4
This section identifies the UEPP as the condition on the disclosure order such that the receiver
does not benefit from early inspections. One potential weakness of this result is the assumption
on how evidence evolves over time. A more general framework would assume that the probabil-
ity of period evidence t2 given period 1 evidence t1 is given by g2(t2, t1), while maintaining the
substantive assumptions that (i) evidence is not lost over time, i.e. t1 d t2 =⇒ g2(t2, t1) = 0, and


















(b) Equilibrium pooling in Periods 1 and 2
Figure 12: Informative Dynamic Signaling Without the UEPP
order is ”large enough” (has a chain of at least 4 types), the receiver does not benefit from early




One reason that there is no use for dynamic signaling is that the evidence type in period 1 is
payoff irrelevant. Recall the entrepreneur releasing customer reviews to an investor. In addition
to signaling value to investors at the angel round, the entrepreneur may make an early disclosure
in order to obtain funding from separate investors at the seed round. The entrepreneur must
balance the incentive to get early funding with how his early disclosure will affect funding in later
rounds. Does the seed investor benefit or suffer from the entrepreneur’s dynamic incentives? Is
the amount of seed funding negatively or positively related to the amount of angel funding?
7.2.1. Model
I augment the previous dynamic model with an additional receiver who takes an action a1 ∈
A, following the first period disclosure. The period 1 and period 2 receiver’s preferences are
represented by U1, U2 : T × A → R respectively. For period 1 and period 2 action choices, a1, a2
the sender’s utility is given by δa1 + (1 − δ)a2. The timing is as follows. The sender obtains type
t1 in period 1 and makes a disclosure d1 ∈ M(t1). Receiver 1 observes d1, takes an action a1, and
obtains utility U1(a1, t1). Then the sender obtains t2 in period 2 and discloses d2 ∈M(t2). Receiver
2 observes d1 and d2, takes an action a2, and obtains utility U2(a2, t2).
The sender’s strategy is a first period reporting strategy, σ : T → ∆T ; and a second period
conditional reporting strategy, γ : T 2 → ∆T . Receiver 1’s strategy is a1 : T → A and Receiver 2’s
strategy is a2 : T 2 → A. I assume that in period 2, γ and a2 are played according to the receiver
2 optimal equilibrium. Thus the equilibrium action in period 2 for type t after a disclosure s in
period 1 is given by pihs(t|U2), where hs ∈ ∆T is the interim distribution over period 2 types given
σ and after observing s in period 1. For tractability I focus on interval equilibria.
Definition 7. An interval equilibrium is one in which {t : a1(t) = c} is is an interval for every
c ∈ R.
Lemma 3. If (T,d) satisfies the UEPP, then any interval equilibrium (a1, σ) has, t d t′ =⇒ a1(t) ≥
a1(t
′). More over if t d t′ and a1(t) > a1(t′) then ht ≥ME ht′ .
This result says that if the sender makes a disclosure in period 1, then he must be given a higher
action than if he did not disclose (or disclosed less). The idea is that the period 1 disclosure induces
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the receiver to believe that the sender has more evidence. Since this induces more skepticism in
the receiver the sender must be compensated in the form of a higher first period action.
Since first period actions are increasing in the disclosure order, increasing δ, the sender’s weight
on the first period action, further dis-incentivizes the sender from withholding. Thus any equilib-
rium action profile under δ will also be one under δ′ > δ.
Proposition 8. Let (T,d) satisfy the UEPP. Define Π(δ) to be the set of interval equilibrium period 1
action profiles, i.e. all a1 such that there exists σ with (a1, σ) constituting an equilibrium.
∀δ < δ′, Π(δ) ⊂ Π(δ′).
Let E1(δ) be the equilibrium that is optimal from the perspective of the period 1 receiver. A
straightforward corollary is that receiver 1’s expected utility from E1(δ) increases in δ. Thus, pe-
riod 2 incentives harm the period 1 receiver. The intuition is that because the sender can always
wait to disclose, he will never be induced to disclose more in period 1 by dynamic incentives.
Moreover, all else equal, the sender would prefer to wait to disclose because first period disclo-
sures induce more skepticism in receiver 2. Therefore, the sender’s dynamic incentives make him
to ”disclose less”.
8. Conclusion
This paper has two main contributions: (i) it characterizes the receiver optimal equilibrium in a
large class of verifiable disclosure games and (ii) it shows that distributions which induce greater
skepticism in the receiver are characterized by the more evidence relation. While quite general,
the disclosure model does not incorporate all related examples from the literature. A prime ex-
ample is that I do not allow for message dependent disclosure costs such as that of Verrecchia
(1983). With disclosure costs, the equilibrium action for any type is not pinned down by the set of
types with with which he pools. This impedes the equilibrium partition approach. Another open
generalization is allowing the sender to have type dependent preferences.
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A. General implications of Algorithm 2
This section establishes a general comparative statics result that concerns the output of Algo-
rithm 2. For a function r : X → R and distribution h ∈ ∆X , denote the conditional expectation
function as Erh(S) ≡ E[r(x)|x ∈ S, x ∼ h].
Proposition 9. Let X be a finite set, f ∈ ∆X , and r : X → R. For any g ∈ ∆X , there exists an interval
partition P = (P1, ..., Pm) of (X,≥f/g) with,
Erf (P1) < ... < E
r
f (Pm), (13)
and Erf (Pi) ≤ Erg(Pi) ∀i, (14)
where the partition P does not depend on g given ≥f/g.
To interpret Proposition 9, consider its implications in two extreme cases. First, if r is strictly
increasing on (X,≥f/g), then the only interval partition satisfying (14) is the complete partition
P = ({x1}, ..., {xn}). Conversely, if r is decreasing on (X,≥f/g), then the only interval partition
satisfying (13) is the trivial partition P = (X).
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Broadly, every function has decreasing and increasing portions on (X,≥f/g). On the decreasing
regions the expectation is lower under f than under g. The argument for Proposition 9 repeatedly
applies this result, collapsing decreasing sequences to their average, until the interval partition
has ”no more decreasing regions”. The consequences are (13) and (14). The former says that the
conditional expectation is strictly increasing in the part’s index. The latter says that for each part
the conditional expectation is lower under f than under g.27
A.1. Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. I prove the existence of a partition satisfying (13) and (14) by construction: the output of
Algorithm 2 satisfies (13) and (14).
Input (X,≥f/g) for some f, g ∈ ∆X , and the conditional expectation function Erf associated
with r : X → R. Because X is a finite set, and the algorithm repeatedly returns coarser and
coarser partitions, the process must terminate at some stage T . At this point P T = P T+1 which
means that Erf (P
T




m). Thus P T satisfies (13). I will show that P T also satisfies (14),
thereby proving the result.
Consider the partition P i = (P i1, ..., P
i
m) generated at stage i > Er1. Each part P ij is the union
of an ”interval” of parts from the previous partition P i−1. More specifically, for each j there exists
k(j) ≤ k(j) such that P ij = ∪k(j)l=k(j)P i−1l . Because P i−1 is an interval partition of (X,≥f/g), and
Erf (P
i−1



















Consider a given part P Tk of the final partition P
T . One can iteratively use the above inequality
for every part of the interval partition at every stage of the algorithm to obtain the following string
27 The last part of the result says that P only depends on g through ≥f/g ; i.e. if P satisfies (13) and (14) for g′ ∈ ∆X ,


































































Combining these inequalities gives Erg(P Tk ) ≥ Erf (P tk), ∀k establishing (14) and thereby Propo-
sition 9. Q.E.D.
B. Preliminaries
B.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of (1)
Proof. Let a1 ≡ mini a∗(qi) and a2 ≡ maxi a∗(qi). Note that because UR is strictly concave, a∗(q) ≥















URa (a2, t)q1(t) < 0.
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This implies that a∗(λq1 + (1 − λ)q2) < a2. The argument is symmetric for a1 < a∗(λq1 + (1 −
λ)q2). Q.E.D.
B.2. Truth leaning Equilibrium Refinement
Hart et al. (2017) show that the truth leaning refinement selects the receiver optimal equilib-
rium. For any sender strategy σ define Supp(σ) ≡ ∪tSupp(σt). An equilibrium (σ, a) is truth
leaning if,
t /∈ Supp(σ) =⇒ a(t) = v(t), and (15)
t ∈ arg max
s∈M(t)
a(s) =⇒ σt(t) = 1. (16)
I recall one result from HKP concerning truth leaning equilibria.
Lemma 4. If (σ, a) constitute a truth leaning equilibrium, then for every t ∈ T exactly one of the following
holds,
σt(t) = 1, and pih(t|UR) = a(t) ≤ v(t), or (17)
σs(t) = 0, ∀ s, and pih(t|UR) > v(t) = a(t). (18)
Proof. See Hart et al. (2017). Q.E.D.
C. Proofs from Section 4
C.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose P is an equilibrium partition but not an interval partition. This means that t d s
where t ∈ Pi, s ∈ Pj , and j > i. But then t can deviate to the strategy of s and obtain a strictly
higher action.
Now suppose that P is an interval partition, and that there exists σ, such that t ∈ Pi =⇒
Supp(σt) ⊂ Pi and s ∈ Pi ∩ Supp(σ) =⇒ arg maxa
∑
UR(a, t)σt(s)h(t) = Vh(Pi). That is, σ is
self contained in each part, and induces the receiver to take the same action for each declaration
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within each part. If such a σ exists then P is an interval partition. To complete the argument I
prove the following claim.
Claim 1. For a subset S ⊂ T . There exist truth leaning mutual best responses σ : S → ∆S and a : S → A,
such that s ∈ Supp(σ) =⇒ a(s) = Vh(S) if and only if Vh is downward biased on (S,d).
Proof. ” =⇒ ” Now say that, Vh is not downward biased on (S,d), i.e. there exists S˜ ⊂ S
such that Vh(W (S˜) ∩ S) < Vh(S). Let W˜ ≡ W (S˜) ∩ S. Take the set of declared types in W˜ to




URa (Vh(S), s)σs(t)h(s) = 0, ∀t ∈ W˜d.
























URa (Vh(S), s)σs(t)h(s) +
∑
s∈W˜
URa (Vh(S), s)h(s). (19)
The last equality follows from the fact that ∪t∈W˜ Supp(σt) ⊂ W˜d and so
∑
t∈W˜d σs(t) = 1, ∀s ∈
W˜ . By assumption Vh(W˜ ) < Vh(S) and so the second term in (19) is negative i.e.,
∑
s∈W˜
URa (Vh(S), s)h(s) < 0.
This means that the first term must be positive. Lemma 4 states that every type s that declares
some other type t must have lower value than the action a(t) which type s obtains. This means
that for s /∈ W˜ such that σs(t) > 0, v(s) < a(t) = Vh(S). Thus, every summand in the first term in
(19), URa (Vh(S), s) < 0. But this is a contradiction.
”⇐= ”
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Now say that Vh is downward biased on (S,d). Bipartition S into U ≡ {t : v(t) ≥ Vh(S)},
D ≡ U c. Now consider any feasible strategy η : D → ∆U , and define σ : S → ∆S as σt(s) =
ηt(s), ∀t ∈ D and σt(t) = 1, ∀t ∈ U . Denote Z the set of all such σ.
First, note that Z is non-empty. Z is empty only if ∃s, s.t. M(s) ∩ U = ∅, i.e. M(s) ∩ S ⊂ D. By
Lemma 1, Vh(M(s)∩S) < Vh(S), which contradicts the fact that Vh is downward biased on (S,d).
Thus the restricted set of strategies Z is nonempty. Define the receiver’s unique truth-leaning best







The objective in (20) is continuous in a and σ. The receiver can be taken to maximize over a
compact set ([mint v(t),maxt v(t)]) so the theorem of the maximum holds. Moreover the maximum
is unique, so for each t ∈ U , aσ(t) is continuous in σ. Since Z is a compact set, the problem has a
solution σ∗ by Weierstrauss theorem. Let the corresponding receiver best response be aσ∗ .
Now say f(σ∗) > 0, i.e. ∃t ∈ U : aσ∗(t) 6= Vh(S). Notice that ∪s Supp(σs) = U , so by Lemma 1,
UB ≡ {s ∈ U : aσ∗(s) ≥ Vh(S)} and UW ≡ {s ∈ U : aσ∗(s) < Vh(S)} are both nonempty. Let,
X ≡ {s : ∃t ∈ Supp(σ∗s), Vh(S) > aσ
∗
(t) > v(s)}, and
Y ≡ {s : UB ∩M(s) 6= ∅}.
X is the set of types that obtain an action with positive probability that is less than Vh(S), but
greater than its own value. Y is the set of types that have value less than Vh(S), but have the
ability to obtain an action greater than Vh(S). I will show that X ∩ Y 6= ∅.
First note that X 6= ∅. This is because UW is non-empty, meaning there exists a type t ∈ U with
a(t) < Vh(S). But by Lemma 1, the best response action must be in between the values of the types
that declare it. Since t ∈ U , v(t) ≥ Vh(S), and σ∗t (t) = 1. This in turn means there must exist an s
that declares t such that v(s) < aσ
∗
(t), or in other words X is non-empty. Let W˜ ≡W (X) ∩ S.
Now suppose that X ∩ Y = ∅. Consider the sender strategy of types in W˜ , and recompute
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receiver best responses as aσ
∗
W˜









I claim that aσ
∗
W˜
(s) < Vh(S). ∀s ∈ W˜ . To see this, first note that aσ∗(s) < Vh(S), ∀s ∈ W˜ , because
by assumption X ∩ Y = ∅, i.e. types in X cannot obtain a higher action than Vh(S). Now inspect
the types that declare some s ∈ W˜ under σ∗, but are not in W˜ . Call this set
R ≡ {t /∈ W˜ : ∃s ∈ W˜ ∩ Supp(σ∗t )}.
Consider t ∈ R. By definition t /∈ X because t /∈ W˜ and X ⊂ W˜ . Now consider s ∈ W˜ ∩ Supp(σ∗t ).
Because, s ∈ W˜ , aσ∗(s) < Vh(S). Then, because t /∈ X and s ∈ Supp(σ∗t ), v(t) ≥ aσ
∗
(s). Thus,




(s) < Vh(S) ∀s ∈ W˜ .
Also by Lemma 1, the best response action to the entire set W˜ must be in between the best












This implies that Vh(W˜ ) < Vh(S). But this is a contradiction, because Vh is downward biased on
(S,d).
Thus X ∩ Y 6= ∅. Let s ∈ X ∩ Y . This means ∃t′, t′′ ∈ S such that t′ ∈ Supp(σ∗s) with v(s) <
aσ
∗
(t) < Vh(S) and t′′ ∈ W˜ with aσ∗(t′′) ≥ Vh(S). Now construct a new strategy σ˜ ∈ Z as follows.
σ˜s˜(t˜) =

σ∗s˜(t˜) if s˜ 6= s, t˜ 6= t′, t′′
σ∗s˜(t˜)− ε if s˜ = s, t˜ = t′
σ∗s˜(t˜) + ε if s˜ = s, t˜ = t
′′
,
with ε > 0 small enough such that this is a feasible strategy. Because Vh(S) > aσ
∗
(t′) > v(s),




(t). This decreases the objective in (20). Similarly because a(t′′) ≥ Vh(S) > v(s)
and this new strategy increases the probability that s declares t′′, this change decreases the best
response aσ
∗
(t′′). This also decreases the objective in (20).28 All other best responses remain un-
changed. This change thereby decreases the objective in (20) so that f(σ˜) < f(σ∗), contradicting
the minimality of σ∗. So at the minimum, f(σ∗) = 0 =⇒ aσ∗(t) = Vh(S) ∀ t ∈ U . Q.E.D.
Q.E.D.
C.2. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let S∗ ∈ arg minS˜⊂S Vh(W (S˜) ∩ S) with value V , let W ≡W (S∗) ∩ S. I prove that,
Vh(W (S˜) ∩W ) ≥ Vh(W ), ∀S˜ ⊂W.
Suppose not, and take W ′ ≡ W (S˜) ∩W such that Vh(W ′) < Vh(W ). Note that W (W ′) ∩ S = W ′,
which contradicts the minimality of W in the above problem. Thus each minimizer of the above
problem is downward biased.
Now take J ⊂ arg minS˜⊂S Vh(W (S˜) ∩ S) with J ≡ (S1, ..., Sc) and W i ≡ W (Si) ∩ S and W ≡
∪ck=1W k. Note that because eachW i is downward biased, for each i, Vh(Wi \∪i−1k=1W i) ≤ Vh(Wi) =
V . Since W is the disjoint union of these sets, i.e. W = ∪ci=1(Wi \ ∪i−1k=1W i), Lemma 1 implies
that Vh(W ) ≥ V . Thus W ∈ arg maxS˜⊂S Vh(W (S˜) ∩ S), and so by the previous argument W is
downward biased. Q.E.D.
C.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Algorithm 1 produces a partition of T into disjoint sets (P1, P2, ..., Pm). I argue that this
partition satisfies the requirements of Proposition 1, and thereby constitutes an equilibrium par-
tition. Lemma 2 implies that each Pi is a downward biased set. One must only check that
i > j =⇒ Vh(Pi) > Vh(Pj) and that i > j =⇒ W (Pj) ∩ Pi = ∅.
First, suppose that Vh(Pi) ≥ Vh(Pi+1). Note that W (Pi ∪ Pi+1) ∩ Si = Pi ∪ Pi+1. This is
because, W (Pi+1) ∩ Si+1 = Pi+1 by definition, and W (Pi+1) ∩ Si ⊂ Pi ∪ Pi+1 by the construction
28 If Vh(S) = aσ
∗
(t′′) then this change actually increases (aσ
∗
(t′′) − Vh(S))2. However, for small enough ε this
increase will be second order.
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in Algorithm 1. Thus, Vh((Pi ∪ Pi+1) ∩ Si) ≤ Vh(Pi) by Lemma 1. But this means that Pi could not
have been the output of the algorithm at stage i as (Pi ∪ Pi+1) ∩ Si is a larger (in the sense of set
inclusion) minimizing set than Pi.
Second, notice that for i < j, Pj ⊂ Si. But W (Pi) ∩ Si = Pi. Since Pi ∩ Pj = ∅, this means that
W (Pi) ∩ Pj = ∅. Q.E.D.
C.4. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. Take the equilibrium partition (P1, ..., Pm). For t ∈ Pi, Vh(Pi) = pih(t|UR). Thus, I prove
that the solution to the problem on the right hand side of (9) is Vh(Pk).
Consider setting S∗a ≡ ∪ik=1Pk and S∗b ≡ ∪mk=iPk. S∗a is the union of parts of the equilibrium
partition that have value less than or equal to Pi, and S∗b is the union of parts of the equilibrium
partition that have value greater than or equal to Pi. Note that W (S∗a) = S∗a and B(S∗b ) = S
∗
b .
Using these choices in equation (9) gives,
Vh(W (S
∗
a) ∩B(S∗b )) = Vh(S∗a ∩ S∗b ) = Vh(Pi).
First, I show that given S∗a , S∗b solves the partial problem max{Sb:t∈Sb} Vh(W (S
∗
a) ∩B(Sb)). This
shows that Vh(Pi) is achievable in the problem in (9). Second, I show that for any feasible Sa,
choosing Sb = S∗b gives Vh(Sa ∩ S∗b ) ≥ Vh(Pi). This means that for any feasible Sa, the value to the
partial problem max{Sb:t∈Sb} Vh(W (Sa) ∩ B(Sb)) ≥ Vh(Pi). Thus, choosing Sa = S∗a achieves the
minimum value, establishing the result.
Step 1: Take any feasible Sb. B(Sb)∩W (S∗a) = ∪ik=1(B(Sb)∩Pk). By the fact that Vh is downward
biased on each part Pk, for k ≤ i (whenever non-empty) Vh((B(Sb)∩Pk) ≤ Vh(Pk) ≤ Vh(Pi). Thus,
by Lemma 1, Vh(∪ik=1(B(Sb) ∩ Pk)) ≤ Vh(Pi). Since S∗b achieves Vh(Pi), S∗b solves the partial
problem max{Sb:t∈Sb} Vh(W (S
∗
a) ∩B(Sb)).
Step 2: Take any feasible Sa. Notice that B(S∗b ) ∩W (Sa) = ∪mk=i(W (Sa) ∩ Pk). Because Vh is
downward biased on each part Pk, for k ≥ i (whenever non-empty) Vh((W (Sa) ∩ Pk) ≥ Vh(Pk) ≥
Vh(Pi). Thus, by Lemma 1 that Vh(∪mk=i(W (Sa) ∩ Pk)) ≥ Vh(Pi). Since S∗b is feasible, the solution
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to the partial problem max{Sb:t∈Sb} Vh(W (Sa) ∩B(Sb)) ≥ Vh(Pi). Since choosing Sa = S∗a achieves
Vh(Pi), this choice achieves the minimal value.
Q.E.D.
D. Proofs from Section 5
D.1. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. ”⇐= ”
Let r : S → R be defined as r(s) ≡ URa (Vf (S), s). Notice that because UR is strictly concave,
Vh(S˜) > Vf (S) ⇐⇒ Erg(S˜) > Erf (S) = 0, ∀S˜ ⊂ S, h ∈ ∆S. (21)
Thus, because Vf is downward biased on (S,d), Erf is downward biased on (S,d). Because f
has more evidence than g, (S,≥f/g) is a refinement of (S,d), and so Erf is also downward biased
on (S,≥f/g).
Using Erf in Proposition 9 produces an interval partition P = (P1, ..., Pm) of (S,≥f/g) such that
(13) and (14) hold. If P is not the trivial partition, then because of (13) Erf (P1) < E
r
f (S). But this is
a contradiction because P1 is a lower contour subset of (S,≥f/g) and Erf is downward biased on
(S,≥f/g). Since P must be the trivial partition, (14) gives Erf (S) ≤ Erg(S).
” =⇒ ”
suppose Vf is not downward biased on (S,d). This means there exists a lower contour subset
L = W (L) ⊂ S, such that Vf (L) < Vf (S) =⇒ Vf (L) < Vf (S \ L). Define g(s) = f(s)F (L) if s ∈ L and
g(s) = 0 otherwise. f ≥ME g but Vf (S) > Vg(S). Q.E.D.
E. Proofs from Section 6
E.1. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. That the expression in (12) corresponds to the receiver optimal equilibrium in H˜ , flows
directly from Theorem 3, and taking Sb ≡ R′ × {NS} in the definition of V˜ .
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The fact that pi∗ is an equilibrium allocation of U˜B is as follows. Receiver and strategic sender
incentive compatibility are directly transferred from that in H˜ . Unbiased sender’s who obtain v(t)
are at their bliss point. unbiased senders who obtain pi∗(t,NS) < v(t) can only potentially deviate
to lower actions which are further from their bliss point, otherwise their strategic counterparts
would deviate in H˜ .
Now I show that pi∗ is receiver optimal in U˜B. Consider some other equilibrium allocation pi′
in U˜B. Define the following commitment allocation, pˆi, in U˜B defined by:
pˆi((t, S)) = pi′((t, S)),
pˆi((t, UB)) = min{pi′((t, UB)), v(t)}.
Take any k, k′ ∈ T ′ × {S,UB} and let k UBd k′. If k is strategic then pi′(k) ≥ pi′(k′) ≥ pˆi(k′)
so pˆi is incentive compatible for strategic senders. If k is unbiased, then either pˆi(k) = v(k), or
v(k) > pˆi(k) = pi′(k) ≥ pi′(k′) ≥ pˆi(k′) so pˆi is also incentive compatible for unbiased senders. The
receiver is better off under pˆi than pi′. Also pˆi is an incentive compatible commitment allocation in
H˜ . Since the optimal commitment allocation is the receiver optimal equilibrium allocation in H˜ ,
the receiver prefers pi∗ to pi′. Q.E.D.
E.2. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Step 1: Every equilibrium of C˜ is an incentive compatible commitment allocation of D˜
Consider any equilibrium allocation of C˜ given by pi : T → R. Consider altering D˜ to a game
in which the receiver can commit ex-ante to an action a : T → R. Say that pi is not incentive
compatible in D˜ with commitment. There exists t, t′ ∈ T ′ such that either
pi((t,H)) < pi((t′, H)), t ′d t′, (22)
pi((t, L)) > pi((t′, L)), t ′d t′, (23)
pi((t,H)) < pi((t′, L)), ∃s ∈M′d(t) ∩M′d(t
′). (24)
The statements in (22) and (23) directly violate incentive compatibility in C˜. incentive compati-
bility in C˜ requires that pi((t,H)) > pi((s,H)) and pi((t′, L)) < pi((s, L)), which combined with (24)
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gives pi((s,H)) < pi((s, L)) violating incentive compatibility in C˜.
Step 2: piD˜ is an equilibrium in C˜, The receiver optimal commitment allocation in D˜ is equiva-
lent to that in D˜ by Sher (2011). By Proposition 1 this corresponds to a interval partition of (T,d),
(P1, ..., Pm) such that Vg is downward biased on each (Pi,d). I will show that condition (B) of
Proposition 12 is satisfied so that there exists a pooling strategy. Let Pi ∩ {T ′ × {H} ≡ Ri and
Pi ∩ {T ′ × {L} ≡ Qi. Take the set of non-dominant elements of (Pi,′d) to be Wi. Consider
W ⊂Wi. Define
Qi ≡ {(t,H) : M′d((t,H)) ⊂W ∩ T
′ × {H}} ∪B′d(W ∩ T
′ × {L}).
Notice that Qi is a lower contour set of (Pi,d), and so by Proposition 1 Vg(Qi) ≥ Vg(Pi). This
verifies condition (B) and therefore there exists a pooling strategy for each Pi under c. Thus
step 3 piD˜ = piC˜ . Notice that the receiver’s expected utility for any allocation in C˜ is the same
as that in D˜. Step 1 shows that the set of equilibrium allocations in C˜ is smaller than the set of
equilibrium allocations of the commitment version of D˜. Second, the set of equilibrium allocations
of the commitment version of D˜ is larger than the set of equilibrium allocations of the commitment
version of D˜. Third, step 2 shows that the receiver optimal commitment allocation in D˜ is incentive
compatible in C˜ and in D˜. Thus, this allocation is both piD˜ and piC˜ . Q.E.D.
F. Proofs from Section 7
F.1. Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Consider any equilibrium allocation p˜i : T → ∆A with sender strategies σ and γ. Let the
perceived distribution over T for period 2 following declaration t in period 1 be ft ∈ ∆T with
corresponding equilibrium partition (Zt, P t1, ..., P
t
m). Note that Supp(ft) = B(S) for some S ∈ T ,














Note that if p˜i is degenerate then the result holds by Lemma 1 and Theorem 3. So in search of a
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contradiction suppose that p˜i is not degenerate. There exists s, t′, t′′ ∈ T with s ∈ P t′k′∩P t
′′
k′′ such that
pif ′t(s|UR) > pif ′′t (s|UR) and pif ′t(s′|UR) = pif ′′t (s′|UR) ∀s′ ∈ B(P t
′
k′) \ P t
′
k′ . In words, there is some
most dominant part of the equilibrium partition in period 2 over which the payoffs to different
period 1 declarations differ. This means that in period 1 type s expects a payoff difference between
declarations t′ and t′′ at pift′ (s|UR)− pift′′ (s|UR) in period 2.
This means that ∀s ∈ P t′ , declaring t′′ in the first period is strictly dominated by declaring
t′, i.e. γs(t′) = 0 ∀s ∈ P t′k′ . I will show that ft′ ≥ME ft′′ on P t
′
k′ . Then by using Proposition 11,
this will imply that Vft′ (P
t′
k′) ≤ Vft′′ (P t
′
k′). This means that by Proposition 2 Vft′ (P
t′
k′) ≥ Vft′′ (P t
′
k′),
contradicting the fact that pif ′t(s|UR) > pif ′′t (s|UR).
The argument for why ft′ ≥ME ft′′ on P t′k′ is as follows. Take s′ d s′′. First suppose that
s′′ 6∈ Supp(ft′′). If s′ ∈ Supp(ft′′) then ∃s˜ ∈ M(s′) such that γs˜(t′′) > 0 and s˜ /∈ M(s′). This
means that s′ d s′′ and s′ d s˜, so because of the UEPP, s˜ 6⊥d s′′. Since s˜ /∈ M(s′) it must be that
s˜ d s′. Given that s′, s′′ ∈ P t′k′ and P t
′
k′ is an interval, s˜ ∈ P t
′
k′ . But this means that γs˜(t
′′) = 0, a
contradiction. Thus s′ /∈ Supp(ft′′) and ft′(s′)ft′′(s′′) ≥ ft′(s′′)ft′′(s′) holds.





































Since s′ d s′′, Rs′,s′′(t′′) ≥ 1. Now if Rs′,s′′(t′′) > 1, this means there exists r ∈M(s′) \M(s′′) such
that γr(t′′) > 0 which implies that t′′ ∈ M(r). Also note that because s′′ ∈ Supp(ft′′), ∃r′ ∈ M(s′′)
with γr′(t′′) > 0. This means that t′′ ∈ M(s′′). But since the UEPP holds, s′′ 6⊥d r, i.e. r d s′′.
But since s′, s′′ ∈ P t′k′ and P t
′
k′ is an interval, we have that r ∈ P t
′
k′ . But this means that γr(t
′′) = 0,
a contradiction. This means that Rs′,s′′(t′′) = 1. But then Rs′,s′′(t′) ≥ Rs′,s′′(t′′) which implies that
63
ft′(s
′)ft′′(s′′) ≥ ft′(s′′)ft′′(s′) holds. Thus ft′ ≥ME ft′′ on P t′k′ , completing the argument.
Q.E.D.
F.2. Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose not, i.e. ∃t, t′ : t d t′, a1(t) < a1(t′). Take the interval of types who induce a1(t)
and a1(t′) to be I and I ′ respectively. Let f and f ′ be the distributions induced after a declaration
x inducing a1(t) and x′ inducing a1(t′) respectively. Because t d t′ and I and I ′ are intervals,
W (I ′) ∩ I = ∅.
Now take s d s′. We will show that f ≥ME f ′. If f ′(s′) = 0, f(s′) > 0, and f ′(s) > 0 then
∃k ∈ I : s′ d k and k′ ∈ I ′ : s d k′, s′ 6d k′. By the UEPP k′ 6⊥ k so k′ d k. But this means
that k ∈ W (I ′) ∩ It, a contradiction. Also if f(s′) > 0, then f(s) > 0. Thus one need only consider




























Notice that if r ∈ M(s) \M(s′) ∩ I ′, then f(s′) = 0. By the UEPP r d s′. So if f(s′) > 0.
∃r′ ∈ M(s′) ∩ I . But then r d r′ contradicting that W (I ′) ∩ I = ∅. Thus if f(s), f(s′), f ′(s), f ′(s′)
are all strictly positive, then Rs,s′(x) = 1, its maximum value.
Since f ≥ME f ′, by Theorem 1, f ≥MS f ′. Thus E[pif (s|U2)|t] ≤ E[pif ′(s|U2)|t]. But since t
induces a1(t) instead of a1(t),
a1(t) + E[pif (s|U2)|t] ≥ a1(t′) + E[pif ′(s|U2)|t].
This gives the desired result that a1(t) ≥ a1(t′). Q.E.D.
G. Generalization to Non-Full Support Distributions
G.1. Results from Section 4
It turns out that all the construction results go through without further refinement of the equi-
librium concept. Adding zero probability types is like order embedding (Supp(h),d) into some
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larger ordered type set (T,′d). This change enlarges the message sets of positive probability types.
One might think that one may have to deter positive probability types from taking advantage of
these new messages by appropriately refining the off path best response to these zero probability
types. Also the set of equilibrium payoffs changes by adding these zero probability types.
However the receiver optimal equilibrium does not change and does not involve declaration of
zero measure types with positive probability. This is because the truth leaning refinement which
identifies the commitment solution ensures that zero probability types will be off path. Consider
some t ∈ T \ Supp(h). Suppose t ∈ ∪t∈Supp(h) Supp(σt), with best response a(t), for truth leaning
a and σ. By Lemma 1 there exists some type s ∈ Supp(h) such that σs(t) > 0 and v(s) ≥ a(t). But
since s 6= t, and pih(s|UR) = a(t), this is a contradiction to Lemma 4 which says that pi(s|UR) ≤
v(t) =⇒ σs(s) = 1. This allows one to ignore zero probability types in the construction of
equilibrium. However, the truth leaning refinement must be adjusted to allow for more flexibility
for off path declarations of zero probability types,
t ∈ arg max
s′∈M(t)
a(s′) =⇒ σt(t) = 1,
s /∈ ∪t Supp(σt) =⇒

a(s) = v(s) ∀s ∈ Supp(h)
a(s) = mins′∈B(s) v(s) ∀s /∈ Supp(h)
.
Without this modification, the equilibrium may not exist. Notice that the modification still selects
a PBNE. The above refinement derives the same equilibrium payoff vector for types in Supp(h) as
when T is restricted to Supp(h). Thus it is without loss to focus on T˜ ≡ Supp(h) and apply the
results of Section 4.
G.2. Comparative Statics Results from Section 5 and Appendix A
In this section I compare equilibrium utilities for distributions without full support. Because the
supports may differ across the distributions one cannot simply discard the zero probability types
as in the previous subsection. The main problem that arises is that the best response function Vh
will not be defined on all sets if h does not have full support. However, I show that the main
theorem, Theorem 1, goes through with little modification.
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First I make some notions robust to general distributions. Consider some finite set X , and
f, g ∈ ∆X such that without loss X = Supp(f) ∪ Supp(g).29Define the f − g likelihood ratio order
≥f/g, as
x ≥ x′ =⇒ f(x)g(x′) ≥f/g f(x′)g(x).
This definition reduces to the one in the main text for full support distributions. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that (X,≥f/g) is a completely preordered set.
I next state the revised versions of the results from Section 5 and Appendix A.
Proposition 10. Let X be a finite set, r : X → R, and f ∈ ∆X with full support. For any distribution
g ∈ ∆X , there exists an interval partition P = (P1, ..., Pm) of (X,≥f/g) with,
Eεf (P1) < ... < E
r
f (Pm), and (26)
Erf (Pi) ≤ Erg(Pi) ∀i : G(Pi) > 0. (27)
Moreover, P is independent of g given ≥f/g.
Proposition 11. Let f ∈ ∆T . If S ⊂ Supp(f) and S ∩ Supp(g) 6= ∅, then Vf (S) ≤ Vg(S),∀g : f ≥ME
g, S ∩ Supp(g) 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ Vf is downward biased on (S,d).
Theorem 4. Let f, g ∈ ∆T , where T = Supp(f) ∪ Supp(g). f ≥ME g =⇒
pif (t|UR) ≤ pig(t|UR) ∀t ∈ Supp(f) ∩ Supp(g), ∀UR ∈ Υ.
Moreover, if f(t)g(t) <
f(t′)
g(t′) for some t d t′ then ∃UR ∈ Υ such that pif (t′|UR) > pig(t′|UR).
The only real amendment in the above results is in Theorem 4. The reason is that one cannot
compare the utility of types that are not in Supp(f) ∩ Supp(g) simply because pif (t|UR) does not
exist if f(t) = 0.
The proofs of the first three results are identical to those of their original versions. The proof of
Theorem 4 is slightly modified.
29 One can disregard elements not in Supp(f) ∪ Supp(g) by the same logic presented above.
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H. Proofs of Equivalence Between ≥MS and ≥ME
H.1. Proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 4
Proof. ” =⇒ ”
The key observation in proving the theorem is that if f ≥ME g then Zg ≡ {t : g(t) = 0} is
an upper contour set of (T,d) and Zf ≡ {t : f(t) = 0} is a lower contour set of (T,d), i.e.
B(Zg) = Zg and W (Zf ) = Zf .
Let P f = (Zf , P f1 , ..., P
f
m) and P g = (P
g
1 , ..., P
g
l , Z
g) be the equilibrium partitions under f and
g respectively.30 ∀t ∈ Supp(f) ∩ Supp(g), t ∈ P fi ∩ P gj for some i, j. I will show that pif (t|UR) =
Vf (P
f
i ) ≤ Vg(P gj ) = pig(t|UR) proving the result. Now let Dg ≡ ∪jk=1P gk and let Uf ≡ ∪mk=iP fk .
Now consider the set R ≡ Uf ∩ Dg. This set is the union of disjoint subsets, R = ∪mk=i(P fk ∩
Dg). Also whenever non-empty W (P fk ∩ Dg) ∩ P fk = P fk ∩ Dg, because W (Dg) = Dg as P g
is an equilibrium partition. Now since P fk is poolable under f , Proposition 1 implies that Vf is
downward biased on (P fk ,d). This means that, whenever non-empty, Vf (P fk ∩ Dg) ≥ Vf (P fk ).
Also because P f is an equilibrium partition, Proposition 1 implies that Vf (P
f
k ) ≥ Vf (P fi ) ∀k ≥ i.
Putting these together gives Vf (P
f
k ∩Dg) ≥ Vf (P fi ) ∀k ≥ i. Since R is the union over these disjoint
sets, Lemma 1 implies, Vf (R) ≥ Vf (P fi ). Now consider the problem,
max
S˜⊂Dg\Zf
Vf (B(S˜) ∩ (Dg \ Zf )), (28)
with corresponding solution S with R ≡ B(S) ∩ (Dg \ Zf ). Because B(R) ∩ (Dg \ Zf ) = R,
Vf (R) ≥ Vf (R). Moreover R ⊂ Supp(f) ∩ Supp(g) and so because of Lemma 2, R is poolable
under f . Using Proposition 11, this means that Vg(R) ≥ Vf (R). Now notice that by Proposition 2,
Vg(P
g
j ) = max
S˜⊂Dg
Vg(B(S˜) ∩Dg).
Thus since R is feasible in this problem, by optimality Vg(P
g
j ) ≥ Vg(R). Putting this string of
30 Since I do not use any refinement beyond truth leaning, one can set the off path actions for declarations in Zg and





j ) ≥ Vg(R) ≥ Vf (R) ≥ Vf (R) ≥ Vf (P fi ),
proving the result.
”⇐= ”
Let A = [a, a]. Define S ≡M(t) ∩B(t′), and S˜ ≡ S \ {t, t′}. By assumption, {t, t′} ⊂ Supp(f) ∩
Supp(g). I prove the case in which F (S˜) ≥ G(S˜); the opposite case is symmetric. Let UR be
quadratic loss, with v(s) = a ∀s /∈ M(t), v(s) = a ∀s ∈ M(t) \ S, v(s) = a∀s ∈ S˜ ∪ {t′}, and
v(t) = A. The equilibrium partition is clearly (M(t) \ S, S,M(t)c) and prior independent. For




G(S∪{t′}) which holds by assumption. Thus pif (t
′|UR) > pig(t′|UR). Q.E.D.
H.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. I only prove the ⇐= direction, as the proof of =⇒ is equivalent to that for Theorem 1.
”⇐= ”
Take the receiver optimal equilibrium partition underd, P = (P1, ..., Pm). I show that P is also
the receiver optimal equilibrium partition under d,v. The result then follows from Theorem 1.
Since d,v is coarser than d, P remains an interval partition. Thus by Proposition 1 all that
remains is to check that Vh is downward biased on (Pi,d,v), ∀i.
Suppose not. Take S ≡ arg minS′∈Pi Vh(Wd,v(S′)), with Vh(S) < Vh(Pi) by assumption. Note
that by Lemma 2, Vh is downward biased (S,d,v). Let R ≡ {t ∈ Pi : t ∈ W (S) \ S}. ∀t′ ∈ R,
t ∈ B(t′)∩S =⇒ v(t) ≥ v(t′). This means that Vh(B(t′)∩S) > v(t′) and sinceB(t′)∩S is an upper
contour subset of S, Vh(S) ≥ Vh(B(t′) ∩ S) ≥ v(t′). This establishes that Vh(R) ≤ Vh(S) which
implies Vh(W (S)) < Vh(Pi) violating that P is the receiver optimal partition under d. Q.E.D.
I. Strict Comparative Statics Results
Theorem 1 says that receiver optimal equilibrium actions weakly decrease when the sender
has more evidence. More evidence is also defined in terms of a weak inequality. In this section
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I characterize changes in the prior distribution that characterize when receiver optimal equilib-
rium actions will strictly decrease. I next introduce the strictly more evidence relation over prior
distributions. For simplicity, assume that all distributions have full support over the type space.
Definition 8. Let f, g ∈ ∆T . Distribution f has strictly more evidence than g (f ≥SME g) if






This definition is not sufficient for receiver optimal equilibrium actions to be strictly lower
under f than g. The reason is that some types may completely separate in equilibrium in which
case the receiver’s best response will be constant across f and g. Thus, the ”strict” version of more
skepticism can only obtain a strict decrease in actions for types that pool together. Moreover, I
incorporate strictness into the definition of pooling.
Definition 9. For the receiver equilibrium partition P = (P1, ..., Pm), P ′ = (P ′1, ..., P ′n) is the strict
equilibrium partition defined by
1) P is an interval partition of (T,d).
2) Vh(Pi) is weakly increasing in i.
3) ∀S ⊂ Pi : Pi 6⊂W (S), Vh(S) > Vh(Pi), ∀i.
P and P ′ differ in their pooled sets but not in their equilibrium outcomes, and so the strict
equilibrium partition is merely a different representation of the same equilibrium. Higher parts
in the strict equilibrium partition can have the same action as those in lower parts, while lower
contour subsets of strict equilibrium parts merit strictly higher actions. Finding P ′ is simple given
P , as P ′ is finer than P , and for all P ′i ⊂ Pj , Vh(P ′i ) = Vh(Pj).
This notion of pooling may seem less observable than that in the main text because types in
different parts can obtain the same action. However, one can distinguish strict equilibrium parts
through messaging behavior, as there exists a sender strategy σ behind the strict equilibrium parti-
tion has that t ∈ P ′i =⇒ Supp(σt) ⊂ P ′i . That is, the receiver can distinguish the strict equilibrium
part from the message that is sent. P ′ is the finest partition that ”represents” the receiver optimal
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equilibrium. I define the strictly more skepticism relation over prior distributions. For any partition
P and t ∈ T , let P (t) be the part that contains t.
Definition 10. Let f, g ∈ ∆T with receiver optimal strict equilibrium partitions P f , P g under UR.
Distribution f induces strictly more skepticism than g (f ≥SMS g) if f ≥MS g and P f (t) 6= {t} or
P g(t) 6= {t} =⇒ pif (t|UR) < pig(t|UR), ∀UR ∈ Υ.
SMS strengthens MS so equilibrium actions are weakly lower for all types under a strictly
more skeptical distribution. The addition is that types that pool together in the sense of the the
strict equilibrium partition obtain strictly lower actions under the more skeptical distribution.
Theorem 5. The strictly more skeptical and strictly more evidence relations are equivalent, i.e.
f ≥SME g ⇐⇒ f ≥SMS g.
Proof. ” =⇒ ”
Let f ≥SMS g. Take hα ∈ ∆T defined by hα(t) ≡ αf(t) + (1 − α)g(t). The first point of the
theorem is guaranteed by Theorem 1. I will prove the case when P f (t) is not a singleton, and omit
the analogous case when P g(t) is not a singleton.
Claim 2. For any α ∈ (0, 1] Vhα(S) > Vf (S) whenever S is not a singleton and satisfies (3) in Definition 9.
If one can find an α small enough such that the equilibrium strict partition does not change,
this completes the proof because hα ≥MS g by Theorem 1. Since the receiver’s best response to
subsets is continuous in α, the only occasion when the strict partition does change for any small
α is when pooled sets Pk, Pk+1, ..., Pj all of the same value join together. Say that for any small
α Pk, Pk + 1, ..., Pj pool together. Since Pj is an upper contour subset of this new pooled set and
Vhα(S) > Vf (Pj), Vhα(Pk∪, ...,∪Pj) > Vf (Pj). Thus proving the claim completes the argument.
Proof of Claim 2: First let Vh(S) be the conditional expectation of v(t) over S and under dis-







v(t) > v(t′).31 Perform a slightly modified version of Algorithm 2 where maximal strictly decreas-
ing sequences are collected, on (S,≥′f/g).
31 Break other ties arbitrarily.
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Let the partition formed at the first stage be Q1, ..., Qm. For each Qi that is not a singleton
Vf (Qi) < Vhα(Qi). This uses the strict version of Remark 4, i.e. the expectation of a strictly
decreasing function is strictly lower under a strict monotone likelihood ratio increase in the dis-
tribution. The one subtlety is that f strictly likelihood ratio dominates hα which comes from the













The algorithm concludes when each maximal strictly decreasing sequence is a singleton, i.e. Vf
is weakly increasing on each part. Because f ≥SME hα, t ≥′f/g t′ is a completion of d. Thus there
does not exist a non-trivial interval partition of S such that Vf is weakly increasing on each part
by (3) in Definition 9. Moreover since S is not a singleton Qi must not be a singleton for some i.
Thus by the logic of the proof of Proposition 9
∑
i
Vf (Qi)hα(Qi) ≥ Vf (S).
This completes the proof for when the best response is an expectation. For the more general case
I apply the logic of the proof of Proposition 3.
”⇐= ”




g(t′′) . It is without loss to take t
′, t′′ such that @s : t′ d
s d t′′. Take UR(a, t) ≡ −(a − v(t))2 with v(t′) = 0, v(t′′) = 1, v(t) = 1,∀t ∈ B(t′′) \ {t}, and
v(t) = 0 otherwise. The strict equilibrium partition is ({s1}, {s2}, ..., {t′, t′′}, {sk}, ..., {sn}) under
both f and g. However Vf ({t′, t′′}) ≥ Vg({t′, t′′}), so f 6≥SMS g. Q.E.D.
71
J. Other Equilibria
This appendix characterizes the conditions for an interval partition (P1, ..., Pm) to constitute an
equilibrium partition without imposing receiver optimality.
J.1. Generally Poolable Sets
Let (P1, ..., Pm) constitutes an equilibrium partition. For each Pi, there exists a sender strategy
that induces the receiver to take the same action following each on-path declaration within Pi. I
formalize this definition below.
Definition 11. a subset S is generally poolable if ∃ mutual best responses σ : S → ∆S, aσ : S → A
such that aσ(t) = Vh(S), ∀t ∈ ∪t∈SSupp(σt).
I next characterize generally poolable sets in terms of the primitives of the model. Let WS ≡
{t ∈ S : M(t)∩S = {t}}S, be the set of non-dominant types in S. Define the following conditions:
(A) ∀ s ⊂ S,Mint∈B(s) v(t) ≤ Vh(S).
(B) ∀W ⊂WS , ∃Q ⊂ B(W ) : S \Q ⊂ B(WS \W ) and Vh(Q) ≥ Vh(S).
Proposition 12. A set S is generally poolable ⇐⇒ (A) and (B) hold.
In considering existence of sender strategies that induce pooling, it is without loss to focus on
those such that a declarations is on path if and only if it is contained in WS .
Proof. ” =⇒ ”
First I will show that (A) must hold. Say, to the contrary that there exists t ∈ S such that
Vh(S) < Mint∈B(s)v(t). It is without loss to take t such that B(t) ∩ S = {t}. If t ∈ ∪t∈SSupp(σt),
then aσ(t) = v(t) = Vh(S) by the fact that σ is pooling and aσ is a best response. This contradicts
the hypothesis. However, if t 6∈ ∪t∈SSupp(σt), then aσ(t) must be a best response to some belief
over types inB(t), which by Lemma 1 implies that aσ(t) > Vh(S). This means that σt(t) = 1 which
contradicts that t is off path.
Now I will show that (B) must hold. Take an arbitrary W ⊂WS . Let
Q ≡ {s ∈ S : v(s) ≥ Vh(S) &Supp(σs) ∩W 6= ∅} ∪ {s : M(s) ⊂W},
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i.e. the types that declare an element of W and have value greater that Vh(S) combined with the
types that can only declare elements of W . It is straightforward that Q ⊂ B(W ). The difference
between Vh(Q) and Vh(S) can be seen through the following shifts. The first component of Q
weakly increases the probability of types with value greater than Vh(S) relative to the induced
distribution under σ. Because σ induces a best response aσ(t) = Vh(S), ∀s ∈ W , this change
increases the value. Secondly, the construction of Q removes all types that had value less than
Vh(S) and could declare something not inW , which also increases the value. Thus, Vh(Q) ≥ Vh(S).
”⇐= ”
For any arbitrary feasible σi : S → ∆WS , let the receiver best response be aσ : WS → A. .
Begin with arbitrary σ and do the following iterated process.
Initialize i = 0.
Step (1): set Wi ≡ arg mins∈S aσ(s). If Wi = WS then σ is a pooling strategy.
Step (2): Take s ∈ B(Wi) : (v(s) ≥ Vh(S) and ∃t ∈ Wi : σs(t) < 1). If this is not feasible,
then take s ∈ B(Wi) : (v(s) ≤ Vh(S) and ∃t ∈ Wi : σs(t) > 0) One of these must exist otherwise
assumption (B) is violated.
Step (3): In the first (second) case increase (decrease) σs(t) until either, (i) ∃t′ 6= t : aσ(t) = aσ(t′),
or (ii) σs(t) ∈ {1, 0} occurs. In both cases, set i = i+ 1 and return to Step (1).
Let the lowest action at stage i be ai. By construction ai is weakly increasing at each stage
with strict increases guaranteed at a future stage if Wi 6= WS . Also ai is bounded above by Vh(S)
because of Lemma 1. Thus ai must converge to Vh(S). The associated σ is a pooling strategy.
Q.E.D.
For completeness I present the characterization of equilibrium with no additional refinement.
Proposition 13. Let pih : T → R with equivalence classes ∪s{pih(s|UR)} = {pi1 < ... < pim} and let
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Pi ≡ {s : pih(s|UR) = pii}. pih is an equilibrium sender payoff vector ⇐⇒
Pi satisfies (A) and (B) ∀i, (29)
(P1, ..., Pm) is an interval partition of (T,d), (30)
and pii = Vh(Pi) ∀i. (31)
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1. Introduction
There are many economic and game-theoretic problems in which agents are faced with
a choice among lotteries. The outcomes of these lotteries could be monetary prizes, polit-
ical policies, or any number of other variables. Suppose the agent is an expected-utility
maximizer whose utility over outcomes depends on some parameter or type. When
choosing among lotteries, which von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions ensure mono-
tone comparative statics (MCS): choice monotonicity in the agent’s type, no matter the
choice set?
MCS are tied to single-crossing properties (Milgrom & Shannon, 1994, Theorem 4).
More specifically, then, this paper’s central question is: given a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function v(a, θ), where a ∈ A is an outcome and θ ∈ Θ the agent’s type, is the dif-
ference in expected utility between every pair of probability distributions on A single
crossing (either from below or above) in θ?1 We call this property single-crossing expecta-
tional differences, SCED.
When there are only two outcomes, A = {a1, a2}, it is straightforward to check that
SCED holds if and only if v(a, θ) has single-crossing differences, i.e., if and only if v(a1, θ)−
v(a2, θ) is single crossing. When |A| > 2, single-crossing differences of v(a, θ) is not
enough, as shown by Example 1.
Our main results are in Section 2. Theorem 1 provides a full characterization of utility
functions v(a, θ) that have SCED. The characterization owes to the structure of expected
utility. Roughly, it requires a pair of type-independent utility functions, say v1(a) and v2(a),
such that there is a representation of each type’s preferences as a convex combination of
v1 and v2, with the relative weight shifting monotonically in type. We confirm that SCED
is satisfied by canonical functional forms used in mechanism designing and screening,
such as v((q, t), θ) = qθ − t (where q ∈ R is quantity, t ∈ R is a transfer, and θ ∈ R is the
1 Informally, a real-valued function is single crossing if crosses over 0 at most once; see Definition 1.
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agent’s marginal rate of substitution; Corollary 2), and those used in communication and
voting, such as v(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2 (where a ∈ R is a policy and θ ∈ R is the agent’s bliss
point; Corollary 1). On the other hand, our characterization also makes clear that SCED is
quite restrictive. For example, within a familiar class of loss functions, the quadratic loss
function is the only one that satisfies SCED (Corollary 1).
We show that SCED is necessary and sufficient for a form of MCS in our setting (Corol-
lary 4). More broadly, we establish a novel result—independent of expected utility or
choice among lotteries—that single-crossing differences characterizes this form of MCS
(Theorem 3).2
We believe the characterization of SCED will be useful in applications. Section 3 elab-
orates, but to illustrate now, consider a sender-receiver cheap-talk problem a` la Crawford
& Sobel (1982). When the receiver’s preferences are known—and satisfy some common
assumptions, like concavity—each message of the sender will, in equilibrium, induce a
particular action from the receiver. Consequently, a standard single-crossing property on
the sender’s preferences ensures monotonicity of communication in any equilibrium: the
set of sender types that induce a particular action is connected. But what about when the
sender does not know the receiver’s preferences? Then, for typical receiver strategies, the
sender will view each message as a non-trivial lottery over the receiver’s actions. SCED
is the requisite property for “interval cheap talk”.
A key step towards our results on SCED is a characterization of when a family of real-
valued functions, {fi(θ)}ni=1, has the property that all linear combinations
∑
i αifi(θ) for
α ∈ Rn are single crossing (Proposition 1). This result relates to Quah & Strulovici (2012),
as elaborated in Section 4; it implies, in particular, a characterization of the monotone
likelihood-ratio property. Section 4 also compares our analysis of SCED to that of Kushnir
2 Milgrom & Shannon (1994, Theorem 4) use a related but different notion of choice monotonicity;
their notion is characterized by the combination of (a version of) single-crossing differences and quasi-
supermodularity.
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& Liu (2017), which concerns monotonic expectational differences.3
Section 5 is the paper’s conclusion. The Appendices contain various proofs and addi-
tional material.
2. Main Results
Let A be an arbitrary set endowed with some σ-algebra such that all elements of A are
measurable and ∆A be the set of probability measures on A and its σ-algebra. Let (Θ,≤)
be a (partially) ordered set containing upper and lower bounds for its pairs.4 We often
refer to elements of Θ as types. Let v : A × Θ → R be a utility function such that, for
every θ, v(·, θ) : A → R is integrable with respect to any probability measure. Define the
expected utility V : ∆A×Θ→ R as




For any two probability measures, also referred to as distributions or lotteries, P ∈ ∆A
and Q ∈ ∆A,
DP,Q(θ) ≡ V (P, θ)− V (Q, θ)
3 Athey (2002) considers the following problem. Let u(a, s) be the payoff from action a ∈ A in “state”
s ∈ S; let f(s, θ) be the probability density over states given parameter θ ∈ Θ. What conditions on u and
f ensure that for all choice sets A′ ⊆ A, arg maxa∈A′
∫
s
u(a, s)f(s, θ)ds is monotonic, in the sense of the
strong set order, in θ? Athey establishes, among other things, that such monotonicity holds for all log-
supermodular u if and only if (ignoring some details) f is log-supermodular. The problem we study in
this paper is different: there is no “state” (i.e., no uncertainty about preferences); we consider comparative
statics in the utility function rather than the distribution of states; and it is essential for us that the choice
space is a lottery space. It may be helpful to summarize the difference as follows: Athey studies “monotone
comparative statics in a parameter of uncertainty”, while we study “monotone comparative statics in a
preference parameter when choosing among lotteries”. There is also recent work of Apesteguia et al. (2017)
on single-crossing random utility models; they discuss some stochastic monotone comparative statics, but
their paper and ours tackle rather different issues.
4 A partial order—hereafter, also referred to as just an order—is a binary relation that is reflexive, anti-
symmetric, and transitive (but not necessarily complete). An upper (resp., lower) bound of Θ0 ⊆ Θ is θ ∈ Θ
(resp., θ ∈ Θ) such that θ ≤ θ (resp., θ ≤ θ) for all θ ∈ Θ0. While none of our results require any assumptions
on the cardinality of Θ, the results in Subsection 2.1 are trivial when |Θ| < 3. Appendix H discusses how
our results extend when (Θ,≤) is only a pre-ordered set, i.e., when ≤ does not satisfy anti-symmetry.
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is the expectational difference.
2.1. Single-Crossing Expectational Differences
2.1.1. The Characterization
Our goal is to characterize when the expectational difference between arbitrary proba-
bility measures is single crossing in the following sense.
Definition 1. A function f : Θ→ R is
1. single crossing from below if
(∀θ < θ′) f(θ) ≥ (>)0 =⇒ f(θ′) ≥ (>)0;
2. single crossing from above if
(∀θ < θ′) f(θ) ≤ (<)0 =⇒ f(θ′) ≤ (<)0;
3. single crossing if it is single crossing either from below or from above.
Plainly, a function f is single crossing if and only if either f or −f is single crossing
from below, and it can be single crossing from both below and above (e.g., (∀θ) f(θ) = 1).
Definition 2. Given any setX , a function f : X×Θ→ R has Single-Crossing Differences
(SCD) if ∀x, x′ ∈ X , the difference f(x, θ)− f(x′, θ) is single crossing in θ.
Definition 3. The utility function v : A × Θ → R has Single-Crossing Expectational
Differences (SCED) if the expected utility function V : ∆A×Θ→ R has SCD.
Our definition of SCD is related to but different from Milgrom (2004), who stipulates
that f : X ×Θ→ R has single-crossing differences given a (partial) order  on X if for all
x′  x′′ (where  is the strict component of ), f(x′, θ) − f(x′′, θ) is single crossing from
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below. We use a different notion because, in the context of choosing among lotteries, there
is no obvious exogenous order on the lottery space ∆A. In Subsection 2.3 we define an
order on ∆A and justify our definition of SCD (Theorem 3).
Remark 1. If A = {a1, a2}, then for any two distributions P,Q ∈ ∆A with probability mass
functions p and q, DP,Q(θ) = (p(a1)− q(a1)) (v(a1, θ)− v(a2, θ)). It follows that v has SCED
if and only if v(a1, θ)− v(a2, θ) is single crossing, i.e., if and only if v has SCD. 
However, the following example shows that when |A| > 2, SCED is not implied by
SCD.
Example 1. Let Θ = [−1, 1], A = {0, 1, 2}, and v(a, θ) = a for a 6= 1 while v(1, θ) = θ2 +1/2.
The function v has SCD: for any a′ > a′′, v(a′, θ) − v(a′′, θ) > 0 for all θ. Now consider
the probability measures P,Q ∈ ∆A with the probability mass functions p(1) = 1 and
q(0) = q(2) = 1/2. DP,Q(θ) = θ2− 1/2 is not single crossing, and so v does not have SCED.
See Figure 1, in which the red dot-dashed curve is
∫
A
v(a, θ)dQ while the others depict















Figure 1: Single-crossing differences does not imply single-crossing expectational differences.
Our characterization of SCED (Theorem 1) uses the following definition.
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Definition 4. Let f1, f2 : Θ→ R each be single crossing.
1. f1 ratio dominates f2 if
(∀θl ≤ θh) f1(θl)f2(θh) ≤ f1(θh)f2(θl), and (1)
(∀θl ≤ θm ≤ θh) f1(θl)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θl) ⇐⇒
 f1(θl)f2(θm) = f1(θm)f2(θl),f1(θm)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θm). (2)
2. f1 and f2 are ratio ordered if either f1 ratio dominates f2 or f2 ratio dominates f1.
Since ratio dominance involves weak inequalities, f1 can ratio dominate f2 and vice-
versa even when f1 6= f2: consider f1 = −f2. We use the terminology “ratio domi-
nance” because when f2 is a strictly positive function, (1) is the requirement that the ratio
f1(θ)/f2(θ) must be (weakly) increasing in θ. Indeed, if both f1 and f2 are probability den-
sities of random variables Y1 and Y2, then (1) says that Y1 stochastically dominates Y2 in
the sense of likelihood ratios.5
Condition (1) is a natural generalization of the increasing ratio property to functions
that may change sign. To get a geometric intuition, suppose f1 “strictly” ratio dominates
f2 in the sense that (1) holds with strict inequality. For any θ, let f(θ) ≡ (f1(θ), f2(θ)).
For every θl < θh, f1(θl)f2(θh) − f1(θh)f2(θl) < 0 implies that the vector f(θl) moves to
f(θh) through a rescaling of magnitude and a clockwise—rather than counterclockwise—
rotation (throughout our paper, a “rotation” must be no more than 180 degrees); see Fig-
ure 2.
To confirm this point, recall that from the definition of cross product,
(f1(θl), f2(θl), 0)× (f1(θh), f2(θh), 0) = ‖f(θl)‖‖f(θh)‖ sin(r)e3
= (f1(θl)f2(θh)− f1(θh)f2(θl)) e3,
5 From the viewpoint of information economics, think of θ as a signal of a state s ∈ {1, 2}, drawn from
the density f(θ|s) ≡ fs(θ). Condition (1) is Milgrom’s (1981) monotone likelihood-ratio property for f(θ|s).
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where r is the counterclockwise angle from f(θl) to f(θh), e3 ≡ (0, 0, 1), × is the cross
product, and ‖·‖ is the Euclidean norm. If sin(r) < 0 (resp., sin(r) > 0), then f(θl) moves
to f(θh) through a clockwise (resp., counterclockwise) rotation.
Figure 2: Geometric representation of Condition (1) for two points θl < θh.
Hence, f1 and f2 are ratio ordered only if f(θ) rotates monotonically as θ increases, either
always clockwise or always counterclockwise.6 It follows that the set {f(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}must
be contained in a closed half-space of R2: otherwise, there will be two pairs of vectors
such that an increase in θ corresponds to a clockwise rotation in one pair and a counter-
clockwise rotation in the other. Plainly, when f1 and f2 are both strictly positive functions,
monotonic rotation of f(θ) is equivalent to monotonicity of the ratio f1(θ)/f2(θ).
Given Condition (1), Condition (2) holds automatically when f1 and f2 are both strictly
positive functions. We explicitly impose it, however, to rule out cases in which, for some
θl < θm < θh, either (i) f(θl) and f(θh) are collinear in opposite directions while f(θm) is
not, or (ii) f(θl) and f(θh) are non-zero vectors while f(θm) is not. See Figure 3, wherein
6 The preceding discussion establishes this point under the presumption that Condition (1) holds strictly;
however, because of the hypothesis in Definition 4 that f1 and f2 are single crossing and because of Condi-
tion (2), the conclusion holds without that presumption.
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panel (a) depicts case (i) and panel (b) depicts case (ii).
(a) Failure of =⇒ . (b) Failure of ⇐= .
Figure 3: f1 and f2 are not ratio ordered because Condition (2) fails for θl < θm < θh.
Let (X,Σ) be a measurable space such that every x ∈ X is measurable. We say that a
function X 7→ R is finitely integrable if it is integrable with respect to every finite signed
measure on (X,Σ). Our main result is:
Theorem 1. The function v : A×Θ→ R has SCED if and only if it takes the form
v(a, θ) = g1(a)f1(θ) + g2(a)f2(θ) + c(θ), (3)
with g1, g2 : A→ R each finitely integrable, f1, f2 : Θ→ R each single crossing and ratio ordered,
and c : Θ→ R.
Example 1 can be understood using Theorem 1. Take c(θ) = 0, f1(θ) = θ2 + 1/2,
f2(θ) = 2, and for each i ∈ {1, 2}, gi(a) = 1{a=i}, where 1{·} is the indicator function. The
Example then satisfies (3), with f1 and f2 each single crossing. But f1 and f2 are not ratio
ordered, as ratio ordering reduces to monotonicity of f1 when f2 is constant.
An asymmetry between a and θ in the functional form (3) bears noting: the function
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c : Θ → R does not have a counterpart function A 7→ R. The reason is that whether
the expectational difference between a pair of lotteries is single crossing or not could
be altered by adding a function of a alone to the utility function v(a, θ). On the other
hand, adding a function of θ alone to v(a, θ) has no effect on expectational differences.
Indeed, SCED is an ordinal property of preferences that is invariant to positive affine
transformations: if v(a, θ) has SCED, then so does b(θ)v(a, θ) + c(θ) for any b : Θ → R++
and c : θ → R.
Theorem 1 implies that a necessary condition for SCED is that every lottery has two
sufficient statistics that determine any type’s preferences. Given the form (3), the relevant





g2(a)dP . Given any pair of lotter-
ies, P and Q, the expected utility difference DP,Q(θ) must be a linear combination of the
functions f1 and f2 in (3). This observation underlies the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let A = R and Θ ⊆ R with |Θ| ≥ 3, with the interpretation that a is a decision or
policy and θ parameterizes the agent’s bliss point. A loss function of the form v(a, θ) = −|a− θ|z
with z > 0 has SCED if and only if z = 2.
Beyond restricting preferences to only depend on two statistics of any lottery, SCED
further constrains how preferences vary across types. This aspect is captured by Theo-
rem 1’s requirement that the functions f1 and f2 in (3) be ratio ordered. It underlies the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. Let A ⊆ R2 with a ≡ (q, t) and Θ ⊆ R, with the interpretation that q is a quantity
of consumption, t is a payment, and θ parameterizes the agent’s marginal rate of substitution.
A quasilinear utility function v((q, t), θ) = g(q)f(θ) − t, where g is finitely integrable and not
constant, has SCED if and only if f is monotonic.
Finally, notice that when v(a, θ) has the form (3) with strictly positive functions f1 and
f2, any type’s utility is, up to a positive affine transformation (viz., subtracting c(θ) and
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dividing by f1(θ)+f2(θ)), a convex combination of two type-independent utility functions
over actions, g1 and g2. Theorem 1’s ratio ordering requirement then simply says that
the relative weight on g1 and g2 changes monotonically with the agent’s type. This idea
underlies the following corollary.
Corollary 3. Let A and Θ be open subsets of R, with the interpretation that a is money and θ
parameterizes the agent’s risk preferences. Assume that v(a, θ) has SCED; moreover, that (3) is
satisfied with twice differentiable functions g1 and g2 such that g′1 > 0 and g′2 > 0, and differ-
entiable functions f1 and f2 such that f1 strictly ratio dominates f2.7 At any a, the Arrow-Pratt
measure of absolute risk aversion, −vaa(a, θ)/va(a, θ), is decreasing (resp., increasing) in θ if and
only if g1 is less (resp., more) absolutely risk averse than g2 at a.8
The remainder of this subsection explains the logic behind Theorem 1. The central
issue is when an arbitrary linear combination of single crossing functions is itself single
crossing, which is of independent interest.
2.1.2. Aggregating Single-Crossing Functions
Suppose v(a, θ) has the form (3). Then, for any P,Q ∈ ∆A, DP,Q(θ) = α1f1(θ) + α2f2(θ)
for some (α1, α2) ∈ R2. What ensures that this function is single crossing?
Lemma 1. Let f1, f2 : Θ→ R each be single crossing. The linear combination α1f1(θ) + α2f2(θ)
is single crossing ∀(α1, α2) ∈ R2 if and only if f1 and f2 are ratio ordered.
Lemma 1 implies a characterization of likelihood-ratio ordering for random variables
with single-crossing densities, e.g., those with strictly positive densities.9 While this
7 That is, Condition (1) holds with strict inequality; see Definition 6 in Subsection 2.2. Primes on g1 and
g2 denote derivatives.
8 Subscripts on v denote partial derivatives. Our assumptions ensure that −vaa(a, θ)/va(a, θ) is well
defined; in particular, va(a, θ) = g′1(a)f1(θ) + g′2(a)f2(θ) 6= 0 because g′1(a) > 0, g′2(a) > 0, and ei-
ther f1(θ) or f2(θ) is non-zero by strict ratio dominance of f1 over f2. The function g1 is less absolutely
risk averse than g2 at a if it has a smaller Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion at a, i.e., if
−g′′1 (a)/g′1(a) ≤ −g′′2 (a)/g′2(a), and similarly for more absolutely risk averse.
9 To see the role of Lemma 1’s hypothesis that each function is single crossing, note that when f1(θ) = 0
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likelihood-ratio ordering characterization is not well-known among economists (to our
knowledge), it is a special case of Karlin’s (1968) results on the variation diminishing
property of totally positive functions. More generally, however, we believe the full force
of Lemma 1 cannot be derived from the variation diminishing property.10
Lemma 1 sheds light on Example 1 and its discussion after Theorem 1. Both f1(θ) =
θ2 + 1/2 and f2(θ) = 2 are single crossing, but 2f1 − f2 is not single crossing because f1
and f2 are not ratio ordered. Note that in this example any linear combination of f1 and
f2 with both positive (or both negative) coefficients is single crossing; the characterization
in Lemma 1 relies on allowing coefficients of opposite signs.11
Here is Lemma 1’s intuition. For sufficiency of Condition (1) of ratio ordering, consider
any linear combination α1f1 + α2f2. Assume α ≡ (α1, α2) ∈ R2\{0}, as otherwise the
linear combination is trivially single crossing. The vector α defines two open half spaces
R2α,− ≡ {x ∈ R2 : α · x < 0} and R2α,+ ≡ {x ∈ R2 : α ·x > 0}, where · is the dot product; see
Figure 4(a). Ratio ordering of f1 and f2 implies that the vector f(θ) ≡ (f1(θ), f2(θ)) rotates
monotonically as θ increases. If the rotation occurs from R2α,− to R2α,+ (resp., from R2α,+ to
R2α,−), then α · f ≡ α1f1 +α2f2 is single crossing only from below (resp., only from above).
for all θ, then f1 and f2 are ratio ordered even if f2 is not single crossing. (A similar observation can be made
for probability densities whose values are zero at some points.) Nonetheless, Lemma 2 in Subsection 2.2
provides a variant of the characterization for arbitrary f1 and f2.
10 Karlin (1968) assumes a completely ordered domain, so consider a completely ordered Θ, with |Θ| > 2
to avoid trivialities. Let K(i, θ) ≡ Ki(θ) for i = 1, 2 and some functions Ki : Θ → R. The function K is
said to be totally positive of order two, abbreviated TP2, if K1 and K2 are both non-negative functions and
(∀θl ≤ θh) K1(θl)K2(θh) ≤ K1(θh)K2(θl). The variation diminishing property of Karlin (1968, Theorem 3.1
in Chapter 5) implies that if—and, more or less, only if—K is TP2, then any linear combination of K1 and
K2 is single crossing. There are, however, ratio-ordered f1 and f2 such that there is no TP2 function K with
{α1f1 + α2f2 : α ∈ R2} = {α1K1 + α2K2 : α ∈ R2}. (4)
When f1 and f2 are ratio ordered and linearly independent (i.e., (∀α ∈ R2\{0}) (∃θ) α1f1(θ) + α2f2(θ) 6= 0),
a TP2 function K satisfying (4) exists if and only if the set {f(θ) : θ ∈ Θ} lies in an open half space of R2. (A
proof is available from the authors on request.) Ratio ordering does imply that the set lies in a half space,
as noted earlier, but the half space need not be open.
11 Indeed, even if two functions are both increasing or both decreasing (in which case all positive and all
negative linear combinations are monotonic, and hence single crossing), ratio ordering remains necessary
for all their linear combinations to be single crossing. Lemma 5 in Subsection 4.1 characterizes when all
linear combinations of a pair of monotonic functions are monotonic, rather than just single crossing.
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(a) Sufficiency of ratio ordering. (b) Necessity of ratio ordering, with θl < θm < θh.
Figure 4: Ratio ordering and single crossing of all linear combinations.
If
⋃
θ∈Θ f(θ) ⊆ R2α,− or
⋃
θ∈Θ f(θ) ⊆ R2α,+, then α · f is single crossing both from below and
above. Other cases are similar.
To see why Condition (1) of ratio ordering is necessary, suppose the vector f(θ) does
not rotate monotonically. Figure 4(b) illustrates a case in which, for θl < θm < θh, f(θl)
rotates counterclockwise to f(θm), but f(θm) rotates clockwise to f(θh). As shown in the
Figure, one can find α ∈ R2 such that f(θm) ∈ R2α,− while both f(θl), f(θh) ∈ R2α,+, which
implies that α · f is not single crossing. The necessity of Condition (2) can be seen by
returning to Figure 3. In panel (a), (f1 + f2)(θl) = (f1 + f2)(θh) = 0 while (f1 + f2)(θm) < 0;
in panel (b), (f1 + f2)(θl) > 0 and (f1 + f2)(θh) > 0 while (f1 + f2)(θm) = 0.
For any two single-crossing and ratio-ordered functions f1 and f2, the direction in
which f(θ) rotates as θ increases determines the direction of single crossing of any given
linear combination. Suppose f1 ratio dominates f2, so that f(θ) rotates clockwise from f
to f as θ increases, as illustrated in Figure 5. To be precise, f and f are extreme rays of
the closed convex cone generated by {f(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}. There are four relevant regions of R2
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Figure 5: Identifying the direction of single crossing of α1f1 + α2f2.
defined by the orthogonals of f (the blue dashed line in Figure 5) and f (the red dashed
line). For any α ∈ R2 in region (A), α · f > 0 > α · f , and so α1f1 + α2f2 is single crossing
only from above; for any α in (B), α ·f < 0 < α ·f , and so α1f1 +α2f2 is single crossing only
from below. If α is in other regions, then (α · f)(θ) is strictly positive for all θ (light gray
area) or strictly negative for all θ (dark gray area), and so α1f1 + α2f2 is single crossing
both from below and above.
Lemma 1 holds without change with only affine combinations, i.e., if we require α1 +
α2 = 1. Nothing would be lost either if we strengthened the hypothesis of Lemma 1 to im-
pose that both functions are single crossing from below (or both from above); the reason
is that for any f1 and f2, {α1f1 + α2f2 : (α1, α2) ∈ R2} = {α1f1 + α2(−f2) : (α1, α2) ∈ R2}
and −f2 is single crossing from below if and only if f2 is single crossing from above.
Theorem 1 requires an extension of Lemma 1 to more than two functions. Let (X,Σ)
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be a measurable space such that every x ∈ X is measurable, and f : X × Θ → R. We
say that f is linear combinations SC-preserving if
∫
X
f(x, θ)dµ is single crossing in θ for
every finite signed measure µ on (X,Σ).
Proposition 1. Let (X,Σ) be a measurable space and f : X × Θ→ R such that (i) (∀x) f(x, θ)
is a single-crossing function of θ and (ii) (∀θ) f(x, θ) is a finitely-integrable function of x. The
function f is linear combinations SC-preserving if and only if there exist x1, x2 ∈ X such that
1. f(x1, ·) : Θ→ R and f(x2, ·) : Θ→ R are ratio ordered, and
2. (∀θ) f(x, θ) = λ1(x)f(x1, θ) + λ2(x)f(x2, θ) with λ1, λ2 : X → R finitely integrable.
The gist of Proposition 1 is that a family of single-crossing functions {f(x, ·)}x∈X , where
each f(x, ·) : Θ→ R, preserves single crossing of all linear combinations if and only if the
family is “linearly generated” by two functions that are ratio ordered.12 In particular,
given any three single-crossing functions, f1, f2, and f3, all their linear combinations will
be single crossing if and only if there is a linear dependence in the triple, say λ1f1 +λ2f2 =
f3 for some λ ∈ R2, and f1 and f2 are ratio ordered.
The sufficiency direction of Proposition 1 follows from Lemma 1, as does necessity
of the “generating functions” being ratio ordered. The intuition for the necessity of lin-
ear dependence is as follows. Assume Θ is completely ordered. For any θ, let f(θ) ≡
(f1(θ), f2(θ), f3(θ)). If {f1, f2, f3} is linearly independent, then there exist θl < θm < θh
such that {f(θl), f(θm), f(θh)} spans R3. Take any α ∈ R3 \ {0} that is orthogonal to the
plane Sθl,θh that is spanned by f(θl) and f(θh), as illustrated in Figure 6. The linear combi-
nation α · f is not single crossing because (α · f)(θl) = (α · f)(θh) = 0 while (α · f)(θm) 6= 0.
While the necessity portion of Proposition 1 only asserts ratio ordering of the “gen-
erating functions”, Lemma 1 implies that if f : X × Θ → R is linear combinations SC-
preserving, then for all x, x′ ∈ X , the pair f(x, ·) : Θ → R and f(x′, ·) : Θ → R must
12 The technical assumption (ii) in Proposition 1 is needed for the “only if” direction; it’s role is to guar-
antee finite integrability of the λ1 and λ2 deduced in part 2. Conversely, finite integrability of λ1 and λ2 are
needed for the “if” direction, so as to apply Lemma 1.
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Figure 6: The necessity of linear dependence in Proposition 1.
be ratio ordered. This observation can simplify the task of showing when f is not linear
combinations SC-preserving.
2.1.3. Proof Sketch of Theorem 1
We can now sketch the argument for Theorem 1. That its characterization is sufficient
for SCED is straightforward from Lemma 1. For necessity, suppose, as a simplification,
A = {a0, . . . , an} and v : A×Θ→ R is such that (∀θ) v(a0, θ) = 0.13 If v has SCED, then for
every a, v(a, θ) = v(a, θ)− v(a0, θ) is single crossing: consider the expectational difference
with distributions that put probability one on a and a0 respectively. For any (λ0, . . . , λn),
we build on the Hahn-Jordan decomposition of (λ1, . . . , λn) to write the linear combina-
tion
∑n
i=0 λiv(ai, θ) as M
∑n
i=0(p(ai) − q(ai))v(ai, θ), where p and q are probability mass
functions on A, and M is a scalar.14 (Unless
∑n





the assumption that v(a0, ·) = 0 permits us to assign all the “excess difference” to a0, as de-
tailed in fn. 14.) Since v has SCED, every such linear combination is single crossing, and so
13 The latter is a normalization, since v(a, θ) has SCED if and only if v˜(a, θ) ≡ v(a, θ)− v(a0, θ) has SCED.
14 Let L ≡ ∑ni=1 λi. For i > 0, set p′(ai) ≡ max{λi, 0} and q′(ai) ≡ −min{λi, 0}. If L ≥ 0, set p′(a0) = 0






′(ai). Finally, for all
a ∈ A, set p(a) ≡ p′(a)/M and q(a) ≡ q′(a)/M .
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Proposition 1 guarantees a′ and a′′ such that for all a, v(a, ·) = g1(a)v(a′, ·) + g2(a)v(a′′, ·),
with v(a′, ·) and v(a′′, ·) each single crossing and ratio ordered.
2.2. Strict Single-Crossing Expectational Differences
For multiple reasons—e.g., to subsequently derive an analog of the standard mono-
tone selection theorem (Milgrom & Shannon, 1994, Theorem 4’)— “strict variants” of the
previous subsection’s results are useful. This subsection provides them.
We now assume the existence of a strictly increasing real-valued function on (Θ,≤).
That is, we assume
∃h : Θ→ R such that θ < θ =⇒ h(θ) < h(θ). (5)
Requirement (5) is related to utility representations for possibly incomplete preferences
(Ok, 2007, Chapter B.4.3). Jaffray (1975, Corollary 1) implies that it is sufficient for (5) if Θ
has a countable order dense subset, i.e., if there exists a countable set Θ0 ⊆ Θ such that
(∀θ, θ ∈ Θ \Θ0) θ < θ =⇒ ∃θ0 ∈ Θ0 s.t. θ < θ0 < θ.
This is satisfied, for example, when Θ ⊆ Rn is endowed with the usual order.
Definition 5. A function f : Θ → R is strictly single crossing from below if (∀θ < θ′)
f(θ) ≥ 0 =⇒ f(θ′) > 0; strictly single crossing from above if (∀θ < θ′) f(θ) ≤ 0 =⇒
f(θ′) < 0; and strictly single crossing if it is either strictly single crossing from below or
from above.
Equivalently, a function is strictly single crossing if it is single crossing and there are
no θ′ < θ′′ such that f(θ′) = f(θ′′) = 0.
Definition 6. A function f1 : Θ → R strictly ratio dominates f2 : Θ → R if Condition (1)
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holds with strict inequality for every θl < θh; f1 and f2 are strictly ratio ordered if either
f1 strictly ratio dominates f2 or vice-versa.
The definition of strict ratio dominance does not make reference to Condition (2) be-
cause that condition is vacuous when Condition (1) holds with strict inequality. Further-
more, unlike with Definition 4, Definition 6 is not restricted to single-crossing functions.
Lemma 2. Let f1, f2 : Θ → R. The linear combination α1f1(θ) + α2f2(θ) is strictly single
crossing ∀(α1, α2) ∈ R2\{0} if and only if f1 and f2 are strictly ratio ordered.
Besides the change to strict single crossing and, correspondingly, strict ratio ordering,
Lemma 2 has two other differences from Lemma 1. First, we rule out (α1, α2) = 0; this
is unavoidable because a zero function is not strictly single crossing. Second, and more
important, Lemma 2 does not need the hypothesis that f1 and f2 are each strictly single
crossing. It turns out—as elaborated in the Lemma’s proof—that when two functions are
strictly ratio ordered, each of them must be strictly single crossing.




f(x, θ)dµ is either a zero function or strictly single
crossing in θ for every finite signed measure µ on the measurable space (X,Σ). Two real-
valued functions f1 and f2 are linearly independent if (∀λ ∈ R2\{0}) λ1f1 + λ2f2 is not a
zero function.
Proposition 2. Let (X,Σ) be a measurable space and f : X×Θ→ R such that (i) (∃x1, x2) f(x1, θ)
and f(x2, θ) are linearly independent functions of θ and (ii) (∀θ) f(x, θ) is a finitely-integrable
function of x. The function f is linear combinations SSC-preserving if and only if
1. f(x1, ·) : Θ→ R and f(x2, ·) : Θ→ R are strictly ratio ordered, and
2. (∀θ) f(x, θ) = λ1(x)f(x1, θ) + λ2(x)f(x2, θ) with λ1, λ2 : X → R finitely integrable.
As with Lemma 2, Proposition 2 does not hypothesize that (∀x) f(x, θ) is strictly single
crossing; this is instead an implication. The Proposition does assume that for some x1, x2,
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f(x1, ·) and f(x2, ·) are linearly independent, as any pair of linearly dependent functions
is not strictly ratio ordered.15
Definition 7. Given any set X , a function f : X × Θ → R has Strict Single-Crossing
Differences (SSCD) if ∀x, x′ ∈ X , the difference f(x, θ)−f(x′, θ) is either a zero function or
strictly single crossing in θ. The utility function v : A×Θ→ R has Strict Single-Crossing
Expectational Differences (SSCED) if the expected utility function V : ∆A×Θ→ R has
SSCD.
The zero-function possibility in the above definition cannot be avoided even if we re-
stricted attention to distinct measures P andQ; for example,DP,Q is a zero function when-
ever P and Q have the same expectation and v is linear in a.
Theorem 2. The function v : A × Θ → R has SSCED if and only if it takes the form (3), with
g1, g2 : A→ R each finitely integrable, f1, f2 : Θ→ R strictly ratio ordered, and c : Θ→ R.
2.3. Monotonicity of Choices
There is a sense in which SCED is necessary and sufficient for monotone comparative
statics, while SSCED guarantees that any selection of choices is monotonic. A precise
statement requires monotonicity theorems (Theorem 3 and Proposition 3 below) related
to, but distinct from, the influential Theorem 4 and Theorem 4’ of Milgrom & Shannon
(1994).
Throughout this subsection, we consider an ordered set of alternatives, (X,), and, as
earlier, an ordered set of types, (Θ,≤). We maintain the assumption that Θ contains upper
and lower bounds for every pair of its elements. Neither  nor ≤ need be complete. We
15 For the “if” direction of Proposition 2, the existence of a pair of linearly independent functions can be
derived as a conclusion rather than a hypothesis. However, without that hypothesis, the “only if” direction
would fail: given X = {x1}, f is linear combinations SSC-preserving if and only if f(x1, θ) is strictly single
crossing in θ. Note also that linear combinations of more than two functions can result in zero functions
even when not all coefficients are zero (unlike in Lemma 2).
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are interested in comparative statics for a function f : X × Θ → R. We assume the set X
is minimal (with respect to f ) in the sense that
(∀x 6= x′)(∃θ) f(x, θ) 6= f(x′, θ).
Monotone Comparative Statics. For any x, y ∈ X , let x ∨ y and x ∧ y denote the usual
join and meet respectively.16 In general, neither need exist. (X,) is a lattice if each pair
of elements has a join and meet in X . Given any Y, Z ⊆ X , we say that Y dominates Z in
the strong set order, denoted Y SSO Z, if for every y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z, (i) y ∨ z and y ∧ z
exist, and (ii) y ∨ z ∈ Y and y ∧ z ∈ Z.
Remark 2. The strong set order is neither reflexive nor transitive: for any S ⊆ X , it holds
that S SSO ∅ and ∅ SSO S, whereas S SSO S if and only if (S,) is a lattice. However,
the strong set order is transitive on non-empty subsets of (X,). While this transitivity is
well-known when (X,) is a lattice, it is a general property.17
Definition 8. f : X ×Θ→ R has monotone comparative statics (MCS) on (X,) if
(∀S ⊆ X) and (∀θ ≤ θ′) : arg max
s∈S
f(s, θ′) SSO arg max
s∈S
f(s, θ).
Our definition of MCS is closely related to but not the same as Milgrom & Shannon
(1994). We take (X,) to be any ordered set while they require a lattice. We focus only on
monotonicity of choice in θ but require the monotonicity to hold for every subset S ⊆ X ;
16 z ∈ X is the join (or supremum) of {x, y} if (i) z  x and z  y, and (ii) if w  x and w  y, then w  z.
The meet (or infimum) of {x, y} is defined analogously.
17 A proof is as follows. The Dedekind-MacNeille (DM) completion (X ′,′) of (X,) is a lattice (in fact,
the smallest complete lattice) that order embeds (X,), i.e., there exists an injection h : X → X ′ such that
x  y if and only if h(x) ′ h(y). It is known that the DM completion preserves all meets and joins that
exist in (X,). To show that SSO is transitive on non-empty subsets of (X,), assume, without loss of
generality, that X ⊆ X ′ and h is the identity function, and take W,Y,Z ∈ 2X\{∅} such that W SSO Y
and Y SSO Z. As the DM completion preserves all existing meets and joins, it holds that W ′SSO Y and
Y ′SSO Z. By transitivity of ′SSO on non-empty subsets of X ′, it follows that W ′SSO Z. That is, for
every w ∈W and z ∈ Z, w ∨′ z ∈W and w ∧′ z ∈ Z. Since w ∨′ z ∈ X and w ∧′ z ∈ X , they are the join and
meet of w and z in (X,). It follows that W SSO Z.
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Milgrom & Shannon require monotonicity of choice jointly in the pair (θ, S), but this im-
plicitly only requires choice monotonicity in θ to hold for every sub-lattice S ⊆ X .
Define binary relations SCD and SCD on X as follows: x SCD x′ if Dx,x′(θ) ≡
f(x, θ) − f(x′, θ) is single crossing from only below; x SCD x′ if either x SCD x′ or
x = x′. Recalling the definition of SCD (Definition 2), it is intuitive that:
Lemma 3. If f : X ×Θ→ R has SCD, then (X,SCD) is an ordered set.
Conversely, if (X,SCD) is a completely ordered set, the function f has SCD.
Given two orders  and ′ on X , the order ′ is a refinement of  if
(∀x, x′ ∈ X) x  x′ =⇒ x ′ x′.
Theorem 3. f : X × Θ → R has monotone comparative statics on (X,) if and only if f has
SCD and  is a refinement of SCD.
Our definition of SCD does not require an order on the set of alternatives, whereas
MCS does. Theorem 3 says that MCS obtains if and only if the function has SCD and the
set of alternatives is ordered by a refinement of the order induced by SCD. In this sense,
SCD is necessary and sufficient for MCS. Moreover, the Theorem justifies viewing SCD
as the prominent order for MCS: MCS do not obtain with any order that either coarsens
SCD or reverses a ranking by SCD.
The argument for necessity in Theorem 3 uses binary choice sets: choices are not mono-
tonic in type on some binary choice set if either SCD fails or the order is not a refinement
of SCD. Note that the direction of ordering in SCD (and hence ) owes to the direction
of monotonicity in the definition of MCS. Regarding sufficiency, we remark only that MCS
is assured by SCD and the order SCD; moreover, the ranking of any pair of alternatives
that are unranked by SCD has no bearing on MCS because, given SCD (and that X is
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minimal), one alternative from the pair will never be chosen by any type when the other
is available.18
Remark 3. If f : X × Θ → R has SCD, then the Szpilrajn extension theorem implies the
existence of a complete order, ∗, on X that refines SCD. f has MCS on (X,∗).
We next apply Lemma 3 and Theorem 3 to our context of choice among lotteries.
Definition 9. For any P,Q ∈ ∆A: (i) P SCED Q if DP,Q is single crossing only from
below; (ii) P ∼SCED Q if (∀θ) DP,Q(θ) = 0; and (iii) P SCED Q, read P dominates Q in
SCED, if P SCED Q or P ∼SCED Q.
Note that P ∼SCED Q if and only if all θ are indifferent between P and Q. Without
any loss of generality then, we can focus on the quotient space of ∆A consisting of the
set of equivalence classes defined by ∼SCED; denote this quotient space by ∆˜A. For any
P,Q ∈ ∆˜A, P ∼SCED Q if and only if P = Q, which implies ∆˜A is minimal and the
relation SCED on ∆˜A is anti-symmetric (and reflexive).19
If v has SCED, the expected utility function V has SCD. By Lemma 3, (∆˜A,SCED) is an
ordered set. According to Theorem 3, any order  on ∆˜A that ensures the monotonicity
of choices in θ for every choice set in ∆˜A must be a refinement of SCED. We summarize
this MCS result as follows:
18 Milgrom & Shannon (1994, Theorem 4) identify their version of single-crossing differences and qua-
sisupermodularity as jointly necessary and sufficient for their monotone comparative statics. (On a lattice
(X,), h : X → R is quasisupermodular if h(x) ≥ (>)h(x ∧ x′) =⇒ h(x ∨ x′) ≥ (>)h(x′).) It bears
explanation why quasisupermodularity plays no role in Theorem 3. Regarding necessity, the reason is that,
as noted after Definition 8, we do not require monotonicity of choice as the choice set varies. Regarding
sufficiency, the reason is that our construction of the order SCD is, to put it succinctly, “fine enough”. In
more detail: let (X,) be a lattice for comparability with Milgrom & Shannon (1994), and for any S ⊆ X ,
let C(S) ≡ {x′ : (∃θ) x′ ∈ arg maxx∈S f(x, θ)}. If f has SCD, then for any S ⊆ X , the set C(S) is completely
ordered by SCD (as elaborated in the sufficiency proof of Theorem 3), and hence by any refinement of
SCD. One can check that quasisupermodularity is only needed in the sufficiency argument of Milgrom &
Shannon (1994, Theorem 4) when, for a sub-lattice S, C(S) is not completely ordered by .
19 For readability, we abuse notation and treat elements of ∆˜A as measures rather than equivalence classes
of measures, and similarly use the notation SCED on ∆˜A instead of the induced quotient relation. We
adopt this convention throughout the paper.
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Corollary 4. Let be an arbitrary order on ∆˜A. V has monotone comparative statics on (∆˜A,)
if and only if v has SCED and  is a refinement of SCED. If v has SCED, then V has monotone
comparative statics with respect to a complete order on ∆˜A that refines SCED.
Monotone Selections. If v has SSCED, then we obtain a stronger notion of monotonicity
of choices, given by the next definition.
Definition 10. f : X ×Θ→ R has Monotone Selection (MS) on (X,) if for any S ⊆ X ,
every selection s∗(θ) from arg maxs∈S f(s, θ) is (weakly) increasing in θ.
Define binary relationsSSCD andSSCD onX as follows: x SSCD x′ ifDx,x′ is strictly
single crossing only from below; x SSCD x′ if either x SSCD x′ or x = x′. From the
definition of SSCD (Definition 7), it follows that:
Lemma 4. If f has SSCD, then (X,SSCD) is an ordered set.
Proposition 3. If f : X × Θ → R has SSCD and  is a refinement of SSCD, then f has
monotone selection on (X,).
It remains only to apply Lemma 4 and Proposition 3 to our context of choice among
lotteries.
Definition 11. For any P,Q ∈ ∆A: (i) P SSCED Q if DP,Q is strictly single crossing only
from below; (ii) P ∼SSCED Q if DP,Q is a zero function; and (iii) P SSCED Q, read P
dominates Q in SSCED, if P SSCED Q or P ∼SSCED Q.
Analogous to the discussion preceding Corollary 4, we focus on the quotient space ∆˜A,
which is minimal and on which SSCED is an order if v has SSCED.
Corollary 5. Let  be an arbitrary order on ∆˜A. If v has SSCED and  is a refinement of
SSCED, then V has monotone selection on (∆˜A,). If v has SSCED, then V has monotone
selection with respect to a complete order on ∆˜A that refines SSCED.
97
3. Applications
This section illustrates how our results can be applied in four applications.
3.1. Cheap Talk with a Stochastic Receiver
There are two players, a sender (S) and a receiver (R). The sender’s type is θ ∈ Θ,
where Θ is partially ordered by ≤. After learning his type, S chooses a payoff-irrelevant
messagem ∈M , where |M | > 1. After observingm but not θ,R takes an action a ∈ A. The
sender’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is v(a, θ); the receiver’s is u(a, θ, ψ),
where ψ ∈ Ψ is a preference parameter that is unknown to S when choosing m, and
known to R when choosing a.20 Note that ψ does not affect the sender’s preferences.
The variables θ and ψ are independently drawn from commonly-known probability mea-
sures.21
An example is Θ = [0, 1], A = R, ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ Ψ ⊆ R2, v(a, θ) = −(a − θ)2 and
u(a, θ, ψ) = −(a− ψ1 − ψ2θ)2. Here the variable ψ2 captures the receiver’s relative “sensi-
tivity” to the sender’s type. If ψ were commonly known and θ uniformly distributed, this
would be the model of Melumad & Shibano (1991), which itself generalizes the canonical
example from Crawford & Sobel (1982) that obtains when ψ1 6= 0 and ψ2 = 1.
We focus on (weak Perfect Bayesian) equilibria in which S uses a pure strategy, µ :
Θ → M , and R plays a possibly-mixed strategy, α : M × Ψ → ∆A.22 Given any α, every
message m induces some lottery over actions from the sender’s viewpoint, Pα(m). An
equilibrium (µ, α) is: (i) connected if every message is used by a connected set of sender
types, i.e., if θl < θm < θh and µ(θl) = µ(θh), then µ(θm) = µ(θl); (ii) sender minimal if for all
20 Ψ is a measurable space endowed with some σ-algebra such that all singletons are measurable.
21 Similar results could also be obtained in an alternative formulation in which the receiver’s preferences
are commonly known but there is exogenous communication noise, as in Blume et al. (2007).
22 Our notion of equilibrium requires optimal play for every (not just almost every) type of sender. The
restriction to pure strategies for the sender is for expositional simplicity; it is essentially without loss of
generality for our purposes when the distribution of θ is non-atomic.
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on-the-equilibrium-path m 6= m′, ∃θ : V (Pα(m), θ) 6= V (Pα(m′), θ); and (iii) sender strict if
all sender types have uniquely optimal messages among the set of on-path messages. In
words, connected equilibria are those with “interval cheap talk”; sender minimality rules
out equilibria in which there is a distinct pair of on-path messages over which all sender
types are indifferent;23 and sender strictness is the usual notion of strictness applied to
only the sender and adapted to the current cheap-talk setting. We say that v strictly violates
SCED if there are P,Q ∈ ∆A and θl < θm < θh such that sign[DP,Q(θl)] sign[DP,Q(θm)] =
sign[DP,Q(θm)] sign[DP,Q(θh)] = −1. (For x ∈ R, sign[x] = 1 if x > 0, sign[x] = 0 if x = 0,
and sign[x] = −1 if x < 0.) We say that v has shared preference if all types have the same
preferences over ∆A; it is straightforward to check that this is equivalent to the form (3)
with f1(θ) > 0 (or f1(θ) < 0) and f2(θ) = 0 for all θ.
Claim 1. Focussing on sender-minimal equilibria:
1. If v has the form stated in Theorem 2, and hence has SSCED, then every equilibrium is
connected; if v strictly violates SCED, then under some parameters, a non-connected sender-
strict equilibrium exists.
2. If v has shared preference, then every equilibrium is uninformative; if v does not have shared
preference, then under some parameters, an informative equilibrium exists.
Proof. Part 1: First assume v has the form stated in Theorem 2 and take a sender-minimal
equilibrium (µ∗, α∗). Suppose, to contradiction, there are θl < θm < θh such that m′ ≡
µ∗(θl) = µ∗(θh) 6= µ∗(θm) ≡ m′′. Let P ′ and P ′′ denote the equilibrium distributions of the
receiver’s actions induced by the messages m′ and m′′ respectively, from the viewpoint of
the sender. Both P ′ and P ′′ are independent of θ because ψ and θ are independent. By The-
orem 2, DP ′,P ′′ is either (i) a zero function, or (ii) strictly single crossing only from below,
or (iii) strictly single crossing only from above. Case (i) contradicts sender minimality of
23 In Crawford & Sobel (1982) and Melumad & Shibano (1991), all equilibria are outcome equivalent to
sender-minimal equilibria. More generally, all equilibria are sender-minimal when there is a complete order
over messages under which higher messages are infinitesimally more costly for all sender types.
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the equilibrium; case (ii) contradicts m′ being optimal for θl and m′′ being optimal for θm;
case (iii) contradicts m′ being optimal for θh and m′′ being optimal for θm.
Next assume v strictly violates SCED: without loss of generality, suppose there are
P,Q ∈ ∆A and θl < θm < θh such that min{DP,Q(θl), DP,Q(θh)} > 0 > DP,Q(θm). Let u(·)
be the zero function and the distribution of sender types have support {θl, θm, θh}. Fix
any m′,m′′ ∈ M with m′ 6= m′′, and for any ψ, let α(m′, ψ) = P while α(m,ψ) = Q for all
m 6= m′. There is a sender-minimal non-connected and sender-strict equilibrium in which
R plays α and S plays µ(θl) = µ(θh) = m′ and µ(θm) = m′′.
Part 2: The first point is immediate given sender minimality; the second point follows
from a construction in which the receiver is totally indifferent and chooses different lot-
teries following different messages such that two sender types do not share preferences
over the two lotteries. Q.E.D.
Part 1 is the more important part of the above claim. In a sense, it establishes that
(S)SCED is necessary and sufficient for interval cheap talk. The result relates to Seidmann
(1990), who first considered an extension of Crawford & Sobel (1982) to sender uncer-
tainty about the receiver’s preferences. His goal was to illustrate how such uncertainty
could facilitate informative communication. The first portion of part 2 of Claim 1 gener-
alizes a point he makes on p. 454 of his article; indeed, with some additional structure, he
identifies the functional form restrictions for “shared preference” as essentially sufficient
for all equilibria to be uninformative. On the other hand, one of Seidmann’s examples
(Example 2 in his paper) constructs a non-connected informative equilibrium. Part 1 of
Claim 1 clarifies that the key is a failure of (S)SCED.
3.2. Collective Choice
Collective choice over lotteries arises naturally in many contexts. For example, in elec-
tions there is uncertainty about what policies some politicians will implement if elected;
100
when hiring a CEO, a board of directors may view each candidate as a probability dis-
tribution over earnings. Zeckhauser (1969) first pointed out that pairwise-majority com-
parisons in these settings can be cyclical, even when comparisons over deterministic out-
comes are not. Our results shed light on when such difficulties do not arise.
Consider a finite group of individuals indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The group must
choose from a set of lotteries,A ⊆ ∆A, whereA is the space of outcomes (political policies,
earnings, etc.) with generic element a. Each individual i has von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function v(a, θi), where θi ∈ Θ is a preference parameter or i’s type. We assume Θ
is completely ordered; without further loss of generality, let Θ ⊂ R and θ1 ≤ · · · ≤ θN . The
expected utility for an individual of type θ from lottery P ∈ A is V (P, θ) ≡ ∫
A
v(a, θ)dP ;
integrability is assumed for all θ ∈ {θ1, . . . , θN} and P ∈ A.
Define the group’s preference relation, maj , over lotteries P,Q ∈ A by majority rule:
P maj Q if |{i : V (P, θi) ≥ V (Q, θi)}| ≥ N/2.
The relation maj is said to be quasi-transitive if the corresponding strict relation is tran-
sitive. Quasi-transitivity of maj is the key requirement for collective choice to be “ratio-
nal”: it ensures—given completeness, which maj obviously satisfies—that a preference-
maximizing choice (equivalently, a Condorcet Winner) exists for the group under stan-
dard conditions on the choice set, e.g., ifA is finite. We say there is a unique median if either
(i) N is odd, in which case we define M ≡ (N + 1)/2 or (ii) N is even and θN/2 = θN/2+1,
in which case M ≡ N/2.
Claim 2. If v has the form stated in Theorem 1, and hence has SCED, then the group’s preference
relation is quasi-transitive. If v has the form stated in Theorem 2 and hence has SSCED, and
there is a unique median, then the group’s preference relation is transitive and is represented by
V (·, θM).
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Proof. Suppose v has SCED. Define the quotient space A˜ from A using the equivalence
relation ∼SCED (Definition 9). We work with A˜ instead of A in order to invoke a result
from Gans & Smart (1996) that assumes a completely ordered set. Corollary 4 implies
there is a complete order  on A˜, which refines SCED, such that
(∀P  Q, ∀θ′ > θ) V (P, θ) ≥ V (Q, θ) =⇒ V (P, θ′) ≥ V (Q, θ′), (6)
(∀P  Q, ∀θ′ > θ) V (P, θ) > V (Q, θ) =⇒ V (P, θ′) > V (Q, θ′). (7)
Conditions (6) and (7) imply that Gans & Smart’s (1996) “single-crossing condition” is
satisfied on A˜; their Corollary 1 implies the group’s preference relation is quasi-transitive
on A˜. Since A differs from A˜ only by distinguishing lotteries that all individuals are
indifferent among, it follows that maj is quasi-transitive on A.
The claim’s second statement follows similarly from Corollary 5 and Gans & Smart’s
(1996) Corollary 2. Q.E.D.
Claim 2 can be applied to a well-known problem in political economy (Shepsle, 1972).
The policy space is a finite set A ⊂ R (for simplicity) and there are an odd N number
of voters ordered by their ideal points in R, θ1 ≤ · · · ≤ θN (i.e., for each voter i, {θi} =
arg maxa∈R v(a, θi)). Let M ≡ (N + 1)/2. There are two office-motivated candidates two
office-motivated candidates, L and R; each j ∈ {L,R} can commit to any lottery from
some given setAj ⊆ ∆A. A restricted setAj may capture various kinds of constraints; for
example, Shepsle (1972) assumed the incumbent candidate could only choose degenerate
lotteries. In our setting, what ensures the existence of an equilibrium, and which policy
lotteries are offered in an equilibrium?24
Claim 2 implies that if voters’ utility functions v have SSCED, and if voter M is indif-
24 More precisely: the two candidates simultaneously choose their lotteries, and each voter then votes
for his preferred candidate (assuming, for concreteness, that a voter randomizes between the candidates
with equal probability if indifferent). A candidate wins if he receives a majority of the votes. Candidates
maximize the probability of winning. We seek a Nash equilibrium of the game between the two candidates.
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ferent between her most-preferred lottery in AL and in AR (e.g., if AL = AR, or if both
sets contain the degenerate lottery on θM , denoted δθM hereafter), then there is a unique
equilibrium: each candidate offers the best lottery for voter M ; in particular, both candi-
dates converge to δθM if that is feasible for both. A special case is when v(a, θ) = −(a− θ)2
and δθM ∈ AL ∩ AR. It bears emphasis, however, that there will be policy convergence
at the median ideal point (so long as δθM ∈ AL ∩ AR) given SSCED not because all vot-
ers need be globally “risk averse”; rather, it is because strict single-crossing differences
over distributions ensures the existence of a decisive voter whose most-preferred lottery
is degenerate.25
There is a sense in which (S)SCED is necessary to guarantee that each candidate j will
offer the median ideal-point voter’s most-preferred lottery from the feasible set Aj . Sup-
pose v(a, θ) strictly violates SCED, as defined in Subsection 3.1 before Claim 1.26 For con-
creteness, suppose that for some P,Q ∈ ∆A and θl < θm < θh, min{DP,Q(θl), DP,Q(θh)} >
0 > DP,Q(θm). Then, if the population of voters is just {l,m, h} and AL = AR = {P,Q},
the unique equilibrium is for both candidates to offer lottery P , which is voter m’s less
preferred lottery.
3.3. Costly Signaling
Consider a version of Spence’s (1973) signaling model. A worker is privately informed
of his type θ that is drawn from some distribution with support Θ ⊆ R and then chooses
education e ∈ R+. There is a reduced-form market that observes e (but not θ) and allocates
wage, or some other statistic of job characteristics, w ∈ R to the worker. The worker’s von
Neumann-Morgenstern payoff is given by v(w, e, θ). It is convenient to let a ≡ (w, e), so
that we can also write v(a, θ).
25 An example may be helpful. Let A = [−1, 1], Θ = {−1, 0, 1}, and v(a, θ) = aθ + 1/(|a| + 1) + 1. The
corresponding functions f1(θ) = θ and f2(θ) = 1 are each strictly single crossing from below and strictly
ratio ordered. For all θ, v(·, θ) : A → R is maximized at a = θ but convex on a sub-interval of the policy
space.
26 A similar point could be made without a strict violation, but it would require endogenous tie-breaking
by an indifferent voter.
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In the standard model, (i) w is an exogenously-given strictly increasing function of the
market’s expectation E[θ|e], (ii) v(w, e, θ) is strictly increasing in w and strictly decreasing
in e, and (iii) v(w, e, θ) has strict single-crossing differences in θ.27
Our results allow us to generalize some central conclusions about education signaling
to settings in which there is uncertainty about what wage the worker will receive, even
conditional on the market belief about his type. Such uncertainty is, of course, econom-
ically plausible. Accordingly, in our specification, we allow for w ∼ Fµ, i.e., w is drawn
from an exogenously-given cumulative distribution F that depends on µ ∈ ∆Θ, the mar-
ket belief about θ. Let V (F, e, θ) ≡ ∫
w
v(w, e, θ)dF and F ≡ {Fµ : µ ∈ ∆Θ} be the family of
feasible wage distributions. We assume that for µ, µ′ ∈ ∆Θ, if µ (strictly) support-dominates
µ′ (i.e., inf Supp[µ] ≥ (>) sup Supp[µ′]), then (∀e, θ) V (Fµ, e, θ) ≥ (>)V (Fµ′ , e, θ). This is a
weak sense in which the worker wants to convince the market that his type is higher. We
also assume that v(w, e, θ) is strictly decreasing in e.
A (weak Perfect Bayesian) equilibrium is described by a pair of functions σ∗(θ) and
µ∗(e), where σ∗ denotes the worker’s mixed strategy (for each θ, σ∗(θ) ∈ ∆R+) and µ∗ the
market belief (for each e, µ∗(e) ∈ ∆Θ). For notational and technical simplicity, we will
restrict attention to equilibria in which for all θ, σ∗(θ) has countable support. When the
equilibrium is pure we write e∗(θ) instead of σ∗(θ). A pure-strategy equilibrium exists: all
types pool on e = 0 and off-path beliefs are the same as the prior.
A fundamental conclusion of the standard model is that in any equilibrium higher
types acquire (weakly) more education. Our results deliver this conclusion in our specifi-
cation; see Liu & Pei (2017) for related work.
We say that a strategy σ is increasing if for all θ < θ and e < e, σ(e|θ) > 0 =⇒ σ(e|θ) =
0. In other words, a strategy is increasing if a higher type never acquires (with positive
probability) strictly less education than a lower type.
27 Given point (ii), point (iii) is implied by the Spence-Mirlees single crossing condition: vw/ve is increas-
ing in θ, where a subscript on v denotes a partial derivative (assuming differentiability).
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Claim 3. Assume v(a, θ) ≡ v(w, e, θ) has the form stated in Theorem 2, and hence has SSCED.
If
F,G ∈ F , e 6= e =⇒ (∃θ) V (F, e, θ) 6= V (G, e, θ), (8)
then in any equilibrium σ∗(θ) is increasing.
Condition (8) is a mild richness condition; in particular, given SSCED, it is automati-
cally satisfied if the worker’s utility is separable in wage and education.28
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose, to contradiction, that σ∗(θ) is not increasing. Then there exist
θ < θ and e < e such that min{σ∗(e|θ), σ∗(e|θ)} > 0. Let F and F be the wage distribu-
tions resulting from e and e respectively. By Corollary 5, there is a complete order, say
∗SSCED, on the quotient space of wage distribution and education pairs with respect to
which V has monotone selection. Condition (8) implies that either (F , e) ∗SSCED (F , e) or
(F , e) ∗SSCED (F , e). As (F , e) ∗SSCED (F , e) would contradict optimality of e for θ and e
for θ (by monotone selection), it holds that (F , e) ∗SSCED (F , e).
Monotone selection now implies that σ∗(e|θ) > 0 =⇒ (∀θ′ > θ) σ∗(e|θ′) = 0.
Consequently, µ∗(e) support-dominates µ∗(e). Given the support-dominance, type θ can
profitably deviate from switching mass from e to e, because the reduction in education
is strictly preferred and the change in market belief is weakly preferred, a contradic-
tion. Q.E.D.
We can also study when there is a separating equilibrium. Let Fθ denote the wage
distribution when the market puts probability one on θ.
Claim 4. Let Θ ≡ {θ1, . . . , θN}. If
28 Suppose v has SSCED and is separable in w and e, so that it has the form v(w, e, θ) = g1(w)f1(θ) +
g2(e)f2(θ) + c(θ). Fix any F,G ∈ F and e 6= e. We compute the expectational difference V (F, e, θ) −






f1(θ) + [g2(e)− g2(e)] f2(θ). The maintained assumption that v is
strictly decreasing in e implies g2(e) − g2(e) 6= 0. As strict ratio ordering of f1 and f2 implies they are
linearly independent, it follows that the expectational difference is non-zero for some θ.
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V (Fθn , e, θn−1) < V (Fθn−1 , 0, θn−1) for all n ∈ {2, . . . , N}, and
3. for all n ∈ {2, . . . , N} and e > e
V (Fθn , e, θn−1) = V (Fθn−1 , e, θn−1) =⇒ V (Fθn , e, θn) ≥ V (Fθn−1 , e, θn), (9)
then there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which e∗(θ) is strictly increasing.
The conditions in the result above are related to those in Cho & Sobel (1990). The
inequalities in part 2 of the Claim merely require that no type θn (n ∈ {2, . . . , N}) would
be willing to pay the cost of acquiring arbitrarily high education to shift the market’s belief
from probability one on θn−1 to probability one on θn. Despite a resemblance, Condition
(9) is not by itself a single-crossing condition. Rather, loosely speaking, it ensures that the
SCED order over wage distribution and education pairs goes in the “right direction”; the
proof below clarifies.
Proof of Claim 4. Set e1 = 0. For n > 1, inductively construct en as the solution to
V (Fθn , en, θn−1) = V (Fθn−1 , en−1, θn−1). (10)
Our assumptions ensure there is a unique solution and that en > en−1 for all n ∈ {2, . . . , N}.
We claim (∀n) e∗(θn) = en can be supported as an equilibrium. To see this, first note
that by Corollary 4, there is a complete order, say ∗SCED, on the quotient space of wage
distribution and education pairs with respect to which V has monotone comparative stat-
ics. It follows that for ∀n ∈ {2, . . . , N}, (9) and (10) imply (Fθn , en) ∗SCED (Fθn−1 , en−1).
Hence, no type can profitably deviate to any on-path e ∈ {e1, . . . , eN}; off-path deviations
can be deterred by simply setting off-path beliefs to put probability one on θ1. Q.E.D.
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3.4. Altruism, Spite, and Utilitarianism
Finally, we illustrate how our results on aggregating single-crossing functions are use-
ful even when the choice space is not a set of lotteries.
Consider two agents, denoted 1 and 2. Each agent i has a direct or material payoff
function vi(a, θ), where a ∈ A is a single choice variable that affects both agents and θ ∈ Θ
is some parameter. Both A and Θ are ordered sets. Assume each vi has SCD, i.e., for
any a and a′, Dia,a′(θ) ≡ vi(a, θ) − vi(a′, θ) is single crossing. To allow for other-regarding





with α = (α1, α2) ∈ R2.29 A positive αi represents altruism towards i, while a negative αi
represents spite (e.g., Levine, 1998).
By Theorem 3, u must have SCD for all α to yield monotone comparative statics no
matter the other-regarding coefficient vector, α. Lemma 1 says that u has SCD for all α if
and only if
(∀a, a′) D1a,a′ and D2a,a′ are ratio ordered. (12)
While the above discussion focuses on two agents, Proposition 1 can be applied when
there are more agents.
One may also interpret (11) as a weighted utilitarian criterion by restricting attention
to α ∈ R2+ \ {0}. Under this restricted domain of α, (12) is not necessary for u to have SCD
given arbitrary v1 and v2. However, suppose there is always disagreement between the
agents in their ordinal ranking of any pair of alternatives:
(∀a, a′)(∀θ) D1a,a′(θ)D2a,a′(θ) < 0. (13)
29 We have not written u to be agent specific purely to lighten notation.
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Under (13), u has SCD for all α ∈ R2+ \ {0} if and only if (12) holds. In particular, (13)
implies that if (12) fails, then for some a and a′, there is α ∈ R2+ \ {0} such that α1D1a,a +
α2D
2
a,a is not single crossing; the essence of the argument can be seen in Figure 4(b).30
4. Discussion
4.1. Single Crossing vs. Monotonicity
We have characterized when v : A×Θ→ R has SCED. Viewing ∆A as a choice set and
Θ as a parameter set, SCED is an ordinal property. Analogous to supermodularity on an
ordered space, one might also be interested in a stronger cardinal property in our setting,
which we call Monotonic Expectational Differences (MED):
(∀P,Q ∈ ∆A) DP,Q(θ) is monotonic in θ.
(A function f : Θ → R is monotonic if (i) (∀θ ≤ θ′)f(θ) ≤ f(θ′), or (ii) (∀θ ≤ θ′) f(θ) ≥
f(θ′).)
To study which functions have MED, we begin with the following analog of Lemma 1.
Lemma 5. Let f1, f2 : Θ→ R be monotonic functions. The linear combination α1f1(θ)+α2f2(θ)
is monotonic ∀(α1, α2) ∈ R2 if and only if either f1 or f2 is an affine transformation of the other,
i.e., there exists (λ1, λ2) ∈ R2 such that either f2 = λ1f1 + λ2 or f1 = λ1f2 + λ2.
We say that f : X×Θ→ R is linear combinations monotonicity-preserving if ∫
X
f(x, θ)dµ
is a monotonic function of θ for every finite signed measure µ on (X,Σ).
Proposition 4. Let (X,Σ) be a measurable space and f : X×Θ→ R such that (i) (∀x) f(x, θ) is
a monotonic function of θ and (ii) (∀θ) f(x, θ) is a finitely-integrable function of x. The function
30 To be precise, this logic only proves the analog of Condition (1) of ratio ordering. But (13) also ensures
that the analog of Condition (2) is satisfied; cf. Figure 3.
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f is linear combinations monotonicity-preserving if and only if there exists x′ ∈ X such that
(∀θ)f(x, θ) = λ1(x)f(x′, θ) + λ2(x) with λ1, λ2 : X → R finitely integrable.
Theorem 4. The function v : A×Θ→ R has MED if and only if it takes the form
v(a, θ) = g1(a)f1(θ) + g2(a) + c(θ), (14)
where g1, g2 : A→ R are finitely integrable, f1 : Θ→ R is monotonic, and c : Θ→ R.
The proof of Theorem 4 in the Appendix uses Proposition 4, exhibiting a parallel with
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1. There is, however, a simple intuition for Theorem 4 based
on the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem. Suppose Θ = [θ, θ] ⊂ R and
vθ(a, θ), the partial derivative of v(a, θ) with respect to θ, exists and is continuous. Con-
sider the following strengthening of MED: (∀P,Q ∈ ∆A) DP,Q(θ) is either a zero function









independent of θ. In other words, for all θ, vθ(·, θ) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern rep-
resentation of the same preferences over lotteries. The conclusion of Theorem 4 follows
from the expected utility theorem’s implication that for any θ′, θ′′ ∈ Θ, vθ(·, θ′) must be a
positive affine transformation of vθ(·, θ′′).31 We are not aware of any related argument for
the SCED characterization, Theorem 1.
Comparing Theorem 1 and Theorem 4, we see that a function v with MED is a special
case of a function v with SCED, in which the function f2 in (3) is identically equal to one.
Note that when this is the case, f1 and f2 being ratio ordered is equivalent to f1 being
monotonic. SCED is more general than MED; for example, given a function v(a, θ) of the
form (14) with f1(·) > 0 and domain Θ ⊆ R++, the function v˜(a, θ) ≡ θv(a, θ) will satisfy
SCED but generally violate MED. The generality translates into preferences: the set of
31 Pick any θ∗ ∈ Θ. The expected utility theorem implies that for some F1 : Θ → R++ and C : Θ → R,
(∀a, θ) vθ(a, θ) = F1(θ)vθ(a, θ∗) + C(θ). Equation 14 follows from integrating up θ at each a, as v(a, θ) =∫ θ
θ
vθ(a, t)dt+ v(a, θ).
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preferences with SCED representations is larger than that with MED representations; see
Example 4 in Appendix G.4. Proposition 5 in Appendix G.4 characterizes exactly when
preferences with an SCED representation have an MED representation. It is when (a)
there is a pair of types that do not share the same strict preference over any pair of lotter-
ies, or (b) there is a pair of lotteries over which all types share the same strict preference.
The MED characterization in Theorem 4 has largely been obtained by Kushnir & Liu
(2017). They restrict attention to Θ ⊆ R, A ⊂ Rk, and functions v that have some smooth-
ness. Modulo minor differences, Kushnir & Liu establish that for their environment, a
strict version of MED (in fact the strengthening discussed in the paragraph after Theo-
rem 4) is equivalent to the characterization in Theorem 4 with f1 strictly monotonic.32
Kushnir & Liu’s focus is on the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant-strategy
implementation; their methodology requires MED rather than SCED.
4.2. The Relationship with Quah & Strulovici (2012)
Lemma 1 is related to Quah & Strulovici (2012, Proposition 1). They establish that for
any two functions f1 and f2 that are each single crossing from below, α1f1 +α2f2 is single
crossing from below for all (α1, α2) ∈ R2+ if and only if f1 and f2 satisfy signed-ratio
monotonicity below:33 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2},
(∀θl ≤ θh) fj(θl) < 0 < fi(θl) =⇒ fi(θh)fj(θl) ≤ fi(θl)fj(θh). (15)
The following example shows that even for a pair of functions that are single crossing
from below, ratio ordering does not imply signed-ratio monotonicity below.
Example 2. Let Θ = [0, 1], f1(θ) = 1, and f2(θ) = −θ − 1. Since f1 is constant and f2
32 The statement in Proposition 3 of their paper is that f1 is strictly increasing; monotonicity vs. increasing
is immaterial, as the direction of monotonicity can be reversed by flipping the sign of the function g1.
33 Quah & Strulovici call this simply “signed-ratio monotonicity”. We note that Quah & Strulovici also
consider aggregating non-negative linear combinations of more than two functions that are each single-
crossing from below (cf. Proposition 1).
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is monotonic, they are ratio ordered; moreover, both functions are single crossing from
below. However, they do not satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity below; f1 + f2, while
single crossing, is not single crossing from below. 
Thus motivated, let us say that f1 and f2 satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity if either
f1 and f2 satisfy signed-ratio monotonicity below or −f1 and −f2 satisfy signed-ratio
monotonicity below; equivalently, f1 and f2 satisfy, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, either (15) or its
reversed-inequality version:
(∀θl ≤ θh) fj(θl) < 0 < fi(θl) =⇒ fi(θl)fj(θh) ≤ fi(θh)fj(θl). (16)
Ratio ordering is still not stronger (nor weaker) than signed-ratio monotonicity:
Example 3. Let Θ = [−1, 1], and for some ε ∈ (0, 1/2),
f1(θ) =

1 if θ ≥ 0
ε(θ − 1) if θ < 0,
and f2(θ) =

1 if θ ≤ 0
−ε(1 + θ) if θ > 0.
Figure 7 depicts these functions (drawn for ε = 1/4). For all θl < θh, f1(θl)f2(θh) <
f1(θh)f2(θl), so f1 ratio dominates f2. As f1(θ) > 0 > f2(θ) for all θ > 0, (15) is violated; as
f1(θ) < 0 < f2(θ) for all θ < 0, (16) is also violated. 
However:
Remark 4. For functions f1 and f2 that are both single crossing from below or both single
crossing from above, ratio ordering implies signed-ratio monotonicity. To prove this, first
note that if there is no θ at which f1(θ)f2(θ) < 0, signed-ratio monotonicity trivially holds.
So assume there is a θ at which, without loss by re-labeling the functions, f1(θ) > 0 >
f2(θ). Since f1 and f2 are both single crossing from below or both from above, there is no
θ′ at which f1(θ′) < 0 < f2(θ′). So we need only to show that fixing i = 1 and j = 2, either
(15) or (16) holds. But this is implied by ratio ordering.
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Figure 7: A violation of signed-ratio monotonicity that satisfies ratio ordering.
Moreover, it is straightforward that if for some i, j and all θ, fi(θ) > 0 > fj(θ), then
ratio ordering is equivalent to signed-ratio monotonicity. 
The reason why our Lemma 1 deduces the more demanding condition of ratio order-
ing even when f1 and f2 are single crossing in the same direction is because it considers
aggregations α1f1+αf2 with coefficients of arbitrary signs, while Quah & Strulovici (2012)
require both coefficients to have the same sign. To illustrate, suppose f1 > 0 and f2 > 0.
Signed-ratio monotonicity trivially holds and αf1+α2f2 is single crossing from both below
and above for all (α1, α2) ∈ R2+ and also for all (α1, α2) ∈ R2−. However, ratio ordering can
fail (f1/f2 need not be monotonic), in which case there exists (α1, α2) ∈ R2 with α1α2 < 0
such that α1f1 + α2f2 is not single crossing, neither from below nor from above. Since a
function f is single crossing from below if and only if −f is single crossing from above,
another perspective is that Lemma 1 accommodates cases in which the aggregating coef-
ficients have the same sign but one of f1 and f2 is single crossing only from below while
the other is single crossing only from above; see the utilitarianism application in Subsec-
tion 3.4. Quah & Strulovici’s result ultimately requires joint restrictions on the signs of
the aggregating coefficients and the directions in which the functions are single crossing.
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5. Conclusion
The main result of this paper is a full characterization of which von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions of outcome and type satisfy single-crossing expectational differences
(SCED): the difference in expected utility between every pair of probability distributions
on outcomes is single crossing in type (Theorem 1). We have established that this prop-
erty is necessary and sufficient for a form of monotone comparative statics when an agent
chooses among distributions over outcomes (Theorem 3).
We close by highlighting aspects of our analysis that suggest directions for future re-
search.
Theorem 1’s characterization that the utility function can be decomposed into a sum
of two products (and a function independent of the outcome), v(a, θ) = g1(a)f1(θ) +
g2(a)f2(θ)+c(θ), owes to the expectational difference being single-crossing. If one were in-
terested in (at most) n-crossings, for n ∈ N,34 then we believe that v(a, θ) = ∑n+1i=1 gi(a)fi(θ)+
c(θ) would be a necessary condition. It would be interesting to find the appropriate gen-
eralization of ratio ordering to make this form necessary and sufficient. Just as ratio or-
dering is related to total positivity of order two (recall the discussion after Lemma 1), we
suspect the generalization would be related to total positivity of order n+ 1.
Theorem 1’s characterization leans on the requirement that the expectational difference
must be single crossing for all pairs of distributions over outcomes. While a “sufficiently
rich” set of pairs should suffice, there is a fundamental tradeoff. Requiring single crossing
for only a subset of distributions would expand the set of utility functions satisfying the
requirement, but any application must then have enough stochastic structure to validate
the restriction on distributions.35 Another possibility would be to weaken or alter the
34 Choi & Smith (2016) generalize Quah & Strulovici (2012) in this vein.
35 Recall that Claim 1 in Subsection 3.1 established a sense in which SCED (over all pairs of distributions)
is necessary to guarantee that all cheap talk equilibria are connected in that application. Restricting the
form of the receiver’s preferences and/or the distributions of her private information could circumvent
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expected utility hypothesis.
Our results have direct bearing on problems in which all types of an agent face the
same choice set of distributions. Such situations arise naturally, as illustrated in Sec-
tion 3. But consider a variation of the cheap-talk application (Subsection 3.1) in which
the sender’s type is correlated with the receiver’s type. Even though the receiver’s type
does not affect the sender’s payoff, different sender types will generally have different
beliefs about the distribution of the receiver’s action that any message induces in equilib-
rium. Effectively, different sender types will be choosing from different sets of distribu-
tions. An approach that synthesizes the current paper’s with that of, for example, Athey’s
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Appendices
A. Proofs of Corollaries in Subsection 2.1
A.1. Proof of Corollary 1
It is clear from Theorem 1 that v(a, θ) = −|a − θ|2 = −a2 + 2aθ − θ2 has SCED, as
f1(θ) = −1 and f2(θ) = 2θ are ratio ordered, g1(a) = a2 and g2(a) = a are each finitely
integrable, and we take c(θ) = −θ2.
For the converse, it is sufficient to prove the following claim.
Claim 5. If there exist g1, g2 : R→ R and f1, f2, c : Θ→ R such that
v(a, θ) ≡ −|a− θ|z = g1(a)f1(θ) + g2(a)f2(θ) + c(θ),
then z = 2.
Fix a0 ∈ R and define v˜(a, θ) ≡ v(a, θ) − v(a0, θ) = g˜1(a)f1(θ) + g˜2f2(θ), where g˜1(a) ≡
g1(a) − g1(a0) and g˜2 ≡ g2(a) − g2(a0). Fix any θl < θm < θh. There exists (λl, λm, λh) ∈
R3\{0} such that












Hence, for every a ∈ R,












We hereafter consider λl 6= 0 (and omit the proof for the other two cases, λm 6= 0 and
λh 6= 0, which are analogous). The previous equation implies that for any a ∈ R,





At any a < θ, v˜(a, θ) = −(θ − a)z − v(a0, θ) is differentiable in a, and hence (17) im-




= − limε↓0 εz−1 must equal the left partial derivative limε↓0 v˜(θl−ε,θl)−v˜(θl,θl)−ε =
limε↓0 εz−1, which implies limε↓0 εz−1 = 0, and thus z > 1.
Now suppose to contradiction that z 6= 2. At any a > θh, (17) and v˜(a, θ) = −(a− θ)z −
v(a0, θ) imply
−λl(a− θl)z = λm(a− θm)z + λh(a− θh)z + (λm + λh − λl)v(a0, θ),
and hence, differentiating with respect to a and simplifying using z > 1 and z 6= 2:
−λl(a− θl)z−1 = λm(a− θm)z−1 + λh(a− θh)z−1, (18)
−λl(a− θl)z−2 = λm(a− θm)z−2 + λh(a− θh)z−2, (19)
−λl(a− θl)z−3 = λm(a− θm)z−3 + λh(a− θh)z−3. (20)
It follows that λmλh 6= 0 and λh 6= 0: if, for example, λl = 0, then (18) implies λh 6= 0 (as
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λl 6= 0), and then (18) and (19) imply a − θl = a − θh for all a > θh, contradicting θl < θh.
Since ((a− θl)z−2)2 = (a−θl)z−1(a−θl)z−3, we manipulate the right-hand sides of (18)–(20)
to obtain
2λmλh(a− θm)z−2(a− θh)z−2 = λmλh
(
(a− θm)z−1(a− θh)z−3 + (a− θm)z−3(a− θh)z−1
)
,






Therefore, a− θh = a− θm for all a > θh, contradicting θm < θh.
A.2. Proof of Corollary 2
If f is monotonic, it ratio dominates any positive constant function. It follows from
Theorem 1 that v((q, t), θ) has SCED.
To prove the converse, suppose, toward contradiction, that f is not monotonic. Then
there exist θl < θm < θh such that either f(θm) > max{f(θl), f(θh)} or f(θm) < min{f(θl), f(θh)}.
We proceed assuming the first case and omit the analogous argument for the other case.
Take any z ∈ R such that f(θm) > z > max{f(θl), f(θh)}, any q1, q2 ∈ R such that
g(q1)− g(q2) > 0, and t1, t2 ∈ R such that (g(q1)− g(q2))z− (t1− t2) = 0. The expectational
difference between degenerate lotteries on a1 = (q1, t1) and a2 = (q2, t2),
D1,2(θ) ≡ v(a1, θ)− v(a2, θ) = (g(q1)− g(q2))f(θ)− (t1 − t2),
is not single crossing as D1,2(θm) > 0 > max{D1,2(θl), D1,2(θh)}.
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A.3. Proof of Corollary 3













is decreasing (resp., increasing) in θ if and only if the partial derivative of
the right-hand side above with respect to θ is positive (resp., negative), or equivalently,
(∀θ) (g′′1(a)f ′1(θ) + g′′2(a)f ′2(θ))(g′1(a)f1(θ) + g′2(a)f2(θ))
≥ (≤) (g′1(a)f ′1(θ) + g′2(a)f ′2(θ))(g′′1(a)f1(θ) + g′′2(a)f2(θ))





(f ′1(θ)f2(θ)− f1(θ)f ′2(θ)) ≥ (≤)
g′′2(a)
g′2(a)
(f ′1(θ)f2(θ)− f1(θ)f ′2(θ)).
The above inequality is equivalent to −g′′1 (a)
g′1(a)
≤ (≥) − g′′2 (a)
g′2(a)
if
f ′1(θ)f2(θ) ≥ f1(θ)f ′2(θ) (21)
for all θ, with strict inequality for some θ. This latter property holds by our hypothesis that
f1 strictly ratio dominates f2. Specifically, letting k(θ, ε) ≡ f1(θ + ε)f2(θ − ε), Condition
(1) with a strict inequality implies that for any θ and (small) ε > 0, k(θ, ε) > k(θ,−ε),
and hence kε(θ, 0) ≥ 0 (where kε is the partial derivative), which is equivalent to (21).
Furthermore, Condition (1) with a strict inequality implies that f2(θ∗) 6= 0 for some θ∗,
and hence, in a neighborhood of θ∗, f1/f2 is strictly increasing, which implies (21) with a
strict inequality for some θ in that neighborhood.
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B. Proof of Lemma 1
When |Θ| ≤ 2, the proof is trivial as all functions are single crossing and every pair of
f1, f2 are ratio ordered. Hereafter, we assume |Θ| ≥ 3.
B.1. ( =⇒ )
To prove (1), we suppose towards contradiction that
(∃θl < θh) f1(θl)f2(θh) < f1(θh)f2(θl) and
(∃θ′ < θ′′) f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) > f1(θ′′)f2(θ′).
(22)
Take any upper bound θ of {θl, θh, θ′, θ′′}.
First, let αl ≡ (f2(θl),−f1(θl)). Then, (αl · f)(θl) = (f2(θl),−f1(θl)) · (f1(θl), f2(θl)) = 0,
and (αl · f)(θh) > 0. Thus, αl · f is single crossing from below, and (αl · f)(θ) > 0.
Second, let α′ ≡ (f2(θ′),−f1(θ′)). Then, (α′ · f)(θ′) = 0 and (α′ · f)(θ′′) < 0. Thus, α′ · f
is single crossing from above, and (α′ · f)(θ) < 0.
Let α = (f2(θ),−f1(θ)). Then,
(α · f)(θl) = (f2(θ),−f1(θ)) · (f1(θl), f2(θl)) = −(αl · f)(θ) < 0,
(α · f)(θ′) = −(α′ · f)(θ) > 0, and
(α · f)(θ) = 0.
Therefore, α · f is not single crossing, a contradiction.
To prove (2), take any θl < θm < θh.
First, we show that f1(θl)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θl) implies f1(θm)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θm) and
f1(θm)f2(θl) = f1(θl)f2(θm). Assume f1 is not a zero function on {θl, θm, θh}, as otherwise
the proof is trivial. Since f1 is single crossing, either f1(θl) 6= 0 or f1(θh) 6= 0. We consider
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the case of f1(θh) 6= 0 (and omit the proof for the other case). Let αh = (f2(θh),−f1(θh)).
Since αh · f is single crossing and (αh · f)(θ) = 0 for θ = θl, θh, it holds that (αh · f)(θm) =
f2(θh)f1(θm) − f1(θh)f2(θm) = 0. It follows immediately that f1(θm)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θm).
As (f1(θm), f2(θm)) and (f1(θh), f2(θh)) are linearly dependent and (f1(θh), f2(θh)) is a non-
zero vector, there exists λ ∈ R such that fi(θm) = λfi(θh) for i = 1, 2. Thus,
f1(θl)f2(θm) = λf1(θl)f2(θh) = λf2(θl)f1(θh) = f2(θl)f1(θm).
Next, we show that if f1(θl)f2(θm) = f1(θm)f2(θl) and f1(θm)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θm), then
f1(θl)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θl). Let α ≡ (f2(θl)− f2(θh),−f1(θl) + f1(θh)). Then,
(α · f)(θl) = (f2(θl)− f2(θh)) f1(θl)− (f1(θl)− f1(θh)) f2(θl) = f1(θh)f2(θl)− f1(θl)f2(θh),
(α · f)(θh) = (f2(θl)− f2(θh)) f1(θh)− (f1(θl)− f1(θh)) f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θl)− f1(θl)f2(θh), and
(α · f)(θm) = (f2(θl)− f2(θh)) f1(θm)− (f1(θl)− f1(θh)) f2(θm) = 0.
As α ·f is single crossing, it follows that (α ·f)(θl) = (α ·f)(θh) = 0, as we wanted to show.
B.2. (⇐= )
We provide a proof for the case in which f1 ratio dominates f2, and omit the other
case’s analogous proof. For any α ∈ R2, we prove that α · f is single crossing. We may
assume that α 6= 0, as the result is trivial otherwise.
Suppose, towards contradiction, that α · f is not single crossing. We require the follow-
ing:36
Claim 6. There exist θl < θm < θh such that
sign[(α · f)(θl)] < sign[(α · f)(θm)] and sign[(α · f)(θm)] > sign[(α · f)(θh)], (23)
36 Recall that we defined sign[x] = 1 if x > 0, sign[x] = 0 if x = 0, and sign[x] = −1 if x < 0.
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or
sign[(α · f)(θl)] > sign[(α · f)(θm)] and sign[(α · f)(θm)] < sign[(α · f)(θh)]. (24)
Note that the claim is obvious when (Θ,≤) is a completely ordered set.
Proof of Claim 6. Since α · f is single crossing neither from below nor from above:
(∃θ1 < θ2) sign[(α · f)(θ1)] < sign[(α · f)(θ2)], and
(∃θ3 < θ4) sign[(α · f)(θ3)] > sign[(α · f)(θ4)].
Let Θ0 ≡ {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4} and θ and θ be an upper and lower bound of Θ0. If (α · f)(θ) =
(α·f)(θ) = 0, then (θl, θm, θh) = (θ, θ0, θ) for some θ0 ∈ Θ0 with (α·f)(θ0) 6= 0 satisfies either
(23) or (24). So assume (α · f)(θ) 6= 0, with a similar argument applying for (α · f)(θ) 6= 0.
If (α ·f)(θ) < 0, then (θl, θm, θh) = (θ1, θ2, θ) satisfies (23). If (α ·f)(θ) > 0, then (θl, θm, θh) =
(θ3, θ4, θ) satisfies (24). Q.E.D.
First, we consider the case in which f(θ) ≡ (f1(θ), f2(θ)) for all θ ∈ {θl, θm, θh} are non-
zero vectors. Take any θ1, θ2 ∈ {θl, θm, θh} such that θ1 < θ2. As f1 ratio dominates f2, by
Condition (1), f(θ1) moves to f(θ2) in a clockwise rotation with an angle less than or equal
to 180 degrees. Let r12 be the clockwise angle from f(θ1) to f(θ2). The vector α 6= 0 defines
a partition of R2 into R2α,+ ≡ {x ∈ R2 : α · x > 0}, R2α,0 ≡ {x ∈ R2 : α · x = 0}, and R2α,− ≡
{x ∈ R2 : α · x < 0}. In both cases (23) and (24), both f(θl) and f(θh) are not in the same
part of the partition that f(θm) belongs to. Thus, rlm > 0 and rmh > 0. On the other hand,
both f(θl) and f(θh) are in the same closed half-space, either R2α,+∪R2α,0 or R2α,−∪R2α,0, and
f(θm) is in the other closed half-space, either R2α,−∪R2α,0 or R2α,+∪R2α,0, respectively. Thus,
rlh ≥ 180. Since Condition (1) implies rlh ≤ 180, it follows that rlh = 180. Hence, f(θl)
and f(θm) are linearly independent (0 < rlm < 180), and similarly for f(θm) and f(θh).
However, f(θl) and f(θh) are linearly dependent (rlh = 180). This contradicts (2).
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Second, suppose either f(θl) = 0 or f(θh) = 0. We provide the argument assuming
f(θl) = 0; it is analogous if f(θh) = 0. Under either (23) or (24), f(θm) 6= 0. By Condition
(2), f(θm) and f(θh) are linearly dependent. In particular, because f(θm) 6= 0, there exists a
unique λ ∈ R such that f(θh) = λf(θm). Under either (23) or (24), λ ≤ 0, which contradicts
the hypothesis that f1 and f2 are single crossing.
Last, suppose f(θl) 6= 0, f(θm) = 0, and f(θh) 6= 0. By Condition (2), f(θl) and f(θh)
are linearly dependent. Hence, there exists a unique λ ∈ R such that f(θl) = λf(θh).
Under either (23) or (24), λ > 0, which contradicts the hypothesis that f1 and f2 are single
crossing.
C. Proof of Proposition 1
Let (X,Σ) be a measurable space and f : X×Θ→ R be as described in the proposition.
The result is trivial if |X| = 1 and it is equivalent to Lemma 1 if |X| = 2, so we may
assume |X| ≥ 3. The proof is also straightforward if all functions f(x, ·) are multiples of
one function f(x1, ·), i.e., if there is x1 such that (∃λ : X → R)(∀x, θ)f(x, θ) = λ(x)f(x1, θ).
Thus, we further assume there exist x′, x′′ such that f(x′, ·) : Θ → R and f(x′′, ·) : Θ → R
are linearly independent, i.e., (∀λ ∈ R2\{0}) λ1f(x′, ·) + λ2f(x′′, ·) is not a zero function.
C.1. (⇐= )
Assume f(x1, ·) and f(x2, ·) are ratio ordered, and that there are finitely-integrable
functions λ1, λ2 : X → R such that for every x, f(x, ·) = λ1(x)f(x1, ·) + λ2(x)f(x2, ·).














which is single crossing in θ by Lemma 1, since for each i = 1, 2,
∫
X
λi(x)dµ ∈ R exists.
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C.2. ( =⇒ )
Take any x1, x2 ∈ X such that f1(·) ≡ f(x1, ·) and f2(·) ≡ f(x2, ·) are linearly indepen-
dent. Then, by Lemma 1, f1 and f2 are ratio ordered as their linear combinations are all
single crossing.






We first prove the following claim:
Claim 7. There exists θl < θh such that rank[Mθl,θh ] = 2
Proof of Claim 7. As f1 and f2 are linearly independent, there exists θ0 such that f2(θ0) 6=
0. Let λ ≡ −f1(θ0)
f2(θ0)
. Then, for some θλ, f1(θλ) + λf2(θλ) 6= 0 and rank[Mθ0,θλ ] = 2.
The proof is complete if θ0 > θλ or θ0 < θλ. If not, take a lower and upper bound, θ
and θ, of {θ0, θλ}. Then rank[Mθ,θ] = 2. For otherwise, there exists α ∈ R2\{0} such that
Mθ,θα = 0. As θ0 and θλ are between θ and θ, and α1f1 + α2f2 is single crossing, we have
Mθ0,θλα = 0, which contradicts rank[Mθ0,θλ ] = 2. Q.E.D.
Now take any x ∈ X , the function fx(·) ≡ f(x, ·), and θl, θh in Claim 7. As rank[Mθl,θh ] = 2,









has a unique solution λ ∈ R2. We will show that fx = λ1f1 + λ2f2.
Suppose, towards contradiction, there exists θλ such that
fx(θλ) 6= λ1f1(θλ) + λ2f2(θλ). (26)
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Let θ, θ be a lower and upper bound of {θl, θh, θλ}. If rank[Mθ,θ] < 2, there is λ′ ∈ R2\{0}
such that λ′1f1(θ) + λ′2f2(θ) = 0 for θ = θ, θ. As θl and θh are between θ and θ, and
λ′1f1+λ
′
2f2 is single crossing, we have λ′1f1(θ)+λ′2f2(θ) = 0 for θ = θl, θh, which contradicts
rank[Mθl,θh ] = 2.
37


























(27) implies that λ′ solves (25). As the unique solution to (25) was λ, it follows that λ′ = λ.
But then (26) and (28) are in contradiction.
We have so far proved that
(∀θ) f(x, θ) = λ1(x)f(x1, θ) + λ2(x)f(x2, θ),
with λ1, λ2 : X → R. It remains to show that λ1 and λ2 are finitely integrable.
Take θl, θh in Claim 7. As rank[Mθl,θh ] = 2, we have
det [Mθl,θh ] ≡ f1(θl)f2(θh)− f2(θl)f1(θh) 6= 0. (29)
37 The function λ′1f1 + λ′2f2 must be single crossing because we can apply the requirement to µ such that
µ({x1}) = λ′1, µ({x2}) = λ′2, and µ(Y ) = 0 for any Y ∈ Σ with Y ∩ {x1, x2} = ∅. We use similar reasoning
subsequently.
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In particular, either f1(θl)f2(θh) 6= 0 or f2(θl)f1(θh) 6= 0. We consider the case of f1(θl)f2(θh) 6=
0 (and omit the proof for the other case).




f(x, θl) = λ1(x)f1(θl) + λ2(x)f2(θl) = (λ1(x) + ηlλ2(x))f1(θl) and
f(x, θh) = λ1(x)f1(θh) + λ2(x)f2(θh) = (ηhλ1(x) + λ2(x))f2(θh),
and, by hypothesis, both are finitely-integrable functions of x. As f1(θl) and f2(θh) are
independent of x, it follows that λ1(x)+ηlλ2(x) and ηhλ1(x)+λ2(x) are finitely integrable,
and so are their linear combinations
ηl (ηhλ1(x) + λ2(x))− (λ1(x) + ηlλ2(x)) = (ηlηh − 1)λ1(x) and
ηh (λ1(x) + ηlλ2(x))− (ηhλ1(x) + λ2(x)) = (ηlηh − 1)λ2(x).
Since ηlηh 6= 1 (as otherwise det [Mθl,θh ] = f1(θl)f2(θh) − ηlηhf1(θl)f2(θh) = 0, contrary to
(29)), λ1 and λ2 are also finitely integrable.
D. Proof of Theorem 1
D.1. (⇐= )
Suppose v(a, θ) = g1(a)f1(θ) + g2(a)f2(θ) + c(θ), with f1 : Θ → R and f2 : Θ → R each














Since g1 and g2 are finitely integrable by hypothesis, DP,Q is single crossing by Lemma 1.
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D.2. ( =⇒ )
Assume, without loss of generality, that |A| ≥ 2, and let Σ be a σ−algebra on A con-
taining all singleton sets. Take any a0 ∈ A, and define A′ ≡ A \ a0. Then (A′,Σ′) with
Σ′ ≡ {A˜ ∈ Σ | A˜ ⊆ A′} is also a measurable space in which Σ′ contains all singleton sets
in A′. We will show that, in some sense, every finite signed measure µ′ defined over Σ′
can be represented as a multiple of the difference between two probability measures P,Q
defined over Σ, and then apply Proposition 1.
Define f : A×Θ→ R as
f(a, θ) ≡ v(a, θ)− v(a0, θ).
It is clear that (∀a) f(a, ·) is single crossing: consider the expectational difference with
probability measures that put probability one on a and a0 respectively. Also, our σ-algebra
contains all elements of A and any finite signed measure equals the difference between
two rescaled probability measures.38 It follows that (∀θ) f(·, θ) is finitely-integrable as
v(a, θ) is integrable with respect to any probability measure.




′ is single crossing if and only if DP,Q is single crossing.
For any finite signed measure µ′ on Σ′, we define a finite signed measure µ over Σ as
an extension of µ′:
µ(a0) ≡ −µ′(A′) and (∀A˜ ⊆ A) µ(A˜) ≡ µ′(A˜\a0) + 1{a0∈A˜}µ(a0).
38 Any finite signed measure µ has a unique Hahn-Jordan decomposition (µ+, µ−) of two positive finite
measures such that µ = µ+ − µ−.
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In a sense, we let a0 absorb the signed measure of A′. In particular, note that
µ(A) = µ(A′) + µ(a0) = µ′(A′)− µ′(A′) = 0.
Let (µ+, µ−) be the Hahn-Jordan decomposition of µ. That is, µ+ and µ− are two posi-
tive finite measures such that µ = µ+ − µ−. Let M = µ+(A) = µ−(A). If M = 0, pick an








Note that P and Q are well-defined probability measures defined over Σ: both are in-


















v(a, θ)dµ− (as µ(A) = 0)
= MDP,Q(θ).
Thus, if v has SCED, then f : A\{a0} × Θ → R is linear combinations SC-preserving.
By Proposition 1, there exist a1, a2 ∈ A\{a0} such that (i) f(a1, θ) and f(a2, θ) are ratio
ordered, and (ii) (∃λ1, λ2 : A \ {a0} → R) (∀θ) f(a, θ) = λ1(a)f(a1, θ) + λ2(a)f(a2, θ),
with λ1, λ2 finitely integrable. Hence, there exist functions g1, g2 : A → R, both finitely
integrable and g1(a0) = g2(a0) = 0, such that f(a, θ) = g1(a)f(a1, θ) + g2(a)f(a2, θ), or
equivalently,
v(a, θ) = g1(a)f(a1, θ) + g2(a)f(a2, θ) + v(a0, θ).
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E. Proofs for Strict Single Crossing (Subsection 2.2)
E.1. Proof of Lemma 2
When |Θ| ≤ 2.
If |Θ| = 1, the proof is trivial as all functions are strictly single crossing and every pair
of f1, f2 satisfy strict ratio ordering. So assume |Θ| = 2 and denote Θ = {θl, θh}; without
loss, we may assume θh > θl because of our maintained assumption that upper and lower
bounds exist for all pairs.
( =⇒ ) Either (f1(θl), f2(θl)) 6= 0 or (f1(θh), f2(θh)) 6= 0: otherwise, for every α ∈ R2\{0},
(α · f)(θl) = (α · f)(θh) = 0, and hence α · f is a zero function, which is not strictly single
crossing. Assume (f1(θl), f2(θl)) 6= 0; the proof for the other case is analogous. Let αl ≡
(f2(θl),−f1(θl)) and consider (αl · f)(θ) = f2(θl)f1(θ)− f1(θl)f2(θ). We have (αl · f)(θl) = 0
and, by strict single crossing of αl · f , (αl · f)(θh) 6= 0. That is, f2(θl)f1(θh) 6= f1(θl)f2(θh),
which means that f1 and f2 are strictly ratio ordered.
(⇐= ) For any α ∈ R2\{0}, α · f is not strictly single crossing if and only if (α · f)(θl) =
(α · f)(θh) = 0. Then, α1f1(θl) = −α2f2(θl) and α1f1(θh) = −α2f2(θh), which result in
α1f1(θl)f2(θh) = −α2f2(θl)f2(θh) = α1f1(θh)f2(θl), and
α2f1(θl)f2(θh) = −α1f1(θl)f1(θh) = α2f1(θh)f2(θl).
As either α1 or α2 is not zero, f1(θl)f2(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θl), which violates strict ratio order-
ing of f1 and f2.
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When |Θ| ≥ 3.
( =⇒ ) Suppose, towards contradiction, that
(∃θl < θh) f1(θl)f2(θh) ≤ f1(θh)f2(θl), and
(∃θ′ < θ′′) f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) ≥ f1(θ′′)f2(θ′).
(30)
Take any upper bound θ of {θl, θh, θ′, θ′′}. First, let αl = (f2(θl),−f1(θl)). Then, αl · f is
strictly single crossing only from below as (αl ·f)(θl) = (f2(θl),−f1(θl)) · (f1(θl), f2(θl)) = 0
and (αl · f)(θh) ≥ 0. Second, let α′ = (f2(θ′),−f1(θ′)). Then, α′ · f is strictly single crossing
only from above as (α′ · f)(θ′) = 0 and (α′ · f)(θ′′) ≤ 0.
Let α = (f2(θ),−f1(θ)). Then,
(α · f)(θl) = (f2(θ),−f1(θ)) · (f1(θl), f2(θl)) = −(αl · f)(θ) ≤ 0,
(α · f)(θ′) = −(α′ · f)(θ) ≥ 0, and
(α · f)(θ) = 0.
Therefore, α · f is not strictly single crossing from below nor from above.
(⇐= ) We provide a proof for the case in which f1 strictly ratio dominates f2, and omit
the other case’s analogous proof. For any α ∈ R2\{0}, we prove that α·f is single crossing.
The argument is very similar to that used in proving Lemma 1, but note that here we do
not assume either f1 or f2 are single crossing.
As f1 strictly ratio dominates f2,
(∀θl < θh) f1(θl)f2(θh) < f1(θh)f2(θl). (31)
Suppose, towards contradiction, that α · f is not strictly single crossing.
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Claim: There exist θl, θm, θh with θl < θm < θh such that
(α · f)(θl) ≤ 0, (α · f)(θm) ≥ 0, and (α · f)(θh) ≤ 0, (32)
or
(α · f)(θl) ≥ 0, (α · f)(θm) ≤ 0, and (α · f)(θh) ≥ 0. (33)
Proof of claim: Since α·f is not strictly single crossing either from below or from above,
(∃θ1 < θ2) (α · f)(θ1) ≥ 0 ≥ (α · f)(θ2), and
(∃θ3 < θ4) (α · f)(θ3) ≤ 0 ≤ (α · f)(θ4).
Let Θ0 ≡ {θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4} and let θ and θ be an upper and lower bound of Θ0, respectively.
Either (α · f)(θ) 6= 0 or (α · f)(θ) 6= 0, as otherwise f1(θ)f2(θ) = f2(θ)f1(θ), contradicting
(31). Suppose (α · f)(θ) 6= 0. If (α · f)(θ) < 0, then we choose (θl, θm, θh) = (θ3, θ4, θ), which
satisfies (32). If (α · f)(θ) > 0, then we choose (θl, θm, θh) = (θ1, θ2, θ), which satisfies (33).
A similar argument applies when (α · f)(θ) 6= 0. ‖
It is clear that f(θ) ≡ (f1(θ), f2(θ)) for all θ ∈ {θl, θm, θh} are non-zero vectors: other-
wise, Condition (31) would not hold for some θ′, θ′′ ∈ {θl, θm, θh} such that θ′ < θ′′. Take
any θ1, θ2 ∈ {θl, θm, θh} such that θ1 < θ2. By Condition (31), f(θ1) moves to f(θ2) in a
clockwise rotation with an angle r12 ∈ (0, 180). Suppose (32) holds; the argument is anal-
ogous if (33) holds. It follows from 0 < rlh < 180, (α · f)(θl) ≤ 0, and (α · f)(θh) ≤ 0 that
{f(θl), f(θh)} ⊆ R2α,− ∪ R2α,0 with {f(θl), f(θh)} 6⊆ R2α,0. This, together with rlm > 0 and
rmh > 0, implies f(θm) ∈ R2α,−, which contradicts (32).
E.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Appendix C proved Proposition 1 assuming certain functions are linearly independent.
Essentially the same proof can be used for Proposition 2; we need only to replace state-
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ments involving “single crossing” with “either a zero function or strictly single crossing”.
E.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Most statements in the proof of Theorem 1 go through with strict single crossing when
we replace “single crossing” with “either a zero function or strictly single crossing”. We
need only to rewrite the proof of the “only if” part in the following two special cases:
1. (∀a′, a′′)(∀θ) v(a′, θ) = v(a′′, θ), or
2. (∃a′, a′′) such that (i) v(a′′, θ)−v(a′, θ) is not a zero function of θ, and (ii) (∀a) v(a, θ)−
v(a′, θ) and v(a′′, θ)− v(a′, θ) are linearly dependent functions of θ.
In the first case, we can write v(a, θ) in form of (3) where g1, g2 are zero functions,
c(θ) ≡ v(a0, θ) for any arbitrary a0, f1(θ) = 1, and f2(θ) is any strictly decreasing function
of θ. Then,
(∀θl < θh) f1(θl)f2(θh) = f2(θh) < f2(θl) = f1(θh)f2(θl).
In the second case, for every a, there exists (λ1, λ2) ∈ R2\{0} such that λ1 (v(a, ·)− v(a′, ·))+
λ2 (v(a
′′, ·)− v(a′, ·)) is a zero function. Note that λ1 6= 0, as otherwise v(a′′, ·) − v(a′, ·)
would be a zero function. It follows that there exists λ : A→ R such that
(∀a) v(a, θ)− v(a′, θ) = λ(a) (v(a′′, θ)− v(a′, θ)) ,
or equivalently,
v(a, θ) = λ(a) (v(a′′, θ)− v(a′, θ)) + v(a′, θ).
Note that v(a′′, θ) − v(a′, θ) is a strictly single-crossing function of θ: consider the ex-
pectational difference with measures that put probability one on a′′ and a′ respectively.
If the difference is strictly single crossing from below, we can write v(a, θ) in the form
of (3) where g1(a) = λ(a), g2(a) = 0, f1(θ) = v(a′′, θ) − v(a′, θ), and c(θ) = v(a′, θ).
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If the difference is strictly single crossing only from above, we let g1(a) = −λ(a) and
f1(θ) = v(a
′, θ)− v(a′′, θ).
Last, we take any strictly increasing function h : Θ→ R and define
hˆ(θ) ≡
 −e
h(θ) if f1(θ) ≤ 0
e−h(θ) otherwise,
and f2(θ) ≡
 hˆ(θ)f1(θ) if f1(θ) 6= 01 otherwise.
To verify that f1 and f2 are strictly ratio ordered, take any θl < θh. There are three possi-
bilities to consider:
1. If f1(θl)f1(θh) > 0, then
f1(θl)f2(θh) = f1(θl)f1(θh)hˆ(θh) < f1(θl)f1(θh)hˆ(θl) = f1(θh)f2(θl),
as hˆ(θ) is strictly decreasing over {θ | f1(θ) < 0} and {θ | f1(θ) > 0}.
2. If f1(θl)f1(θh) < 0, as f1(θ) is strictly single crossing from below, we have f1(θl) <
0 < f1(θh). Hence,
f1(θl)f2(θh) = f1(θl)f1(θh)hˆ(θh) < 0 < f1(θl)f1(θh)hˆ(θl) = f1(θh)f2(θl).
3. If f1(θl)f1(θh) = 0, by strict single crossing from below of f1, we have either (i)
f1(θl) < 0 = f1(θh), which results in f1(θl)f2(θh) = f1(θl) < 0 = f1(θh)f2(θl), or (ii)
f1(θl) = 0 < f1(θh), which results in f1(θl)f2(θh) = 0 < f1(θh) = f1(θh)f2(θl).
F. Proofs for Monotonicity of Choices (Subsection 2.3)
F.1. Proof of Lemma 3
We omit the proof that SCD is reflexive and anti-symmetric. To prove that SCD is
transitive, take x, y, z such that x SCD y and y SCD z. It is sufficient to show x SCD z
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assuming x SCD y and y SCD z (if x = y or y = z, it trivially holds that x SCD z).
Since f has SCD, Dx,z is single crossing. As both Dx,y and Dy,z are single crossing only
from below, Dx,z = Dx,y + Dy,z cannot be single crossing from above; since Dx,z is single
crossing by SCD, it is single crossing only from below. Thus, x SCD z.
F.2. Proof of Theorem 3
( =⇒ ) We first prove the following claim.
Claim 8. For every x, x′ ∈ X , if ∃θl < θh such that sign[Dx,x′(θl)] < sign[Dx,x′(θh)], then
x  x′.
Proof. Consider S = {x, x′}. Since sign[Dx,x′(θl)] 6= sign[Dx,x′(θh)], we have
arg max
s∈S
f(x, θl) 6= arg max
s∈S
f(x, θh).
Thus, either (i) x ∈ arg maxs∈S f(x, θl) and x′ ∈ arg maxs∈S f(x, θh), or (ii) x′ ∈ arg maxs∈S f(x, θl)
and x ∈ arg maxs∈S f(x, θh). Since f has MCS on (X,), we have arg maxs∈S f(x, θh) SSO
arg maxs∈S f(x, θl). Therefore, x ∧ x′ ∈ arg maxs∈S f(s, θl) and x ∨ x′ ∈ arg maxs∈S f(s, θh),
which implies that either x  x′ or x′  x. Since x′ 6= x, we have either x  x′ or x′  x. If
x′  x, then x′ = x ∨ x′ ∈ arg maxs∈S f(s, θh), contradicting sign[Dx,x′(θl)] < sign[Dx,x′(θh)].
Thus, x  x′. Q.E.D.
To show that f has SCD on X , suppose not, per contra. Then there exist x, x′ ∈ X and
θl < θm < θh such that either,39
sign[Dx,x′(θl)] < sign[Dx,x′(θm)] and sign[Dx,x′(θm)] > sign[Dx,x′(θh)], or (34)
sign[Dx,x′(θl)] > sign[Dx,x′(θm)] and sign[Dx,x′(θm)] < sign[Dx,x′(θh)]. (35)
39 The existence of such θl, θm, θh is immediate if (Θ,≤) is a completely ordered set. More generally, the
existence of θl, θm, θh follows from our maintained assumption that every pair in Θ has upper and lower
bounds; see Appendix B.2.
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Given either (34) or (35), Claim 8 implies x  x′ and x′  x, a contradiction.
To show that  is a refinement of SCD, it suffices to show that
(∀x, x′ ∈ X) x SCD x′ =⇒ x  x′, (36)
because both  and SCD are anti-symmetric. Take any x, x′ ∈ X such that x SCD x′. As
Dx,x′ is single crossing only from below, ∃θl < θh such that sign[Dx,x′(θl)] < sign[Dx,x′(θh)].
Claim 8 implies x  x′, which proves (36).
(⇐= ) Take any S ⊆ X and θl < θh. To establish that
arg max
s∈S




x ∈ arg max
s∈S




x ∧ x′ ∈ arg max
s∈S
f(s, θl) and x ∨ x′ ∈ arg max
s∈S
f(s, θh). (38)
Pick any x and x′ satisfying (37) (if there is either no such x or no such x′, we are done),
which implies
Dx,x′(θl) ≥ 0 ≥ Dx,x′(θh). (39)
Assume x 6= x′, as otherwise (38) holds trivially. Dx,x′ is single crossing in θ because
f has SCD on X . As X is minimal and x 6= x′, (39) implies that Dx,x′ cannot be single
crossing from both below and above.
Suppose first that Dx,x′ is single crossing only from below. Then x SCD x′ (by defini-
tion of SCD), and hence x  x′ (since  is a refinement of SCD), which in turn implies
x = x ∨ x′ and x′ = x ∧ x′. Moreover, (39) implies that Dx,x′(θl) = 0 = Dx,x′(θh). Hence,
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both x and x′ are in arg maxs∈S f(s, θl) and in arg maxs∈S f(s, θh), which implies (38).
Suppose next that Dx,x′ is single crossing only from above, or equivalently, Dx′,x is
single crossing only from below. Analogous to the previous paragraph, it follows that
x′ SCD x, x′  x, and hence x′ = x ∨ x′ and x = x ∧ x′. Plainly, (38) holds as it is
equivalent to (37).
F.3. Proof of Lemma 4
The proof is omitted as it is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3 in Appendix F.1.
F.4. Proof of Proposition 3
Take any S ⊂ X . To show that any selection is monotonic, we assume that arg maxs∈S f(s, θ)
is non-empty for all θ, as otherwise the result holds vacuously. Pick any θl < θh and any
x ∈ arg maxs∈S f(s, θl) and x′ ∈ arg maxs∈S f(s, θh). We must show that x′  x. As this is
trivially true if x = x′, assume x 6= x′. Dx,x′ is strictly single crossing in θ because f has
SSCD and X is minimal. Since Dx,x′(θl) ≥ 0 ≥ Dx,x′(θh) from the hypotheses on x and
x′, it follows that Dx,x′ is strictly single crossing only from above, or equivalently, Dx′,x is
strictly single crossing only from below. Thus, x′ SSCD x (by definition of SSCD) and
x′  x (as  is a refinement of SSCD).
G. Proofs for Monotonic Expectational Differences (Sub-
section 4.1)
G.1. Proof of Lemma 5
(⇐= ) Suppose there exist λ1, λ2 ∈ R such that f2 = λ1f1 + λ2. Then, for any α ∈ R2,
(α · f)(θ) = α1f1(θ) + α2(λ1f1(θ) + λ2) = (α1 + α2λ1)f1(θ) + λ2,
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which is monotonic.
( =⇒ ) The proof is trivial if both f1 and f2 are constant functions. Thus, we suppose
that one function, say f1, is not constant:
(∃θ′, θ′′) f1(θ′) 6= f1(θ′′). (40)

















has a unique solution λ ∈ R2. We will show that f2 = λ1f1 + λ2.
Suppose, towards contradiction, there exists θλ such that
f2(θλ) 6= λ1f1(θλ) + λ2. (42)
Let θ and θ be a lower and upper bound of {θ′, θ′′, θλ}. If rank[Mθ,θ] < 2, f1(θ) = f1(θ).
As θ′ and θ′′ are between θ and θ, and f1 is monotone, we have f1(θ′) = f1(θ′′), which





























Equation 43 implies that λ′ solves (41). As the unique solution to (41) was λ, it follows
that λ′ = λ. But then (42) and (44) are in contradiction.
G.2. Proof of Proposition 4
(⇐= ) We omit the proof as it is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix C.1.
( =⇒ ) For the proof of necessity, if (∀x) f(x, θ) is a constant function of θ, then we
let λ1(x) = 0 and λ2(x) = f(x, θ). If there exists x′ ∈ X such that f(x′, θ) is not a con-
stant function of θ, then Lemma 5 implies (∀x, θ) f(x, θ) = λ1(x)f(x′, θ) + λ2(x), with
λ1, λ2 : X → R.
It remains to verify the λ1 and λ2 are finitely integrable. Take θ′, θ′′ such that f(x′, θ′) 6=
f(x′, θ′′), so that f(x, θ′) = λ1(x)f(x′, θ′)+λ2(x) and f(x, θ′′) = λ1(x)f(x′, θ′′)+λ2(x). By hy-
pothesis, both f(x, θ′) and f(x, θ′′) are finitely-integrable functions of x. Since f(x′, θ′) and
f(x′, θ′′) are independent of x, it follows that f(x, θ′)−f(x, θ′′) = λ1(x) (f(x′, θ′)− f(x′, θ′′))
is finitely integrable, and so is λ1(x). Moreover, λ2(x) = f(x, θ′) − λ1(x)f(x′, θ′) is finitely
integrable.
G.3. Proof of Theorem 4
(⇐= ) We omit the proof as it is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix D.1.
( =⇒ ) The proof is trivial if v(a, θ) = 0 for all a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ, so assume there exists a0
such that v(a0, ·) : Θ→ R is not a zero function. Define f : A×Θ→ R by f(a, θ) ≡ v(a, θ)−
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v(a0, θ). Note that (i) (∀a) f(a, ·) is a monotonic function of θ (consider the expectational
difference with measures that put probability one on a and a0 respectively), and (ii) (∀θ)
f(·, θ) is a finitely-integrable function of a.
Let Σ be a σ-algebra on A containing all singleton sets. Let A′ ≡ A\a0. Then (A′,Σ′)
with Σ′ ≡ {A˜ ∈ Σ | A˜ ⊆ A′} is also a measurable space, in which Σ′ contains all singleton
sets in A′. As in the proof of Theorem 1 in Appendix D.2, for every finite signed measure
µ′ over Σ′, there exist P,Q ∈ ∆A such that ∫
A′ f(a, θ)dµ
′ is monotonic if and only if DP,Q
is monotonic. By Proposition 4, there exist a′ ∈ A\a0 and λ1, λ2 : A\{a0} → R such that
(∀a, θ) f(a, θ) = λ1(a)f(a′, θ) + λ2(a), with λ1, λ2 finitely integrable. Hence, there exist
functions g1, g2 : A → R, both finitely integrable and g1(a0) = g2(a0) = 0, such that
f(a, θ) = g1(a)f(a
′, θ) + g2(a), or equivalently, v(a, θ) = g1(a)f(a′, θ) + g2(a) + v(a0, θ).
G.4. Further Results Comparing MED and SCED
LetΘ≡ {θ : θ ∈ Θ} be a family of type-dependent preferences (i.e., complete, reflex-
ive, and transitive binary relations) over ∆A. We say that v : A × Θ → R represents Θ
(in the expected utility form) if







We say that v′ : A × Θ → R is a type-dependent positive affine transformation of v if
there exist b : Θ → R++ and d : Θ → R such that v′(a, θ) = b(θ)v(a, θ) + d(θ). For any
v : A × Θ → R and Θ defined by (45), a function v′ : A × Θ → R is a type-dependent
positive affine transformation of v if and only if v′ represents Θ.
Proposition 5. Let v : A×Θ→ R have SCED: i.e.,
v(a, θ) = g1(a)f1(θ) + g2(a)f2(θ) + c(θ),
where g1, g2 : A → R are each finitely integrable, f1, f2 : Θ → R are each single crossing and
140
ratio ordered, and c : Θ→ R. LetΘ be the family of type-dependent preferences over ∆A defined
by (45). Then, Θ can be represented by a function with MED if and only if (i) either g1 is an
affine transformation of g2 or vice-versa, or (ii) f1 and f2 are linearly dependent, or (iii) there exists
λ ∈ R2\{0} such that (∀θ) (λ · f)(θ) > 0.
We can interpret Proposition 5 as follows: givenΘ with an SECD representation, there
is an MED representation if and only if either
(a) there is a pair of types that do not share the same strict preference over any pair of
lotteries (i.e., (∃θ′, θ′′) (∀P,Q ∈ ∆A) DP,Q(θ′)DP,Q(θ′′) ≤ 0), or
(b) there is a pair of lotteries over which all types share the same strict preference (i.e.,
(∃P,Q ∈ ∆A) (∀θ) DP,Q(θ) > 0).
To see this interpretation, suppose Case (i) or (ii) holds in Proposition 5. Then, there
are functions gˆ1, fˆ1, and cˆ such that v(a, θ) = gˆ1(a)fˆ1(θ) + cˆ(θ), with fˆ1 single crossing. If
gˆ1 is constant or fˆ1 is a zero function, every type is indifferent across all lotteries, and (a)
holds. Suppose gˆ1 is not constant. If fˆ1 > 0 (or < 0), then (b) holds.40 If fˆ1(θ) is single
crossing from only below or from only above, then for some θ′ and θ′′, fˆ1(θ′)fˆ1(θ′′) ≤ 0;
the pair θ′ and θ′′ does not share the same strict preference over any two lotteries, and so
(a) holds. On the other hand, if Proposition 5’s Case (iii) applies and Case (i) does not,
then (b) holds, because (∃P,Q ∈ ∆A,M ∈ R++) (∀θ) MDP,Q(θ) = (λ · f)(θ) > 0; see (46).41
Here is some geometric intuition for the “if” direction of Proposition 5. For Case (i) or
(ii), v(a, θ) = gˆ1(a)fˆ1(θ) + cˆ(θ) with fˆ1 single crossing, as already noted. We can rescale
fˆ1(θ) using a function b : Θ → R++ such that b(θ)fˆ1(θ) is monotonic. Thus, v′(a, θ) ≡
b(θ)v(a, θ) represents Θ and has MED. For Case (iii), assume without loss of generality
40 Consider two degenerate lotteries over a′ and a′′ such that gˆ1(a′) 6= gˆ2(a′′).
41 Conversely, (a) implies either Case (i) or (ii) of Proposition 5. If g1 and g2 are affinely independent (i.e., a
violation of (i)), then (∀λ ∈ R2\{0}) (∃P,Q ∈ ∆A,M ∈ R++) (∀θ) (λ · f)(θ) = MDP,Q(θ); see (46). Then, (a)
implies that for some θ′, θ′′ and for some β ≤ 0, f(θ′) = βf(θ′′), which, together with Condition (2) of ratio




gi(a)d[P −Q] for i = 1, 2, it holds that λ1f1(θ) + λ2f2(θ) = DP,Q(θ) > 0 for all θ.
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that ‖(λ1, λ2)‖ = 1. Let b(θ) ≡ 1(λ·f)(θ) . It follows that (∀θ) (λ · (bf))(θ) = 1, i.e., the function
b adjusts the lengths of vectors {f(θ) ∈ R2 : θ ∈ Θ} while maintaining their directions,
as illustrated in Figure 8. The vector (bf)(θ) rotates monotonically as θ increases, while
staying on the hyperplane {x ∈ R2 |λ · x = 1}. Let e1 ≡ (1, 0) and e2 ≡ (0, 1). Suppose
{e1, λ} is a basis forR2 (an analogous argument would hold if instead {e2, λ}were a basis).
Then, for every θ, the vector (bf)(θ) is represented as (b(θ)f1(θ), 1) with respect to the new
basis. We define f˜1(θ) ≡ b(θ)f1(θ) and
v′(a, θ) ≡ b(θ)v(a, θ) = g˜1(a)f˜1(θ) + g˜2(a) + b(θ)c(θ),
with appropriately defined functions g˜1 and g˜2. Since (bf)(θ) rotates monotonically, f˜1(θ)
is monotonic. It follows that v′ has MED.
Figure 8: A geometric intuition for sufficiency of (iii) in Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 5. ( ⇐= ) First we prove that if either (i) or (ii) holds, then we can
write v as v(a, θ) = gˆ1(a)fˆ1(θ) + cˆ(θ), with fˆ1 single crossing.
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Suppose (i) holds; without loss, assume (∃d1, d2 ∈ R) (∀a) g2(a) = d1g1(a) + d2. Then,
gˆ1(a) = g1(a), fˆ1(θ) = f1(θ) + d1f2(θ), and cˆ(θ) = d2f2(θ) + c(θ). Next suppose (ii) holds;
without loss, assume (∃d ∈ R) (∀θ) f2(θ) = df1(θ). Then, gˆ1(a) = g1(a) + dg2(a), fˆ1(θ) =






|fˆ1(θ)| if fˆ1(θ) 6= 0,
1 otherwise.
Since (∀θ) b(θ) > 0, v′(a, θ) ≡ b(θ)v(a, θ) = gˆ1(a)b(θ)fˆ1(θ) + b(θ)cˆ(θ) is a type-dependent
positive affine transformation of v, and hence it also represents Θ. As fˆ1 is single cross-
ing, b(θ)fˆ1(θ) = sign[fˆ1(θ)] is monotonic, and v′ has MED.
Now suppose (iii) holds: (∃λ ∈ R2\{0}) (∀θ) (λ · f)(θ) > 0. Define b(θ) ≡ 1
(λ·f)(θ) . Then
(λ · (bf))(θ) = 1, so that either (bf1)(θ) is an affine transformation of (bf2)(θ), or vice-versa:
(∃γ, ω ∈ R) such that either b(θ)f1(θ) = γb(θ)f2(θ) + ω or b(θ)f2(θ) = γb(θ)f1(θ) + ω.
We consider the case in which b(θ)f2(θ) = γb(θ)f1(θ) + ω and omit the other case’s
analogous proof. If λ2 ≥ (≤)0, then as f1 ratio dominates f2,
(∀θ′ ≤ θ′′) f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) ≤ f1(θ′′)f2(θ′)
=⇒ λ1f1(θ′)f1(θ′′) + λ2f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) ≤ (≥)λ1f1(θ′)f1(θ′′) + λ2f1(θ′′)f2(θ′)
=⇒ f1(θ′)(λ · f)(θ′′) ≤ (≥)f1(θ′′)(λ · f)(θ′)
=⇒ b(θ′)f1(θ′) ≤ (≥)b(θ′′)f1(θ′′).
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Thus, regardless of whether λ2 ≥ 0 or λ2 ≤ 0, (bf1)(θ) is monotonic in θ. It follows that
v′(a, θ) ≡ b(θ)v(a, θ) = g1(a)b(θ)f1(θ) + g2(a)b(θ)f2(θ) + b(θ)c(θ)
= g1(a)b(θ)f1(θ) + g2(a)(γb(θ)f1(θ) + ω) + b(θ)c(θ)
= (g1(a) + γg2(a))b(θ)f1(θ) + ωg2(a) + b(θ)c(θ)
has MED.
( =⇒ ) We prove that if neither (i) or (ii) holds, then (iii) holds.
We first show that when (i) does not hold,
(∀λ ∈ R2\{0}) (∃P,Q ∈ ∆A,M ∈ R++) (λ · f)(θ) = MDP,Q(θ) for all θ. (46)
As (i) does not hold, the three functions g1, g2, and 1 (where 1 represents the constant
function whose value is 1) are linearly independent. For otherwise, either g1 and g2 are
linearly dependent, or (∃α ∈ R2\{0}) (∀a) α1g1(a) + α2g2(a) = 1; in either case, either g1
would be an affine transformation of g2 or vice-versa.
























Take a sufficiently large M ∈ R++ such that |di| ≤ M/3 for i = 0, 1, 2, and define P,Q ∈
∆A so that P ({ai}) = 1/3 and Q({ai}) = 1/3 − di/M for i = 0, 1, 2. Then, both P and Q
are probability measures on {a0, a1, a2}, and




di (g1(ai)f1(θ) + g2(ai)f2(θ))
= MDP,Q(θ).
Suppose Θ is represented by a function v′ : A × Θ → R with MED. As both v and v′
represent Θ in the expected utility form, v′ is a type-dependent positive affine transfor-
mation of v. It follows that there exist b : Θ→ R++ and d : Θ→ R such that
v′(a, θ) = b(θ)v(a, θ) + d(θ) = g1(a)fˆ1(θ) + g2(a)fˆ2(θ) + cˆ(θ),
where fˆ1(θ) = b(θ)f1(θ), fˆ2(θ) = b(θ)f2(θ), and cˆ(θ) = b(θ)c(θ) + d(θ).
Given (46), for any λ ∈ R2\{0}, there exist P,Q ∈ ∆A and M ∈ R++ such that















As f1 and f2 are linearly independent, there exist θ1, θ2 such that rank[Mθ1,θ2 ] = 2, which
implies that rank[Mˆθ1,θ2 ] = 2. Let λ∗ ∈ R2\{0} be the unique solution of Mˆθ1,θ2λ = (1, 1).
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Take any θ0, and let θ and θ be a lower and upper bound of {θ0, θ1, θ2}. It must be that
rank[Mˆθ,θ] = 2. If otherwise, there exists λ ∈ R2\{0} such that (λ · fˆ)(θ) = (λ · fˆ)(θ) = 0. By
(46), λ·fˆ is monotonic, so (λ·fˆ)(θ1) = (λ·fˆ)(θ2) = 0, which contradicts rank[Mˆθ1,θ2 ] = 2. Let
λ∗∗ be the unique solution of Mˆθ,θλ = (1, 1). By monotonicity of λ
∗∗ · fˆ , Mˆθ1,θ2λ∗∗ = (1, 1),
which implies that λ∗∗ = λ∗. It follows that (λ∗ · fˆ)(θ0) = 1. As θ0 is arbitrary, we have
(∀θ) (λ∗ · fˆ)(θ) = 1.
Finally, (∀θ) (λ∗ · f)(θ) = (λ∗·fˆ)(θ)
b(θ)
> 0. Q.E.D.
We can use Proposition 5 to provide an example of type-dependent preferences repre-
sentable by an SCED function that are not representable by any MED function:
Example 4. Let Θ ≡ (−1, 1] ⊂ R and A = {a0, a′, a′′}. Consider v(a, θ) = g1(a)f1(θ) +
g2(a)f2(θ), with
1. g1(a0) = g2(a0) = 0, g1(a′) = g2(a′) = 1, g1(a′′) = 2, g2(a′′) = 3, and
2. f1(θ) = θ, f2(θ) = 1− θ2.
Observe that f1 ratio dominates f2: if θ′ < θ′′, then θ′θ′′ < 1, and hence f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) <
f1(θ
′′)f2(θ′). It follows that v has SCED.
We claim the family of type-dependent preferences Θ represented by v is not repre-
sentable by any MED function. It is easy to verify that neither is g1 is an affine transfor-
mation of g2 nor vice-versa, and that f1 and f2 are linearly independent. By Proposition 5,
it suffices to show that @λ ∈ R2 such that (∀θ) (λ · f)(θ) > 0. Take any (λ1, λ2) ∈ R2\{0}. If
λ1 = 0, then (λ · f)(1) = 0. If, on the other hand, λ1 6= 0, then sign[(λ · f)(1)] = sign[λ1] and
limθ→−1 sign[(λ · f)(θ)] = − sign[λ1], and so (∃θ)(λ · f)(θ) < 0. 
H. Relaxing Anti-symmetry
This appendix shows how anti-symmetry of ≤ over Θ can be dropped by appropri-
ately generalizing the definition of single crossing. This extension is useful, for example,
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because rankings over Θ based on norms (say, when Θ ⊆ Rn) generally violate anti-
symmetry.
Assume (Θ,≤) is a preordered set, i.e., ≤ is a binary relation that is reflexive and tran-
sitive, but not necessarily anti-symmetric. We write θ′ ∼= θ′′ when θ′ ≥ θ′′ and θ′ ≤ θ′′.
Definition 12. When (Θ,≤) is a preordered set, a function f : Θ→ R is42
1. single crossing from below if
(∀θ < θ′) f(θ) ≥ (>)0 =⇒ f(θ′) ≥ (>)0, and
(∀θ′ ∼= θ) sign[f(θ)] = sign[f(θ′)];
2. single crossing from above if
(∀θ < θ′) f(θ) ≤ (<)0 =⇒ f(θ′) ≤ (<)0, and
(∀θ′ ∼= θ) sign[f(θ)] = sign[f(θ′)];
3. single crossing if it is single crossing either from below or from above.
Definition 12 reduces to Definition 1 when (Θ,≤) is a partially-ordered set, because in
that case θ′ ∼= θ ⇐⇒ θ′ = θ.
Lemma 6. Let f1, f2 : Θ→ R be single-crossing functions on a preordered set (Θ,≤). The linear
combination α1f1(θ)+α2f2(θ) is single crossing ∀α ∈ R2 if and only if f1 and f2 are ratio ordered.
The rest of our main results (Proposition 1, Theorem 1, and Theorem 3) and their proofs
remain the same.
The proof of Lemma 6 consists of establishing Claim 9 and Claim 10 below.
42 Recall that for x ∈ R, sign[x] = 1 if x > 0, sign[x] = 0 if x = 0, and sign[x] = −1 if x < 0.
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Claim 9. Let f1, f2 : Θ→ R each be single crossing. Then, (∀α ∈ R2)
either (∀θ < θ′) (α · f)(θ) ≥ (>)0 =⇒ (α · f)(θ′) ≥ (>)0,
or (∀θ < θ′) (α · f)(θ) ≤ (<)0 =⇒ (α · f)(θ′) ≤ (<)0
if and only if fi and fj , for either (i, j) = (1, 2) or (i, j) = (2, 1), satisfy
(∀θl < θh) fi(θl)fj(θh) ≤ fi(θh)fj(θl), and
(∀θl < θm < θh) fi(θl)fj(θh) = fi(θh)fj(θl) ⇐⇒
 fi(θl)fj(θm) = fi(θm)fj(θl),fi(θm)fj(θh) = fi(θh)fj(θm).
Proof. The proof of Claim 9 is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 given two observations:
(i) the proof of Lemma 1 does not use anti-symmetry of≤ over Θ; (ii) the weak inequalities
θl ≤ θh in (1) and θl ≤ θm ≤ θh in (2) can be replaced with strict inequalities. Q.E.D.
Claim 10. Let f1, f2 : Θ→ R each be single crossing. Then,
(∀α ∈ R2)(∀θ′ ∼= θ) sign[(α · f)(θ′)] = sign[(α · f)(θ′′)]
if and only if
(∀θ′ ∼= θ′′) f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) = f1(θ′′)f2(θ′).
Proof. ( =⇒ ) Suppose, towards contradiction, that (∃θ′ ∼= θ′′) f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) 6= f1(θ′′)f2(θ′).
Then, α′ ≡ (−f2(θ′), f1(θ′)) 6= 0. It follows that (α′ · f)(θ′) = 0 and (α′ · f)(θ′′) 6= 0, which
contradicts to single crossing of α′ · f .
( ⇐= ) Take any α ∈ R2 and θ′ ∼= θ′′. If f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) = f1(θ′′)f2(θ′) 6= 0, then all four
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function values are non-zero. Thus,








(because sign[f1(θ′)] = sign[f1(θ′′)] 6= 0)
= sign [α1f1(θ
′′) + α2f2(θ′′)] (using f2(θ′′) = f2(θ′)f1(θ′′)/f1(θ′))
= sign[(α · f)(θ′′)].
If, on the other hand, f1(θ′)f2(θ′′) = f1(θ′′)f2(θ′) = 0, then at least one function value,
say f1(θ′), equals zero. As f1 is single crossing, f1(θ′) = f1(θ′′) = 0. Thus,
sign[(α · f)(θ′)] = sign[α2f2(θ′)] = sign[α2f2(θ′′)] = sign[(α · f)(θ′′)]. Q.E.D.
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Abstract
A principal hires an agent to acquire costly information that will influence the decision of a third
party. While the realized piece of information is observable and contractible, the experimental process
is not. Assuming a general family of information cost functions (inclusive of Shannon’s mutual infor-
mation), we show that the first best is achievable when the agent has limited liability or when he is risk
averse, in contrast to standard moral hazard models. However, when the agent is risk averse and has
limited liability, efficiency losses arise generically. Specifically, we show that the principal obtains his
first best outcome if and only if she intends to implement a ”symmetric” experiment, i.e. one in which
the cost of generating each piece of evidence is the same. On the other hand, ”asymmetric” experiments
that are relatively uninformative with high probability but occasionally produce conclusive evidence will
bear large agency costs.
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1. Introduction
As a firm expands, its research activities once juggled by a single individual are delegated to analysts.
Similarly, upon obtaining a grant an empirical researcher is able to hire assistants to carry out her surveys.
Moral hazard arises naturally in these delegated information acquisition problems as the interested party
is unable to fully monitor the investigation. However, upon its conclusion there is usually some form of
hard and observable evidence. To what extent does contracting only on this observable evidence alter the
new ventures considered by the firm or the survey design of the empirical researcher? Relatedly, are com-
mon contracting frictions that induce inefficiency in classic moral hazard models as problematic when the
”output” is information and the ”effort” is a costly investigation?
Our information acquisition model is motivated by the bayesian persuasion framework (Kamenica and
Gentzkow (2011)) in which a sender seeks information in order to influence the choice of a decision maker.
In reality, the sender in these games represents multiple individuals with differing levels of interest in the
eventual decision. For example, a prosecutor attempting to persuade a judge often delegates the investigative
effort to an agent or a group of agents including police officers, private investigators, or forensic scientists.
While the prosecutor is evaluated by her rate of conviction, it is likely that the lab technician or private
investigator is disinterested in the eventual decision.1 Following this logic, our study ”splits” the sender in
bayesian persuasion problems into an interested principal and a disinterested agent. The principal incen-
tivizes the agent to seek costly information through the use of monetary transfers. Moreover, our framework
encompasses the case in which the principal also has decision rights and incentivizes an agent to inform her
own choice.2
This problem introduces two important modeling questions: what kind of investigations, or experiments,
can the agent conduct, and what about these experiments can the principal observe?3 Following the literature
on flexible costly information acquisition (e.g. Caplin and Dean (2013)), we assume that the agent can
pursue any experiment at a cost that is proportional to the expected reduction of uncertainty it induces.
Uncertainty is measured by an arbitrary concave function over beliefs about the state of the world. Shannon’s
1 Other classic examples from bayesian persuasion also into this paradigm: the CEO of a company directs managers and analysts
to seek the relevant information about whether a merger or acquisition is profitable, and a pharmaceutical company employs lab
technicians and scientists to conduct its randomized trials.
2 These decision problems capture most of the interesting tensions that are present in the general model.
3 Given a state space, an experiment is an arbitrary signal space and a mapping from states to distributions over that signal space.
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mutual information, with entropy as the measure of uncertainty, is an example of such a cost function.
In answering the second question, it is natural to assume that the principal can observe the discovered
evidence but not the research process generating it. This is consistent with general practice as experts and
researchers are commonly rewarded for their conclusions rather than their investigations. However, many
economically different models of delegated experimentation match this general description. The key ques-
tion distinguishing these is as follows: conditional on observing the realized evidence, how much additional
information (about the payoff relevant state) would be gleaned from learning the remaining details of the
investigation? Our approach is to assume that learning these additional details would not cause any party to
update their beliefs about the state. More formally, the principal can observe and contract upon the posterior
belief that results from the agent’s experiment but cannot observe the set of posterior beliefs that could have
been realized or on the probability of their realizations.4 In Subsection 1.1 we provide examples that do and
do not fit this framework. As well as being realistic in many situations, our observability assumptions ab-
stract from strategic misreporting issues: the agent credibly reveals his private information about the payoff
relevant state.
This allows us to zero in on the agency costs of not observing the experiment. We find that inefficiency
arises in certain contexts relative to the ”first best” case in which the principal can directly observe and
contract on the entire investigative process.5 Our main results are two-fold. First, we find that if the agent
is risk neutral or has no limited liability, then the principal can implement the same experiment at the same
wage bill as in the first best problem, despite it being impossible or unprofitable to ”sell the firm to the
agent”. However, if the agent is strictly risk averse and has limited liability, the principal will generically
suffer a loss relative to the first best problem, implement a different experiment, and provide the agent with
a positive rent.
The efficiency results in the presence of a single friction are in stark contrast to those in standard moral
hazard problems. To fix ideas, consider a worker whose potential output is his effort level plus a normal
noise.6 All effort levels induce distributions over outputs that share a common support. Thus, in order to
4 It is worth noting that in typical models of bayesian persuasion, the distinction between observing the experiment or only
observing the realized posterior is irrelevant. The difference in our model is that the principal can ex-ante commit to incentives for
the agent.
5 The first best is best from the principal’s perspective, and is not necessarily the best outcome for the decision maker and the
agent. Inefficiencies are correspondingly taken from the principal’s perspective.
6 Assume that the output space is bounded and the normal noise is truncated at these boundaries to avoid the critique in Mirrlees
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provide sufficient incentives for the desired effort level, the principal must provide a large enough wage
spread over outcomes. This may be prohibitively costly in the presence of risk aversion or limited liability.
In contrast, consider an information acquisition problem in which the state space is binary, {L,R}, and the
principal seeks full information about the state, i.e. an experiment that realizes posteriors p ∈ {0,1} (where
p is identified with the probability that the state is R). Notice that any other experiment would generate
some posteriors that are not contained in {0,1}. This means that when the agent has unlimited liability,
the principal can dis-incentivize any deviation while maintaining the value of the intended experiment by
setting low wages for beliefs outside of {0,1}. As we elaborate in Subsection 3.3, the fact that no two
potentially optimal experiments share a common support also drives efficient implementation when the
agent has limited liability but is risk neutral. This latter result also relies on the fact that information cost
function takes the form of an expectation.
The reason that both frictions together induce inefficiency is as follows. We will show that under lim-
ited liability, implementing an experiment while providing the agent zero rent requires paying wages that
are commensurate with the ”change in certainty” that each piece of evidence provides. That is, potential
evidence realizations that move the principal’s belief further from the prior must be allocated a higher wage,
where the relevant distance measure depends on the information cost function.7 When the agent is strictly
risk averse, and the evidence realizations from the intended experiment provide different ”changes in cer-
tainty”, the agent must be compensated for the induced risk in the wage schedule. As a consequence, the
principal pays a higher cost to implement (almost) every experiment, and will generically choose to imple-
ment a different experiment than that chosen in the first best problem. The exception to this rule is the class
of symmetric experiments: experiments in which all pieces of realized evidence induce the same ”change in
certainty”. Symmetric experiments are the only experiments that will be implemented at the first best wage
bill and provide the agent with zero rent.
We derive the above results by characterizing cost minimizing wage contracts (Proposition 5) in the pres-
ence of limited liability and risk aversion. As mentioned, the information cost function induces a distance
measure, D(p||p), which represents how costly a given belief p is to obtain when the prior is p. For a
given experiment, the agent’s information cost is proportional to the expectation of this distance measure.
(1999).
7 In the case of Shannon entropy, a belief is ”more certain” than another if the relative entropy between it and the prior belief is
larger.
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Finding the cost minimizing wage contract reduces to choosing a ”substitute prior”, p∗, in that the agent is
provided a utility for each belief proportional to the information cost of producing it as if the prior were
p∗, i.e. D(p||p∗).8 The agent receives a rent proportional to D(p∗||p) and the cost minimizing p∗ is set to
balance two incentives: (i) to minimize risk by equalizing the wages across the induced posteriors and (ii)
to minimize the agent’s rent, which increases as one moves p∗ away from the true prior p.
Our results speak to the kinds of information structures that pose potential incentive issues when dele-
gating information acquisition to an agent. The informativeness of an experiment does not make delegation
more or less costly: symmetric experiments, which are implemented at first best cost, are a class that can
be ranked by Blackwell’s informativeness order (Blackwell (1953)).9 It is instead the ”asymmetry” in an
experiment that drives its implementation cost over that in the first best problem: an experiment that obtains
certainty with low probability and is relatively uninformative otherwise will be costly to implement relative
to the first best. Examples of this kind of information structure include a scientific researcher looking for a
breakthrough, or a police officer conducting a stop and frisk investigation.
Layout The paper is organized as follows. Subsection 1.1 discusses our observability and contractibility
assumptions. Subsection 1.2 briefly surveys the related literature. Section 2 presents our model and dis-
cusses its assumptions. Section 3 shows how first best can be achieved when only one friction is present.
Section 4 characterizes cost minimizing wage contracts under both frictions. Section 5 uses this charac-
terization to discuss the inefficiencies that arise. Section 6 studies an application with a binary state space
and action choice and describes further properties of the second best solution. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Omitted proofs are in Appendix E.
1.1. Observability and Contractibility
Observability Assumptions The key feature of our observability assumptions is that the principal forms
the correct posterior beliefs after observing any realized piece of evidence. This means that after any signal
realization, the agent’s and principal’s beliefs about the state are aligned, despite the agent having private
information about the experiment that was run. Next, we detail examples of experiments that generally pro-
8 The wage for each belief is set as the inverse utility of this distance, U−1(λD(p||p∗)) (when liability is limited at zero, and the
agent has no outside option).
9 Symmetric experiments are completely ranked by Blackwell’s order in the case of a binary state space.
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duce different information while still being indistinguishable under some evidence realizations: Example 1
and Example 2 fit our assumptions, whereas Example 3 does not.
Example 1. A prosecutor hires a private investigator to ask potential witnesses whether they saw the defen-
dant at the crime scene. We assume that witnesses never lie: if one witness affirms seeing the defendant at
the crime scene, the fact then becomes established. Therefore, the investigator will question witnesses until
he finds one that confirms seeing the defendant or until he gives up. The important parameter in the choice
of investigation is this stopping time.
Consider two such alternatives in which the investigator stops after questioning one or two witnesses
respectively. In either case, all interviews and responses are truthfully relayed to the prosecutor and then the
court. Note that if the first witness affirms seeing the defendant, the prosecutor will not be able to distinguish
the two investigations: both will question the first witness, receive a confirmation and stop. Moreover, if the
court were to learn the type of investigation, there would be no update on the posterior belief concerning the
defendant’s guilt: knowing how many more witnesses the investigator planned on questioning is irrelevant.
If instead, none of the witnesses had seen the defendant at the crime scene, one investigation would
reveal two negatives while the other would reveal only one. In this case, the investigations produce different
beliefs concerning the guilt of the defendant; the more people that did not see the defendant at the crime
scene, the less likely he is to be guilty.
Example 2. A firm hires an external consultant to assess whether to enter a new market. The profitability
of the new venture is distributed with full support over values x ∈ {0,1,2,3}. Consider the following two
investigations for the external consultant: investigation (i) reveals whether the profit is very high (x= 3), low
(x ∈ {1,2}), or if the project is a failure (x = 0); while investigation (ii) distinguishes very low (x = 1), high
(x ∈ {2,3}) or failure (x = 0). If the project is a failure they will both provide the same information about
the project, and learning the type of investigation would not further inform the firm about the profitability
of the new venture. However, these investigations are not equivalent as the set of evidence and resulting
posteriors are different.
Example 3. It is important to note situations in which our observability assumptions are not appropriate.
Again consider the two investigations from Example 1. Imagine that instead of requiring that all interviews
be presented at trial, the investigator simply reports whether or not some witness confirmed seeing the
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defendant at the crime scene. Unlike in our model, learning the investigation in addition to the realized
evidence could cause the prosecutor and the judge to update their beliefs. If the investigator does not find a
witness, learning that two interviews had been conducted would make the judge believe the defendant was
less likely to be guilty.
Contractibility Assumptions In addition to assuming that posteriors are observable, we also assume that
they are contractible. That is, the principal can commit to a wage contract that depends on the realized
posterior. In some settings such as scientific research, a payment for a specific belief may be enforceable,
but in others it is hard to imagine that something as esoteric as a posterior could form the basis of a lost
wages lawsuit. It is therefore more appropriate to interpret the assumption of contractible posteriors as
being made credible through the existence of relational contracts a la MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). If
the value of the relationship is high enough and the discount factor is low enough, relational contracts will
allow the principal to behave as if non-contractibles were contractible.
Furthermore, in many instances the posterior that results from an experiment is the only contractible
outcome. Indeed, in addition to the choice of the experiment being hidden, the actual state of the world
might never be precisely observed. This is typical in criminal trials: most cases do not see new evidence
after the jury reaches a verdict. In other situations the state may be observed, but only after the contracting
period between the principal and the agent has passed.
1.2. Related Literature
Our focus is a moral hazard problem and so our study relates to the enormous literature on this subject
initiated by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Ross (1973), Holmstrom (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1981).
However, our paper centers on incentivizing an agent to gather costly information instead of producing costly
output.
Certain strands of the delegation literature study an agent who can acquire additional information. Ex-
amples include Szalay (2005), Szalay (2009), and Che and Kartik (2009). These papers differ from ours
in that (i) they focus on strategic issues of communicating the realized evidence, whereas we assume that
this information is automatically and credibly communicated and (ii) agents are incentivized through their
preferences over decisions, instead of monetary transfers. Angelucci (2014) concerns delegation of costly
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information acquisition to potentially multiple interested senders and, like our paper, assumes that the ”re-
sults” of the investigation are directly passed to the principal. However, the observability assumptions are
different in that, conditional on the realized evidence, learning the actual experiment undertaken by the agent
could cause the principal to update her beliefs.
Our paper is not the first to consider incentivizing information acquisition through monetary transfers.
Early work includes Osband (1989), in which a planner wants to match his action to an unknown state, and
hires an agent to provide a forecast of it, while both the cost of effort and the effort itself are unobservable
to the planner. A closely related paper is Zermeno (2011), which also studies the problem of a principal
incentivizing an agent to acquire information about an unknown state through monetary transfers. Zermeno
assumes, in contrast to this study, that posteriors are non-contractible while realized states and payoffs are.
Caroll (2012) characterizes the optimal contract when both the realized posterior and the realized state are
observable but there is some uncertainty about which experiments the agent can run - the principal is taking
a robustness approach and uses a max-min criterion.
Yoder (2017) analyzes designing a contract to incentivize risk neutral agents when, like in our model,
the payment to the agent only depends on the resulting posterior. The agent’s marginal cost of information
acquisition is unknown to the designer, and the author’s focus is the ensuing adverse selection problem.
Instead we focus on the moral hazard issue in the presence of limited liability and risk aversion.
Boleslavsky and Kim (2017) also study moral hazard in bayesian persuasion problems, but from a dif-
ferent perspective. The sender retains his information acquisition role instead of delegating it to the agent.
However after the sender designs an experiment, the agent chooses an unobserved effort level that affects
the prior distribution of the state.
As mentioned, our work extends the now large literature on bayesian persuasion initiated by Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). We rely on the associated techniques developed in Aumann et al. (1995) when
solving for the optimal contract. We also use insights from Caplin and Dean (2013) and Matejka and
McKay (2015), who analyze a decision maker acquiring costly information in order to aid her own decision,




2.1. Preliminaries and Timing
An interested principal seeks to influence the choice of a decision maker. To this end, the principal con-
tracts with an agent to acquire costly information about the state of the world. After the agent investigates,
the principal and decision maker observe the resulting posterior, and the decision maker chooses an action.
While the principal is interested in the decision per-se, the agent is not and is instead incentivized through
monetary transfers.
Preferences of the Decision Maker and Principal The set of actions available to the decision maker,
A = {a1, ...,an}, is finite. The payoff of each action to the decision maker and the principal depends on the
realized state ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is finite. Let ∆Ω denote the simplex, i.e. the set of probability distributions,
or beliefs, on Ω. Let uDM : A×Ω→ R represent the decision maker’s utility over actions and states.
Define a(p) ≡ argmaxa∈A∑ω p(ω)uDM(a,ω) as the choice correspondence of a decision maker who
holds belief p ∈ ∆Ω. Let the principal’s utility over actions and states be uP : A×Ω→ R. We assume that
if the decision maker is indifferent between many actions, he takes the one preferred to the principal. The




Given a distribution over beliefs pi ∈ ∆(∆Ω), let the induced expected payoff of the principal be:
B(pi)≡ Epi [b(p)].
We call the set of posteriors that induce a particular action ai,10
Ai ≡ {p ∈ ∆Ω : b(p) =∑
ω
p(ω)uP(ai,ω)}.
10 We assume without loss of generality that these sets are disjoint. The Ai will not be disjoint if the principal and decision maker
are both indifferent between multiple actions at some belief p. But in this case, we simply conventionalize that the highest action
(in index) is chosen. Also without loss of generality we discard all dominated actions and consider A≡ ∪i{Ai : Ai 6= /0}.
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Finally, we assume that the principal’s payoff is quasi-linear in money. Note that our setting subsumes
the case in which the principal is also the decision maker, i.e. uP = uDM.
Information Acquisition Technology Prior to the decision being made, the principal hires an agent to
gather information about the state, which will be credibly communicated to the principal and decision maker.
The principal, the decision maker, and the agent all share the same prior on the state: p ∈ ∆Ω. The agent
chooses an experiment (also dubbed signal or signal structure in other studies), i.e. a set of signal labelsS ,
and a conditional distribution overS in each state. For a given experiment, due to the common prior, each
signal can be identified with its induced posterior belief about the state. This means that an experiment can
be described as an unconditional distribution over these posteriors beliefs, pi ∈∆(∆Ω). Conversely, as shown
by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), the only condition for such a distribution over posteriors to represent an
experiment is Bayes plausibility: the expectation of the posteriors is equal to the prior. We allow the agent
to choose any experiment, i.e. any element of the set:
Π(p)≡ {pi ∈ ∆(∆Ω) : Epi [p] = p} .
Agent’s Preferences The agent values money according to some utility function U : R→ R that is twice
continuously differentiable, weakly concave, strictly increasing, and unbounded above and below. We nor-
malize: U(0) = 0. Furthermore, the agent has access to an outside option that provides a utility level equal
to U and his liability may be limited, i.e. any monetary transfer to the agent is constrained to be weakly
greater than L ∈ R∪{−∞}.
The agent bears a cost of running each experiment, K(pi). We assume that this cost takes the following
posterior separable form:
K(pi) = λ (H(Epi [p])−Epi [H(p)]) = λ (H(p)−Epi [H(p)]), ∀pi ∈Π(p),
for some function H : ∆Ω→ R and parameter λ ∈ R+.
H can be interpreted as a measure of uncertainty about the state: H(p) is the initial uncertainty at the
prior, while Epi [H(p)] is the expected remaining uncertainty after the signal is observed. Thus, the cost
function K(pi) is the expected reduction in uncertainty that the experiment provides. Figure 1 illustrates the
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information cost function with a binary state space.11
Figure 1: Geometric representation of the cost function




with the corresponding cost function being Shannon’s mutual information. This was first introduced to
economics to model flexible and costly information acquisition by Sims (1998, 2003).12
We make the following assumptions concerning H.
Assumption 1. H has the following properties:
1. H is three times continuously differentiable and strictly concave;
2. Inada conditions: ∀p ∈ ∂ (∆Ω) and pn→ p,(pn)n ∈ ( ˚∆Ω)N, limn→∞ ||∇H(pn)||= ∞;13
11 In this case, the experiment pi has two posteriors in its support: p1 and p2 (with the weights pinned down by Bayes rule). The
information cost is the difference between ”expected ex-post uncertainty” and the prior uncertainty, H(p).
12 Caplin and Dean (2013) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2014) also make similar assumptions on an information cost function.
13 For any set X , we note X˚ the interior of the set X .
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3. D3H(p1)[(p2− p1), ., .]−D2H(p1)[., .] is positive semi-definite ∀p1, p2 ∈ ∆Ω.
Because H is strictly concave, for any informative experiment,14 the expected reduction in uncertainty,
and thereby the cost of the experiment is positive. Moreover, the concavity of H ensures that more informa-
tive experiments in the sense of Blackwell (1953) are more costly. The second part of Assumption 1 is an
Inada condition that will guarantee interior solutions. The third condition is technical, and is used later in
the paper.15 All of the above assumptions are satisfied by entropy.
2.2. The First Best Problem
To understand the potential efficiency losses that result from our observability assumptions, we first
formulate a basis for comparison. We take the first best to be the situation where the principal can directly
observe and contract on the agent’s choice of experiment. The principal chooses a desired experiment





U(w(pi))−K(pi)≥U(w(pi ′))−K(pi ′), ∀pi ′ ∈Π(p) (IC0),
w(pi)≥ L (LL0).
The (IR0) constraint ensures that the agent does not choose his outside option, and the (IC0) constraint
ensures that he does not choose another experiment.
First, notice that (IR0) implies that w(pi) ≥U−1(K(pi)+U). Second, setting the wage for other exper-
iments as low as (LL0) will permit, i.e. w(pi ′) = L, ∀pi ′ 6= pi , is optimal as this loosens (IC0), and leaves
the objective and the (IR0) constraint unchanged. This means that (IC0) is tightest when pi ′ = piN is the
uninformative experiment (K(piN) = 0), and reduces to w(pi) ≥U−1(K(pi)+U(L)). Thus, minimizing the
wage bill requires setting:
w(pi) =U−1(K(pi)+max{U(L),U}).
14 The uninformative experiment, piN , is characterized by, piN(p) = 1. An informative experiment is any experiment that is not
piN .
15 It is equivalent to the convexity in the second argument of the distance function we introduce in Subsection 3.3.
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The payoff to the agent for any experiment is max{U ,U(L)}. We denoteΠFB to be the set of solutions to
(1), and for piFB ∈ΠFB, we define V ∗FB =VFB(piFB).16 We refer to elements of ΠFB as first best experiments.
2.3. The Second Best Problem
Our main focus is the ”second best” problem that arises when the experiment cannot be observed. While
the agent still chooses a distribution over posteriors, only the realized posterior is observable and con-
tractible. The principal’s problem is to choose an intended experiment pi ∈ Π(p), and a wage contract
w : ∆Ω→ R, such that w is feasible (satisfies limited liability) and implements pi (makes pi incentive com-





Epi [U(w(p))+λH(p)]≥U +λH(p) (IR),
Epi [U(w(p))+λH(p)]≥ Epi ′ [U(w(p))+λH(p)] ,∀pi ′ ∈Π(p) (IC),
w(p)≥ L,∀p ∈ ∆Ω (LL).
Throughout we disregard the constant term λH(p) in the information cost and refer to the function
U(w(p))+λH(p) as the agent’s utility from generating belief p. LetΠSB be the set of solutions to the second
best problem, or second best experiments. For any experiment pi ∈ Π(p), we refer to the cost minimized
second best value as VSB(pi) = maxw B(pi)−Epi [w(p)], and note V ∗SB = VSB(piSB), for piSB ∈ ΠSB.17 For an
experiment pi and an optimal wage schedule w implementing it, we define the implementation cost as:
C(pi)≡ Epi [w(p)]−U−1(K(pi)+max{U(L),U}).
16 Appendix A provides details as to why ΠFB is non-empty.




As the first best problem provides the principal with more flexibility, C(pi)≥ 0, ∀pi ∈Π(p).
The rent obtained by the agent is Epi [U(w(p))]−K(pi)−U , i.e. the surplus utility the agent receives
beyond that of his outside option. However when U(L)>U , limited liability ensures a minimal rent to the
agent of U(L)−U , even in the first best problem. For this reason we focus on the excess rent of the agent:
ER(pi)≡ Epi [U(w(p))]−K(pi)−max{U ,U(L)}.
The excess rent is also the difference in the utility of the agent between the second and first best problems.
2.4. Analogy with the Standard Moral Hazard Problem
In standard moral hazard problems (SMH) (e.g. Holmstrom (1979)) the agent chooses a level of costly
unobservable effort which positively influences the distribution of the observable output. The principal must
implement his preferred effort level with a wage contract that depends only on the realized output.
Our model is comparable along many dimensions. First, the agent’s unobservable costly effort in the
SMH corresponds to the agent’s unobserved costly experiment in our model. Second, the observed output
in the SMH corresponds to the observed evidence or posterior in our model. Third, just as the principal in
the SMH must incentivize the agent with a wage contract that depends only on the realized output, in our
model he must do so with a wage contract that depends only on the realized posterior.
Despite these analogous features, our results diverge from those commonly found in the SMH. In the
next section, we show that if the agent’s liability is unlimited or the agent is risk neutral, the first best is
achievable.
3. Efficiency with a Single Friction
3.1. Unlimited Liability
We say that the agent has unlimited liability if L =−∞.
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Proposition 1. Assume that the agent has unlimited liability. The principal obtains his first best utility if
ΠFB contains an extreme point of Π(p).18
The extreme points of Π(p) are those with linearly independent support. For example, when |Ω| = 2
the set of extreme experiments are those with at most two posteriors in their support, i.e. each belief can be
uniquely identified with its prediction of the most likely state.19 Roughly, this assumption is equivalent to
imposing that the first best experiment does not induce more actions than there are states. In fact violations of
this assumption are non-generic when |A| ≤ |Ω|.20 The first best experiment is always an extreme experiment
in the application studied in Section 6.
The result stands in stark contrast with standard moral hazard problems. In those models, implementation
of the first best requires steep incentives, which then forces the principal to compensate the agent for the
resulting risk. Consider an agent choosing an effort level e with output y ∈ [y,y] distributed according to
some y∼Fe(.), with full support. For any realized output, all effort levels could have potentially led to its
realization. Thus if the principal attempted to dis-incentivize one action by lowering the wage on some y,
he would also necessarily lower a utility realization for the intended action.
Conversely, notice that given a posterior, only some experiments could have led to its realization. This
means that the principal can lower the agent’s utility for ”almost” all other experiments without affecting the
utility for her desired experiment. Consider |Ω| = 2 and an intended experiment pi with support {p1, p2}.
Because pi is extreme, it is the unique experiment that has support contained in {p1, p2}. For any other
experiment pi ′, consider lowering the wage on some posterior, p′ ∈ Supp(pi ′) \ {p1, p2}. This decreases
the utility of pi ′ while maintaining the utility of pi . Thus, the principal can implement the first best by
setting a constant (riskless) wage schedule for all posteriors in the support of the desired experiment, and
by sufficiently lowering the wage for all other posteriors. Unlimited liability ensures that the resulting wage
contract is feasible.
This logic is similar to that in Mirrlees (1999) in which the principal decreases wages for very low
18 An extreme point of a convex set X is a point that is not a convex combination of other points in X , i.e. x ∈ X such @x′,x′′ ∈
X ,α ∈ (0,1) such that αx′+(1−α)x′′ = x.
19 We provide a sufficient condition for ΠFB to contain an extreme experiment in Appendix D. It is a strengthening of the
condition developed in Caplin and Dean (2013) on the affine independence of actions’ payoffs.
20 The optimal experiment generates at most one posterior per action, hence will have less than |Ω| posteriors when |A| ≤ |Ω|.
Therefore the support of the optimal experiment is a linearly dependent set of lower cardinality than the dimension of the underlying
space.
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realizations of output at which the likelihood ratio between high and low effort levels vanishes.21 Let
pi ∈ΠFB be extreme. In Mirrlees’ terminology, for any other pi ′ ∈Π(p), there exists a posterior at which the
likelihood ratio between pi and pi ′ is zero.
The exception to the above argument is when pi is not the unique experiment with support contained in
Supp(pi), i.e. pi is not an extreme experiment. Experiments whose support is a subset of the intended exper-
iment cannot be dis-incentivized through the method above. Moreover, a partial converse to Proposition 1 is
as follows. When ΠFB does not contain an extreme experiment, and the agent is strictly risk averse, then the
principal will experience a utility loss compared to the first best problem. To implement any experiment pi at
first best cost when the agent is strictly risk averse, the principal must provide a constant wage schedule for
the posteriors in the support of pi . However, for any non-extreme experiment there exists an experiment pi ′
with nested support and strictly lower information cost. Since the wage contract is constant, pi ′ is a profitable
deviation for the agent.
3.2. Divergence Measure and Optimal Wage Contracts
The process of lowering wages for posteriors that are not in the support of the intended experiment can
be infeasible under limited liability, i.e. when L ∈R.22 Our next result establishes that the principal can still
implement any experiment at first best cost if the agent is risk neutral. The key to this implementation is
the class of wage contracts introduced below in (2). In Section 4 we show that the cost minimizing contract
remains among this class regardless of the agent’s risk aversion. For readability we introduce the contracts
here and present their geometric derivation later.
The contracts are defined in terms of the following distance measure which represents how costly it is for
the agent to obtain any given belief. Consider any belief p∗ ∈ ∆Ω. Define the divergence measure associated
with H:
D(p||p∗)≡ [H(p∗)+∇H(p∗).(p− p∗)]−H(p).
D(p||p∗) represents the ”vertical” distance between the graph of H, gr(H), and the hyperplane tan-
21 For two distributions f and g over output X , the likelihood ratio at output x ∈ X is f (x)g(x) .
22 The argument will go through if L is sufficiently low.
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gent to gr(H) at p∗.23 As H is concave, gr(H) lies below this tangent hyperplane (see Figure 2). If H




The information cost can be rewritten as the expected cost of obtaining the beliefs in the support in the
experiments:
K(pi) = λEpi [D(p||p)],∀pi ∈Π(p).
Figure 2: Divergence measure when H is entropy
Next we list some properties of D that hold given our assumptions on H.
Remark 1. Given Assumption 1,
1. D(p||p∗)≥ 0 for all p, p∗ ∈ ∆Ω, and D(p||p∗) = 0 ⇐⇒ p = p∗;
2. D(p||p∗) is continuously differentiable in both of its arguments;
3. D(p||p∗) is convex in both of its arguments;
23 For an arbitrary set X the graph of a function f : X → R is gr( f )≡ {(x, f (x)) ∈ X ×R : x ∈ X}. A hyperplane is the graph of
a linear function.
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4. For all experiments pi ∈Π(p) and beliefs p∗,
Epi [D(p||p∗)] = Epi [D(p||Epi [p])]+D(Epi [p]||p∗) ,
i.e.
Epi [D(p||p∗)] = Epi [D(p||p)]+D(p||p∗) .
The first two points and the convexity of D in its first argument are consequences of the smoothness and
strict concavity of H. The convexity of D in its second argument is exactly the third point in Assumption 1.
Finally, the last identity follows directly from the definition of D.




By construction, such a wage contract satisfies (LL). Moreover, when facing w, the payoff to the agent for
any experiment pi ∈Π(p) is
Epi [U(w(p))]−K(pi) = max{U(L),U}+Epi [λD(p||p∗)−λD(p||p)]
= max{U(L),U}+λD(p||p∗). (3)
The agent is indifferent between all experiments, and prefers them to his outside option, so w implements
any experiment. Moreover, in this case his excess rent is:
ER(pi) = λD(p||p∗).
3.3. Risk Neutral Agent
The important parameter for the class of wage contracts in (2) is the belief p∗. One can interpret this as
choosing an ”as if” prior: the principal pays the agent the cost of acquiring each belief ”as if” the prior were
p∗. However, as can be seen in (3), any disparity between p∗ and p is costly for the principal in the amount
of the excess rent to the agent, λD(p||p∗). The principal can minimize excess rent to zero by setting p∗ = p.
But because U is weakly concave, this wage contract does not generally implement each experiment at first
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best cost. Since K(pi) = Epi [λD(p||p)], by Jensen’s inequality,
Epi [w(p)] = Epi [U−1(max{U(L),U}+λD(p||p))]≥U−1(max{U(L),U}+K(pi)),
where the right hand side is the first best wage bill. This inequality is an equality if the agent is risk neutral.
Proposition 2. If the agent is risk neutral, i.e. U(w) = w,24 then the first-best is achieved and the agent
receives no excess rent. An optimal wage schedule is w(p) = min{L,U}+λD(p||p),∀p.
This result obtains even when the principal cannot sell the firm to the agent, i.e. b(p) is below L for
some posterior realizations. This again contrasts with standard moral hazard models where first best is not
achieved in these cases. The key insight behind Proposition 2 is being able to write the cost of effort for the
agent, K(pi), as the expectation of a positive function over the contractible outcome, posterior beliefs. This
is achieved in our case by the divergence measure from the prior, D(p||p).
To see why this cannot be done in standard moral hazard problems, consider the case in which a principal
induces effort from an agent (both are risk neutral) whose liability is limited at L and has no outside option.
Let there be two output levels x ∈ {0,1}, and two effort levels e ∈ {l,h}. Each effort level e is associated
with a cost ce and a probability of inducing x = 1 given by pe, where ph > pl , and ch > cl = 0.25 Notice that
if there exists a positive wage function w over outputs x ∈ {0,1}, such that
E[w(x)|e] = pew(1)+(1− pe)w(0) = ce, ∀e ∈ {l,h}, (4)
then the feasible wage contract w(x)+ L implements all effort levels at first best cost. However, (4) has
a solution if only if pl = 0.26 Indeed, the only case in which all effort levels can be implemented at first
best cost for any L ∈ R is when pl = 0. This fringe case bears a similarity to our model in that any two
extreme experiments (those that will be optimal in the first best problem with a risk neutral agent), must
24 This is a normalization. When the agent is risk neutral, the first-best characterization in Subsection 2.2 is equivalent to
maximizing surplus, Epi [b(p)]−λ ′K(pi), where λ ′ is interpreted to be the normalized marginal cost of information incorporating
any differences in the marginal utility of wealth between the two parties. That is, if the principal’s payoff is Epi [b(p)]−Epi [w(p)]
and the agent’s is αEpi [w(p)]−λK(pi), let λ ′ = λ/α .
25 Setting the cost of the lowest effort level to 0 is a normalization. In general, implementation of any effort level at first best cost
will require that there exists a wage function w : {0,1}→ R over outputs X such that w(x)≥ cl and E[w(x)|e] = ce ∀e ∈ {l,h}.
26 Similarly, there does not exist such a positive wage function in the standard moral hazard problem in Subsection 3.1, i.e. an
agent choosing an effort level e with output y ∈ [y,y] distributed according to some y ∼Fe(.), with full support. The expected
payment for the lowest effort e must equal its cost ce ≡ 0, but since w(y)≥ 0,∀y, then w(y) = 0,∀y.
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have supports with non-empty set differences.
4. Cost Minimization in the Presence of Both Frictions
We say that w is cost minimizing for pi if Epi [w(p)] is minimized among all feasible w that implement pi .
In this section we show that the class of contracts in (2) contains the cost minimizing wage contract under
limited liability regardless of the agent’s risk aversion. We also characterize the optimal ”as if” prior p∗ for
any experiment.
4.1. Implementation
Recall the agent’s (IC) constraint:
pi ∈ argmax
pi ′∈Π(p)
{Epi ′ [U(w(p))+λH(p)]} (IC).
It is now well known (from Aumann et al. (1995) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) that the solution to
the above problem is the value of the concavification of U(w(p))+λH(p) at the prior p. The concavification
of a function f : X → R is the smallest concave function that lies weakly above f .27 Figure 3 illustrates the
concavification of f (x) = sin(x).
A feasible wage schedule satisfies (IC) for an experiment pi if and only if the agent’s utility from choosing
pi is equal to the concavification of U(w(p))+λH(p) at p. We can also capture the (IR) constraint in this
framework: in order for w to satisfy (IC) and (IR) for an experiment pi , the utility from pi must be equal to
the concavification at p of
Mw(p)≡

U(w(p))+λH(p) if p 6= p
max{U(w(p)),U}+λH(p) if p = p
.28
Figure 4 displays the geometric representation of the agent’s problem: the wage schedule, the (IR)
27 That is, f˜ : X→R concave such that f˜ (x)≥ f (x), ∀x∈X , and for any concave function f ′ : X→R, if f (x)≤ f ′(x)≤ f˜ (x) ∀x∈
X =⇒ f ′ = f˜ .
28 If the value of pi to the agent is not equal to the concavification of Mw at p, then by construction this value is lower than this
concavification at p. This means that the value of pi is less than either: (i) the concavification of U(w(p))+λH(p) at p; or (ii)
U +λH(p). But (i) is a violation of (IC) and (ii) is a violation of (IR).
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Figure 3: f˜ is the concavification of f
Figure 4: Geometric representation of the second best problem
constraint, the agent’s optimal experiment, and his expected utility.29
29 L = 0,U < 0, and λ = 1 in this example. The principal implements the experiment pi with support {p1, p2} = {.4, .7} with
p = .5. The principal pays strictly positive wages for posteriors in the support of pi and zero wages for every other posterior. In this
case the (IR) constraint is non-binding as U < 0 = L.
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For an intended experiment pi and a wage schedule w, defineMw,pi ≡ {(p,Mw(p)) : p ∈ Supp(pi)} as the
posteriors and corresponding utility levels induced by the experiment pi when facing w. Consider dividing
the set of experiments based on whether or not their support is contained in that of pi . Dis-incentivizing
deviations with contained support requires that Mw,pi lies in a hyperplane. This comes for free in Figure 4
as the intended experiment involves only two posteriors. However, if this is not true, the agent will choose
a strict subset of the posteriors in the support of pi that span the hyperplane with the highest value above
the prior. Dis-incentivizing deviations whose support is not contained in pi requires that this hyperplane lies
weakly above gr(Mw). If this is not true, the agent will substitute a posterior p outside the support of pi such
that (p,Mw(p)) is above this hyperplane. We summarize these observations below and display examples of
these two types of violations of (IC) in Figure 5.
Proposition 3. A wage schedule w : ∆Ω→ R implements an experiment pi if and only if Mw,pi lies in a
hyperplane that is weakly above gr(Mw).
4.2. Cost Minimization
It is apparent that the wage contract in Figure 4 is not cost minimizing among those that implement pi .
The principal could lower the wages on both {p1, p2} while still implementing pi until the line connecting
Mw(p1) and Mw(p2) is tangent to λH(p). To formalize this, let
ML(p)≡

U(L)+λH(p) if p 6= p
max{U ,U(L)}+λH(p) if p = p
.
ML coincides with Mw when the principal sets the minimal allowable wage given limited liability, L, for
all posteriors.
For two functions f ,k : X→R, gr(k) is supported by gr( f ) if k(x)≥ f (x),∀x∈ X and ∃x′ : k(x′) = f (x′).
Proposition 4. If a wage schedule w : ∆Ω→ R minimizes cost for an experiment pi ∈Π(p), thenMw,pi lies
in a hyperplane supported by gr(ML).
For the remainder of the main text, we focus on the case in which U(L)≥U , and hence the (IR) constraint
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(a) Mw,pi does not lie in a hyperplane
(b) Hyperplane spanned byMw,pi is not above Mw
Figure 5: (IC) violations
can be ignored.30 This means that limited liability binds in cost minimization for any experiment.31 It also
30 In Appendix B, we characterize cost minimizing wage contracts without restrictions on U and L.
31 When U(L)<U we cannot ignore either constraint. Indeed Appendix B notes situations in which both (LL) and (IR) bind.
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ensures that the concavification of ML is smooth, and so supported hyperplanes are uniquely identified by
their tangency point. The above result reduces the set of wage schedules under consideration to the contracts
described in (2), with the tangency point at the ”as if” prior p∗. Thus the cost minimizing wage schedule is
found by minimizing the wage bill over p∗.
Notice that if a wage schedule w : Ω→ R implements pi , then any wage schedule w′ such that w′(p) =
w(p) if p ∈ Supp(pi) and L ≤ w′(p) ≤ w(p) otherwise also implements pi . Thus, to implement pi , we only
need to specify the on path wage schedule wop : Supp(pi)→ R.
Proposition 5. [Cost Minimization]
Let an experiment pi with finite support S.32 A cost minimizing wage schedule w exists. The cost mini-
mizing on path wage schedule wop that implements pi is unique and characterized by the following system
of equations:






Mw,pi lies in a hyperplane which is supported by gr(ML) at p∗. The agent’s excess rent is: ER(pi) =
λD(p||p∗).
Figure 6 illustrates a cost minimizing wage contract that implements a given experiment pi .33 This figure
details the role of the ”as if” prior p∗, in the optimal wage contract. While moving p∗ away from p provides
a positive excess rent to the agent, it can also mitigate risk in the wage contract. In Figure 6, the experiment
pi is ”asymmetric” in that p2 is more costly for the agent to generate than p1, i.e. D(p2||p)> D(p1||p). Thus
the principal moves p∗ to the right of p, decreasing the wage on the more coslty posterior p2 and increasing
the wage on the less costly posterior p1, thereby decreasing the risk in the wage schedule. This incentive
can be seen in (??): the optimal p∗ is the expectation of the posteriors in the support of pi where the weights
of pi are rescaled according to the distance D(p||p∗).
32 As shown in Appendix B, only finite support experiments will be optimal.
33 In this example, |Ω|= 2, L = 0, and λ = 1. The support of the experiment pi is {p1, p2}= {.4, .95}, and the prior p = .5.
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Figure 6: Cost minimization when U ≤U(L)
5. Efficiency loss in the Presence of Both Frictions
While the first best is achieved when the agent is risk neutral, or when he has unlimited liability, it is
not achieved generically in the presence of both frictions. This section makes this notion precise. We will
identify a class of ”symmetric” experiments which are exactly the experiments that are implementable at
first best cost. We also show that if there is no first best experiment that is symmetric, a different experiment
is implemented, and the agent obtains a positive excess rent.
In this section we continue to assume that U(L)≥U . This assumption ensures that the cost minimizing
wage contracts characterized in Proposition 5 remain optimal. In addition, we assume that U is strictly
concave in order to exclude the analysis in Subsection 3.3.
5.1. Symmetric Experiments and Implementation of the First Best
Proposition 2 showed that when the agent is risk neutral, it is optimal to set p∗ = p. Equation (??) shows
that this is also optimal when the cost of generating each posterior in the support of the intended experiment,
D(p||p), is constant. We call an experiment that satisfies this condition a ”symmetric experiment”.
Definition 1. piS ∈ Π(p) is a symmetric experiment if: ∃c ∈ R: ∀p ∈ Supp(piS), D(p||p) = c. Denote the
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set of all symmetric experiments ΠS.
Lemma 1.
piS is symmetric ⇐⇒ VFB(piS) =VSB(piS).
The intuition for the result is as follows. In order to implement an experiment pi at the first best wage
bill, the principal needs to give the agent zero excess rent. Proposition 5 reveals that the excess rent of the
agent, D(p||p∗), is zero only when p∗ = p. This involves paying wages equal to U−1(D(p||p)+U(L)),
∀p ∈ Supp(pi). But if pi is asymmetric, this wage schedule will constitute a risky lottery for the agent. Since
the agent is strictly risk averse, compensating him will cost more than in the first best problem. The next
proposition extends the intuition of Lemma 1 to the properties of the optimal experiment.
Proposition 6.
The outcome is efficient if and only if there exists a symmetric first best:
V ∗FB =V
∗
SB ⇐⇒ ΠFB∩ΠS 6= /0. (6)
The set of symmetric first best experiments are the set of optimal second best experiments:
ΠFB∩ΠS 6= /0 =⇒ ΠSB =ΠFB∩ΠS. (7)
The agent obtains a positive excess rent if and only if the implemented experiment is asymmetric:
ER(pi)> 0 ⇐⇒ pi 6∈ΠS. (8)
These results imply that efficiency loss and the agent receiving an information rent are generic properties
of the solution, as symmetric experiments are non-generic in the space of feasible experiments. Moreover,
as the uninformative experiment is symmetric, this implies the following corollary:
Corollary 1. If ΠFB = {piN} is uninformative, then ΠSB = {piN} is also uninformative.
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5.2. Further Results on Efficiency Loss
The above analysis leaves some questions unanswered. First, will the principal implement a different
experiment in the second best problem if the first best solution is not symmetric? Second, can the agent
obtain a zero excess rent even if the first best solution is not symmetric? We next explore the extent to which
there is a coincidence between efficiency loss, implementation of a different experiment, and a positive
excess rent when the first best experiment is not symmetric.
For readability, we focus on decision problems, i.e. uDM = uP.34 Consider the case in which the principal
implements an informative experiment in the first best problem, but the uninformative experiment in the
second best problem. Because piN is symmetric the agent obtains zero excess rent even though the principal
experiences an efficiency loss. As will be clear later, this issue arises because the uninformative experiment
is generically a ”local maximum” of VFB in the following sense: experiments that generate posteriors that
are all ”close” to p will induce a single action, and therefore are dominated by piN . We next formalize this
notion.
We say that a sequence of experiments {pin}n support converges to an experiment pi , if {Supp(pin)}n
set converges to Supp(pi) and {pin}n converges in distribution to pi .35 Support convergence strengthens
convergence in distribution to rule out cases in which {pin} puts vanishing probability on posteriors ”far
away” from those in the support of pi .
Definition 2. An experiment pi is a local maximum (minimum) of f : ∆Ω→ R if there does not exist a
sequence of experiments {pin}n that support converges to pi such that f (pin)> (<) f (pi), ∀n.
This notion is relevant because the risk of the wage contract (see (??)) depends on distances in the
posterior space. Thus the support convergence is the correct ”closeness notion” for the implementation
cost: every (interior) local minimum of the implementation cost is also a global minimum, i.e. a symmetric
experiment. However, as mentioned above with the uninformative experiment, VFB is not similarly well
behaved.36 We next make an assumption that rules out cases in which a second best experiment is a non-
34 The results are shown to hold with caveats when the principal’s and decision maker’s interests are not aligned in Appendix C.
35 A sequence of sets {An}n set converges to a set A, if: ∀x ∈ A, ∃{xn}n : xn ∈ An,∀n, and {xn}n→ x; and: ∀{xn}n: xn ∈ An ,∀n,
and {xn}n→ x, we have that x ∈ A.
36 The first best value, VFB is concave in the experiment pi (with the usual point-wise mixture operation). Thus, if we were
to weaken support convergence to convergence in distribution in Definition 2, local maxima of VFB would would also be global
maxima in this sense.
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optimal local maximum in the first best problem. Define Ipi ≡ {ai ∈ A : ∃p ∈ Ai ∩ Supp(pi)} as the set of
actions induced by an experiment pi .
Assumption 2. For every piSB ∈ΠSB \ΠFB, there exists pi ′ such that IpiSB = Ipi ′ and VFB(pi ′)>VFB(piSB).
In words, for every second best experiment that is not optimal in the first best problem, there exists an
experiment that induces the same actions and improves first best value. This will imply that we can find
another experiment whose first best value is also higher and whose support is a small perturbation of the
support of the second best experiment, i.e. the second best experiment is not a local maximum in the first
best problem.
The intuition is as follows. Non-optimal local maxima in the first best problem arise from the multiplicity
of action profiles that can be used: upon fixing the set of induced actions, every local maximum is a global
maximum.37 Given Assumption 2, every second best solution that is not a first best solution is dominated in
the first best problem by an experiment with the same action profile and therefore is not a local maximum.
We will use this property to establish that a second best experiment is symmetric only if a first best
experiment is symmetric; or equivalently by Proposition 6, that the agent receives zero excess rent only if a
first best experiment is symmetric. This assumption holds in the application studied in Section 6.
We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 7. If Assumption 2 holds, then the following statements are equivalent.
ΠFB∩ΠS 6= /0; (9)
ΠSB∩ΠS 6= /0; (10)
ΠFB∩ΠSB 6= /0; (11)
ΠFB∩ΠS =ΠSB. (12)
To make the statement more transparent, consider its implications in the case in which there are unique
37 More formally, consider the principal maximizing first best value when restricted to {pi : Supp(pi)⊂ ∪i∈JAi} for some subset
J of actions. In Subsection A.1 we show that for two experiments that induce the same actions, we can perform a mixture operation
⊕ roughly defined as follows. pi ⊕α pi ′ (i) takes the standard point-wise mixture of piα ≡ αpi +(1−α)pi ′, then (ii) collapses all
posteriors that induce an action ai to their ”average posterior” assigning this posterior pi(Ai). We show that VFB(piα )≤VFB(pi⊕α
pi ′). Moreover, pi⊕α pi ′ support converges to pi when α → 1, which shows that every local maximum is a global maximum when
restricted to a particular subset of actions.
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This is saying that there are two mutually exclusive possibilities for the relationship between the first best
and second best solutions. Either the first best experiment is implemented in the second best problem, it
is symmetric, and the excess rent is zero; or the first best is not implemented in the second best problem,
neither are symmetric, and the excess rent is positive.
The result that (9) =⇒ (12) is transferred from Proposition 6, and the fact that (12) implies the other
conditions is mechanical. Thus the new portions of this result are that (10) =⇒ (9), and (11) =⇒ (10).
The former is the only part that requires Assumption 2, whereas the latter is the only part that uses our focus
on decision problems.
The intuition for (10) =⇒ (9) is as follows. Recall that the implementation cost is defined as
C(pi)≡ Epi [U−1(λD(p||p∗)+U(L))]−U−1(K(pi)+U(L)),
for the optimal p∗. By Lemma 1, if piSB ∈ΠSB is symmetric, then the implementation cost is minimized and
has a value of zero. But the implementation cost is a differentiable function of the posteriors in the support
of the experiment. This means that a small shift in the experiment’s support will incur only a second order
increase in the implementation cost. However, if piSB /∈ΠFB, Assumption 2 ensures that there exists a small
change in the support of the experiment that incurs a first order benefit in VFB. Therefore, this small change
provides a profitable deviation in the second best problem, contradicting the optimality of piSB.38 Thus, if
the second best experiment is different from the fist best experiment, then the second best experiment is not
symmetric and by Proposition 6 the agent receives a positive excess rent.
The intuition for (11) =⇒ (10) uses a converse to the logic above: small changes in the support of
38 Without Assumption 2, we would have that piSB is symmetric implies that piSB is a local maximum of VFB.
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an experiment produce second order changes in the implementation cost only if the experiment is symmet-
ric. Consider a second best experiment that is also a first best experiment, but that is not symmetric, i.e.
piSB ∈ ΠSB ∩ΠFB such that piSB /∈ ΠS. Consider moving the belief in the support of piSB that requires the
highest wage (i.e. the highest D(p||p∗)) ”toward” the belief with the lowest wage. Such a transformation is
illustrated in Figure 7. After moving the belief with the larger wage, p2 leftward toward p1, the new wage
schedule is less risky and induces a lower implementation cost.39 Conversely, in a decision problem, the
posteriors used in the second best experiment piSB are in the interior of action sets. Therefore, since piSB is
also a first best experiment, small changes in the support of piSB produce only a second order loss in VFB.40
This contradicts the optimality of piSB. This means that if there is no first best symmetric experiment, the
principal will implement a different experiment in the second best problem.
Figure 7: First order change in information cost
39 Here, the principal moves from implementing an experiment with support {.3, .9} to one with support {.3, .8}, while leaving
p∗ unchanged.
40 This is the only use of our focus on decision problems. In Appendix C, we show that this goes through in the general framework
as long no belief in the support of piFB is on the boundary between two actions sets-Ai,A j.
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6. Second Best Solution with a Binary State Space
In this section we specify our model in order to make further comparisons between the first best and
second best problems.
6.1. Direction of Asymmetry
Consider an empirical researcher testing a theory. Typically, a higher degree of certainty is required
to overturn the existing theory than to accept it: if the probability of generating the observed data under
the ”null hypothesis” is greater than 5 percent, it is accepted. In our terminology, the optimal experiment
is asymmetric. Furthermore, it is asymmetric in a particular direction in that it expends more effort and
seeks more certain conclusions in the event that the null hypothesis is rejected. This section formalizes this
notion and illustrates how it depends on intuitive aspects of the problem. We then show that the direction of
asymmetry is unaffected by the agency costs faced in the second best problem.
Let Ω= {null,alt} and A= {accept,re ject}, with the convention that the decision maker prefers re ject
in state alt and accept in state null. Define the set of binary support experiments as Π2(p) ≡ {pi ∈ Π(p) :
|Supp(pi)| ≤ 2}, and refer to an experiment pi ∈ Π2(p) by its support {p1(pi), p2(pi)} with the convention
that p1(pi)< p.
Definition 3. The experiment pi ∈Π2(p) is alt (null) asymmetric if D(p1(pi)||p)< (>) D(p2(pi)||p).
An alt asymmetric experiment is relatively more certain about state alt when it induces the decision
maker to choose reject, than about state null when it induces accept. The direction of asymmetry is related
to natural ”symmetry properties” of the problem. We require higher degrees of certainty in order to reject
the null hypothesis, either because the null is very likely, or because rejecting it when it is correct is more
costly than accepting it when it is false.
Example 4. Consider a decision problem in which the principal has preferences given by up(accept,null) =
−up(re ject,null) = x and −up(accept,alt) = up(re ject,alt) = (1− x) with x ∈ [0,1]. The uncertainty
function is H(p) = p(1− p), with D(p||p) = (p− p)2.41
The cost of a type 1 error, i.e. choosing re ject instead of accept when the state is null, is 2x. The cost of
a type 2 error, i.e. choosing accept instead of re ject when the state is alt, is 2(1− x). If piFB is informative,
41 H(p) does not satisfy our Inada conditions so we explicitly focus on solutions whose posteriors lie in the interior of the simplex.
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then one can show that p2(piFB)− x = x− p1(piFB). This means that
D(p2(piFB)||p)> D(p1(piFB)||p) ⇐⇒ x > p,
that is, the first best experiment is alt asymmetric if either the cost of a type 1 error is large or if the null
hypothesis is very likely.
A natural question is whether this intuitive relationship is maintained in the second best problem. When
an empiricist is promoted she gains the ability to delegate experimentation to a disinterested research assis-
tant, or survey collection organization. One may worry that the resulting agency problem could induce the
empiricist to choose an experiment that is asymmetric in the ”wrong direction”. For a science community
that does not care about such agency costs, rejecting the null hypothesis with relatively uncertain beliefs can
be inefficient.
While in Example 4, the direction of asymmetry only depends on the relative cost of type 1 and type
2 errors and the prior, it will generally depend on all ”symmetry properties” of the problem including the
information cost function and other parameters of the principal’s payoff. In this more general environment
does the direction of asymmetry of the first best experiment coincide with that of the second best experiment?
We provide an affirmative answer to this question. As in Subsection 5.2 we focus on cases in which
both experiments gather information, i.e. piN /∈ ΠSB.42 All informative experiments use the same action
profile, {accept,re ject}, meaning that in this binary model Assumption 2 holds, the first and second best
experiments will be unique, and both will generate two posteriors.
Proposition 8. Suppose that piN /∈ΠSB, piFB is alt (null) asymmetric if and only if piSB is alt (null) asymmet-
ric.
The result says that if agency costs do not cause the principal to shut down operations (i.e. implement the
uninformative experiment piN), she will implement an experiment that is asymmetric in the same direction
as the first best. The intuition is as follows. Consider deforming the posteriors of piSB to those of piFB in a
continuous way such that each induced experiment along this path has greater first best value than piSB. This
42 This assumption can be achieved through various more primitive sufficient conditions. One example is that there exists a
symmetric experiment piS such that VFB(piS)>VFB(piN). A less restrictive sufficient condition, is that ∃p′ ∈ [0,1]: b′(p)(p′− p)≤
b(p′)−U−1(D(p||p)).
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continuous path exists because both experiments use the same action profile. If piSB and piFB are asymmetric
in opposite directions then this continuous path must contain a symmetric experiment piS. But since piS
can be implemented at first best cost by Lemma 1, piS provides a higher value than piSB, contradicting its
optimality.
6.2. Amount of Asymmetry
Given the above result, one may be motivated to seek similar comparisons concerning the ”amount of
asymmetry” between the first and second best solutions. Does delegating to a research assistant induce the
empiricist to use a lower or higher significance threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis?
In the binary model above there is a natural way to rank experiments according to their level of asym-
metry. For two alt (null) asymmetric experiments, pi1,pi2 ∈ Π2(p), we say that pi1 is more asymmetric than
pi2, if p1(pi1)≥ (≤)p1(pi2) and p2(pi1)≥ (≤)p2(pi2). This definition captures the idea that pi1 expends even
more effort confirming state alt relative to state null than does pi2. The comparison is only valid between
pairs of experiments that are asymmetric in the same direction, but given Proposition 8 we can meaningfully
compare piFB and piSB.
Casual intuition would suggest that piSB should be less asymmetric than piFB. Relative to the first best
problem, asymmetric experiments in the second best problem impose the additional cost of compensating the
agent for the induced risky wage schedule. Thus, the principal should choose a less asymmetric experiment
in the second best problem in order to mitigate this risk and lower the implementation cost, C(pi). The
question then is: if pi1 is more asymmetric than pi2 in the sense above, is it true that C(pi1)≥C(pi2)?
The answer is ambiguous in general, and so piSB need not be less asymmetric than piFB. We illustrate this
in Figure 8. While it is true that the incentive to mitigate risk exists, the principal also faces a higher cost for
every experiment than in the first best problem. This pushes the principal toward less costly experiments.
When the experiment is less costly, the wages paid are smaller, and so due to ”level effects” in risk aversion,
the mitigating risk incentive can be eschewed. However, if the latter effect dominates in that K(piSB) ≥
K(piFB) then the intuition goes through and piSB is less asymmetric than piFB.43
43 Consider an alt asymmetric experiment, pi , i.e. D(p2(pi)||p)> D(p1(pi)||p). Using the logic in Subsection 5.1, we know that
decreasing the posterior with the highest wage, p2(pi), decreases C(pi). Consider a first best problem with a risk neutral agent
whose marginal cost of information is λU ′(U−1(K(piSB))) , and call the solution pi
′. Since K(piSB)≥ K(piFB), p2(pi ′)≤ p2(piFB). This
means that decreasing p2(piSB) is a profitable deviation if p2(piSB) ≥ p2(piFB). This means that p2(piSB) < p2(piFB). But since
K(piSB)≥ K(piFB), we have that p1(piSB)≤ p1(piFB).
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Example 5. Again, consider a decision problem in which the principal has preferences given by up(accept,null)=
−up(re ject,null) = x and−up(accept,alt) = up(re ject,alt) = (1−x) with x∈ [0,1]. The uncertainty func-
tion is H(p) = p(1− p), with D(p||p) = (p− p)2. Also let U(w)≡√2w.
Figure 8 illustrates values of p1(piFB) and p1(piSB) as we increase the marginal cost of information λ ,
with x = .7, and p = .5. The first and second best experiments are both alt asymmetric. However, p1(piFB)
and p1(piSB) are not uniformly ordered, and so the amount of asymmetry between the first and second best
experiments cannot be ranked in general.
p1πFB
p1πSB
6 7 8 9 10





Figure 8: Belief when the null is accepted as a function of λ .
7. Conclusion
This paper addresses the moral hazard issues that arise in incentivizing information acquisition. We take
the position that, while the experiment is not observable, the realized posterior is. In this framework we
show that the frictions that are alone able to generate inefficiency in the standard moral hazard problem, i.e.
limited liability and risk aversion, still allow for first best implementation in our model. However, in the
presence of both frictions, the principal can only implement the first best if it is a symmetric experiment.
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Our observability assumptions are generous to the principal. We assume that the principal observes
everything that the agent has observed. Future work should explore relaxing this assumption and allow for
the possibility that the agent holds private information about the state of the world after the evidence is
realized. However, this requires taking a stand on which sets of signals from different experiments result in
the same observation for the principal.
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A. Preliminaries
A.1. The ⊕ Operation
Recall that Ipi ≡ {i|Supp(pi)∩Ai 6= /0} is the set of actions induced by the experiment pi with positive
probability. Note pi(Ai) the unconditional probability of taking action ai when implementing pi . For any
experiments pi,pi ′ ∈Π(p) and α ∈ (0,1), define the convex combination of two experiments as
(αpi+(1−α)pi ′)(p) = αpi(p)+(1−α)pi ′(p),∀p ∈ ∆Ω.
Now, we define the operation ⊕ as:
(pi⊕α pi ′)(p) =

(αpi+(1−α)pi ′)(Ai) , if p = Eαpi+(1−α)pi ′ [q|q ∈ Ai] for some i in Ipi ∪ I′pi ,
0 , otherwise.
This operation first takes the (point-wise) convex combination of the two experiments –call this piα . The
operation then takes all the posteriors that induce a particular action ai under piα and collapses them into
their expected posterior. The probability assigned to this expected belief is the total probability that piα
induces ai, i.e. piα(Ai). The resulting experiment induces exactly the actions induced by either pi or pi ′,
i.e. Ipi⊕αpi ′ = Ipi ∪ Ipi ′ . In addition the resulting experiment generates exactly one posterior for every induced
action, i.e. |Supp(pi⊕α pi ′)|= |Ipi ∪ Ipi ′ |. Most importantly, we have that
VFB(pi⊕α pi ′)≥VFB(αpi+(1−α)pi ′)≥ αVFB(pi)+(1−α)VFB(pi ′).
The second inequality holds because VFB is concave for the first mixture operation. Moreover, on each
action set Ai the benefit function is linear but the cost is strictly convex. Thus the contraction of beliefs on a
given action set does not change benefit but reduces cost. This yields the first inequality. One implication of
this is that all optimal experiments under the first best will generate at most one posterior per action.
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A.2. First Best Optima and Faces
Define F(pi) as the smallest face of Π(p) containing pi .44 For any pi ∈ Π(p) with compact support,
F(pi)≡ {pi ′ : Supp(pi ′)⊂ Supp(pi)}.




exists, and there exists pi∗ such that the maximizing set is F(pi∗).
Lemma 2 implies:
Proposition 9. maxpi∈Π(p)VFB(pi) exists. Call the maximizing set ΠFB. If U is linear, then ∃pi ∈Π(p) such
that ΠFB = F(pi). If U is strictly concave then ∃pi ∈ Π(p) such that ΠFB = F(pi)∩{pi ′ : K(pi) = K(pi ′)}.
Moreover, ∀piFB ∈ΠFB we have that |Supp(piFB)|= |IpiFB |.
B. Second Best Wage Contracts for Arbitrary L and U
Proposition 5 describes cost minimization in the ”smooth case” in which U(L) ≥ U . Conversely, if
U > U(L) then there will be a point of non-differentiability in the concavification of ML at p. Therefore,
the set of supported hyperplanes at p is not unique. Nonetheless, we characterize cost minimization in this
general case. Let p∗ be the unique solution of (??) (which is defined regardless of whether U(L) ≥ U).
Denote M˜L the concavification of ML.
Proposition 10. [Cost minimizing wage schedule]
Let an experiment pi with finite support: S, and let wop : S→ R be an on path cost minimizing wage
schedule. Then one of the following is true:
(1) U(L)+λH(p∗) = M˜L(p∗), (IR) does not bind, and wop is given by (??).
(2) U(L) + λH(p∗) < M˜L(p∗), (IR) binds, and the affine subspace spanned by Mw,pi is supported by
gr(ML) at p. In this case, ER(pi) = 0
44 Let C be a convex set. A face F of C, is any set with the property that if c ∈ F and c′,c′′ ∈ C such that ∃α ∈ (0,1) with
αc′+(1−α)c′′ = c, then c′,c′′ ∈ F .
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Moreover, if U is striclty concave and pi is optimal in the second best problem, there exists an extreme
experiment pi ′ : Supp(pi ′) ⊂ S that is also optimal, with wop : Supp(pi ′)→ R unique, and in which case (2)
can be further decomposed into the following:
(2a) (LL) does not bind; the principal achieves his first best value; wop is constant, and given by:
wop(p) =U−1(K(pi ′)+U),∀p ∈ Supp(pi ′);
wop(p) = L,∀p /∈ Supp(pi ′).
(2b) (LL) also binds; the principal experiences efficiency loss; the affine subspace spanned by Mw,pi ′ is
also supported by gr(λH(p)+U(L)). wop is given by
wop(p) =U−1(λD(p||p˜)+U(L)),∀p ∈ Supp(pi ′);
wop(p) = L,∀p /∈ Supp(pi ′).
where p˜ ∈ ∂{p : λH(p)+U(L) = M˜L(p)}
Case (1) describes a situation in which even though the (IR) constraint distorts ML, it is not relevant to
the cost minimization problem. More specifically, the desired tangency point p∗ is still feasible. Indeed, the
case when U ≤U(L) considered in the main text is the case in which (IR) will never bind.
Case (2) describes situations in which the wage contract specified in Proposition 5 will not be feasible,
and (IR) will bind. In this case, because the cost minimization problem is convex in the tangency point, the
hyperplane induced by the wage contract will be supported by gr(ML) at p.
Note that if pi is an extreme experiment (i.e. with linearly independent support), one such hyperplane
passing through (p,U +H(p)) will be the one induced by the constant wage contract given by w(p) =
U−1(K(pi)+U), ∀p ∈ Supp(pi). If this is indeed supported by gr(ML) (case (2a)), then it implements pi at
the first best wage bill and is optimal. If it is not feasible (case (2b)), then the principal, in order to reduce
risk, will rotate the induced hyperplane toward this constant wage hyperplane as much as possible, i.e. until
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it is tangent to the smooth part of gr(ML). This means that at the optimum, the induced hyperplane will also
be supported by gr(λH(p)+U(L)). The wage contract will be given by (??) for some distorted ”as if” prior
p˜ 6= p∗. p˜ is ”as close as possible” to the optimal tangency point p∗ given the (IR) constraint. Moreover,
because the principal’s utility is linear in the experiment (given a wage contract), there will exist an optimal
extreme experiment with support contained in that of pi .
The figures below depict the different cases of cost minimization in general. In Case (1) (Figure 9),
the affine subspace spanned by Mw,pi is tangent to gr(ML) at p∗. In Case (2a) (Figure 10), the constant
wage schedule is feasible. In Case (2b) (Figure 11), the constant wage schedule is not feasible in that the
associated hyperplane intersects gr(ML), and so the affine subspace given by Mw,pi is supported by both
gr(ML) at p and gr(H(p)+U(L)).
Figure 9: Cost minimizing wage schedules: Case (1)
We conclude this section by extending the existence of a cost minimizing wage schedule to the existence
of an optimal experiment in the second best problem.
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Figure 10: Cost Minimizing Wage Schedules: Case (2a)
Figure 11: Cost Minimizing Wage Schedules: Case (2b)
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exists. Call the maximizing set ΠSB. There exists piSB ∈ΠSB such that |Supp(piSB)| ≤ |Ω|.
C. Efficiency Loss in Bayesian Persuasion Problems
This appendix details the extent to which Proposition 7 holds outside the realm of decision problems.
Proposition 12. Under Assumption 2, the following statements are equivalent.
ΠFB∩ΠS 6= /0 (13)
ΠSB∩ΠS 6= /0 (14)
ΠFB∩ΠS =ΠSB (15)
Moreover, if Supp(piSB)⊂ ∪iA˚i ∀piSB ∈ΠSB then ΠFB∩ΠSB 6= /0 is also equivalent to the above statements.
The only change in the above result from Proposition 7 is that when a second best experiment is a first best
experiment this does not necessarily imply that both are symmetric. The reason is that in general bayesian
persuasion problems, the first best objective need not be differentiable in the posteriors in the support of
the experiment. These points of non-differentiability occurs at the boundary of the action sets Ai. Decision
problems avoid this issue because the first best objective function is always strictly convex on the boundary
of action sets. This means that the posteriors in the support of the optimal experiment always lie in the
interior of action sets.
D. Assumption of Independence
We make the following assumption which facilitates uniqueness in our study. It is similar to an assump-
tion made in Caplin and Dean (2013).
Assumption 3. (Independence) Take any c∈R|Ω|−1. Take any subset I ⊂{1, ...,n}= A. There is no linearly
dependent set of beliefs {pi}i∈I such that pi ∈ Ai, ∀i ∈ I, experiment pi ∈Π(p) such that Supp(pi)⊂ {pi}i∈I ,
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and multiplier λ0 ∈ R+ that solves the following set of equations:∇(λ0H(pi)+b(pi))
−1
 ∈ { /0,
 c
−1
}, ∀i ∈ I;





Lemma 3. Under Assumption 3, VFB has a unique optimum piFB which is an extreme experiment.
Proof. Say that the ΠFB has an optimal non-extreme experiment, pi∗. This means that pi∗ is also optimal in
the problem maxpi∈Π(p)B(pi)−λpi∗(K(pi)) where λpi∗ = λU ′(U−1(K(pi∗)) . But this means it solves a concavifi-
cation problem and must satisfy the conditions laid out in Assumption 3. Because pi∗ is not extreme it must
have a linearly dependent support meaning that we violate the assumption. Q.E.D.
The assumption is connected to the affine independence assumption of Caplin and Dean. In the language
of this study, they solve the first best problem in the case in which the principal and decision maker have
aligned interests, i.e. a decision problem, the agent is risk neutral, and the cost function H is entropy. Their
assumption of affine independence is equivalent to the following. For any hyperplane in ∆Ω×R that is
supported by the surface gr(λH(p)+b(p)), the set of beliefs at which this hyperplane is supported must be
linearly independent. The result is that the support of the optimal experiment is a linearly independent set
of beliefs, i.e. the optimal experiment is an extreme point of Π(p). Since our first best problem is generally
concave in pi , and not linear as in Caplin and Dean, we need a more restrictive assumption. Our assumption
is roughly the same as above, but for all λ .
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E. Proofs
E.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The implementation cost of an arbitrary experiment piS is




The first inequality arises because U−1 is a convex function. As U−1 is strictly convex, this inequality is
weak if and only if the distribution of D(p||p∗) under piS is degenerate. Because U−1 is strictly increasing,
and D(p||p∗) = 0 ⇐⇒ p = p∗, the last inequality is an equality if and only if p∗ = p. Putting these two
together, the implementation cost is 0 if and only if the distribution of D(p||p) under piS is degenerate.
Q.E.D.
E.2. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The optimum exists because Π(p) is compact and L is upper semi-continuous. Take the optimizing
set to be Π∗ which is therefore the convex hull of a subset of extreme points in C. Let pi∗ be any experiment
with S≡ Supp(pi∗) = ∪pi∈Π∗Supp(pi).
To see that S is closed take any {pn}n in S that converges to p. This means there exists {pin}n ⊂ Π∗
such that pn ∈ Supp(pin),∀n. {pin}n must admit a convergent subsequence as Π(p) is compact. Let this
subsequence converge to pi which has p ∈ Supp(pi). Since L is upper semi-continuous, Lim
pin→pi
Epin [L(p)] ≤
Epi [L(p)]. By optimality pi ∈Π∗, and p ∈ S.
Now take pi ′ such that Supp(pi ′) ⊂ Supp(pi∗) and assume that pi ′ /∈ Π∗. Because S is compact, the
convex combination αpi∗+(1−α)pi ′ is feasible for α ≤ 1+ ε , for small enough ε . But since the objective
is linear in pi , the experiment αpi∗+(1−α)pi ′ is strictly better than pi∗ for 1 < α < 1+ ε , contradicting
optimality. Q.E.D.
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E.3. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let pi∗ ∈ ΠFB be optimal and an extreme point of Π(p). Consider setting w(p) = U−1(K(pi∗)+
U), ∀p ∈ Supp(pi), and w(p) = B otherwise. First note that this satisfies (IR) as Epi∗ [U(w(p))]−K(pi∗) =
K(pi∗)+U −K(pi∗) =U . The expected wage bill is Epi∗ [w(p)] =U−1(K(pi∗)+U) which is the expected
wage bill in the first best problem. Thus, all that remains is to show that this wage schedule satisfies (IC).
By Proposition 4, this holds if gr(λH(p)+U(w(p))) lies in a hyperplane for all p ∈ Supp(pi∗), and this
hyperplane is supported by gr(Mw). The first requirement is met by the fact that the support of pi∗ is linearly
independent because pi∗ is an extreme experiment. The second requirement is met by noticing that the set
of super gradients of Mw at the point p, eventually includes all hyperplanes as B→−∞. Q.E.D.
E.4. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For any experiment pi , the wage schedule characterized in Proposition 10 gives that p∗ = p. Set
wages equal to w(p) = λD(p||p) +max{U ,L}, ∀p ∈ ∆Ω. Note that the agents excess rent for any ex-
periment is λD(p||p) = 0. Since the agent is risk neutral this is equivalent to saying that Epi [w(p)] =
K(pi)+max{U ,L}. Because the agent is indifferent among all experiments, the principal can implement




But this is exactly the first best problem given a risk neutral agent. Thus any first best solution can be
implemented at first best cost. Q.E.D.
E.5. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. ”⇐= ”
The payoff to any experiment is bounded above by the concavification of (U(w(p))+ λH(p)) which
is weakly below the concavification of Mw(p). Since Mw,pi lies in a hyperplane weakly above gr(Mw), its









Let w′ be the upper envelope of w, that is w′ : ∆Ω→ R such that
w′(p) = Lim sup
pn→p
w(pn).
Note that by construction, w′(p) is upper semi-continuous. If w′ implements pi as well and if w is upper
semi-continuous on Supp(pi), then we can use the following argument.
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), show that maxp˜i∈Π(p)Ep˜i [U(w′(p))+λH(p)] exists, and that the support
of any optimal experiment spans an affine subspace supported by the surface given by gr(Mw′(p)). Thus in
order for pi to be optimal for the agent when facing w′,Mw′,pi must span an affine subspace that is supported
by gr(Mw′(p)). But since w′(p) = w(p), ∀p ∈ Supp(pi), we have that Mw,pi must span an affine subspace
supported by gr(Mw′(p)). Let the associated linear function be k. We have that k(p)≥Mw′(p)≥Mw(p), ∀p,
soMw,pi lies in a hyperplane that is weakly above gr(Mw).
Therefore, all that is left to prove is that w is upper semi-continuous for every p ∈ Supp(pi), and that the
upper envelope of w implements pi . First, we will show that if w implements pi then so does w′. If not, then
there exists pi ′ such that for small enough ε > 0,
Epi ′ [U(w′(p))+λH(p)]> Epi [U(w′(p))+λH(p)].
As the objective of the agent is linear, it is without loss to assume that pi ′ is an extreme experiment and
thereby has finite support. Let pin→ pi for all pi ∈ Supp(pi ′), such that Limpin→piw(pin)> w′(pi)−δ . Since
p is in the interior of the convex hull of Supp(pi ′) for large enough n, p will also be in the interior of the
convex hull of {pin}i. Therefore the set of experiments with this support is non-empty. In addition, as pi ′ is
an extreme experiment, for large enough n, there will be a unique experiment on {pin}i, that we denote pin.
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{pin}n converges in distribution to pi ′, and:
lim
pin→pi ′




for small enough δ because γ goes to 0 with δ . This contradicts the fact that w implements pi .
Now consider that w′(p) > w(p) for some p ∈ Supp(pi). Take an extreme experiment pi ′, such that
p ∈ Supp(pi ′) ⊂ Supp(pi). Because the agent’s objective is linear, pi ′ must be optimal under the wage
contract w′. There exists γ small enough such that:
Epi ′ [U(w′(p))+λH(p)]− γ > Epi ′ [U(w(p))+λH(p)].
As before, for every δ > 0 we can take a set of sequences pin→ pi, ∀pi ∈ Supp(pi ′)with Limpin→piw(pin)>
w′(p)−δ . For any such sequence, we take {pin}n with Supp(pin) = {pin}i. {pin}n converges in distribution
to pi ′. For small enough δ ,
Lim
pin→pi ′
Epin [U(w(p))+λH(p)]> Epi ′ [U(w
′(p))+λH(p)]− γ,
which also contradicts the fact that w implements pi .
Q.E.D.
E.6. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Let pi be given, and w cost minimizing for pi . From Proposition 3, we know thatMpi,w spans a strict
affine subspace T that lies weakly above gr(ML).
If T is strictly above gr(ML), consider lowering T uniformly by ε and recomputing the induced wages.
For small enough ε , the new hyperplane T ′ will still lie above gr(ML), so that the new induced wage
schedule still implements pi . In addition this strictly lowers the wage bill, thereby contradicting the fact that
w minimized costs for pi .
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Q.E.D.
E.7. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Because ML is smooth, any supported hyperplane is characterized by its point of tangency p˜. Since
these are the only candidates for cost minimization by Proposition 4, we can simply minimize the wage bill
over all such p˜. The wage paid for any posterior is given by (2).




Let∇ denote the gradient and∇2 denote the hessian. By the definition of D, we have: ∇Di≡∇D(pi||p˜)=
∇2H(p˜)(pi− p˜) which is the gradient of D with respect to p˜. Let wi =U−1(λD(pi||p˜)+U(L)). Therefore














Hence, since the hessian of H is semi-definite positive by assumption, we have a minimum wage bill at













E.8. Proofs of Proposition 6, Proposition 7, and Proposition 12
Proof. First note that (6), (7), and ”(9) =⇒ (12)” are direct applications of Lemma 1 to the first best
optimal experiment, combined with the fact that for any experiment pi , VFB(pi)≥VSB(pi).
To see (8), consider implementing some piSB. Note that excess rent in the smooth case is given by
D(p||p∗). This is zero if and only if p∗ = p. By inspecting Proposition 5, we can see that p∗ = p is a
solution if and only if D(p||p) is constant for all p ∈ Supp(piSB), i.e. piSB is a symmetric experiment.
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By definition, ”(12)” implies the other conditions. In order to prove the rest of this proposition, we
establish the following claims.
Claim 1. Let piSB ∈ ΠSB, and let Assumption 2 hold. There exists a sequence of experiments {pin}n that




if and only if piSB /∈ΠFB. Moreover if piSB ∈ΠFB and Supp(piSB)⊂ ∪iA˚i then for every sequence of experi-






If there exists some direction such that a small change is profitable then piSB is not a local maximum in
the first best problem, meaning it is not a global maximum, i.e. piSB /∈ΠFB.
”⇐= ”
Since piSB /∈ΠFB, Assumption 2 implies that there exists pi ′ such that Ipi ′ = IpiSB , and VFB(pi ′)>VFB(piSB).
For α ∈ (0,1), define piα ≡ pi ′⊕α piSB. We know that for any α ∈ (0,1),
VFB(pi ′⊕α piSB)≥VFB(αpi ′+(1−α)piSB)>VFB(piSB).
Take a sequence {αn}n such that αn → 0 and the corresponding sequence of experiments {piαn}n which
support converges to piSB. The value of the above limit for this sequence is ∂VFB(piα )∂α
∣∣∣∣
α=0
. because of the





















But VFB(pi ′)>VFB(piSB) implies that:
B(pi ′)−B(piSB)− (U−1(K(pi ′))−U−1(K(piSB)))> 0,
which combined with the fact that U−1 is convex gives that the desired result.
Now consider that piSB ∈ ΠFB and Supp(piSB) ⊂ ∪iA˚i. Because the support of piSB is in the interior of
each action set, we know that the first best value is locally continuously differentiable for any direction.
Hence, because of optimality the above limit must be 0.
Q.E.D.
Recall that the implementation cost of an experiment pi is
C(pi)≡ Epi [U−1(λD(p||p∗))]−U−1(K(pi)),
and that the implementation cost subtracted from first best value is equal to VSB.
Claim 2. For any experiment with finite support pi , there exists a sequence of experiments {pin} where pin




if and only if pi /∈ΠS. Moreover if pi ∈ΠS the above limit is zero for every such sequence.
Proof. First consider moving the posteriors in the support of pi in some direction γ which is a |Ω| ×
|Supp(pi)| matrix. This direction is feasible if for all small enough ε > 0 there exists some new experiment
piε ∈ Π(p), such that piε(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ {p : p 6= pk + εγk; pk ∈ Supp(pi)} and |piε(pk + εγk)−pi(pk)| → 0
as ε → 0. piε support converges to pi as ε → 0. We will abuse notation and refer to this small change in
experiment as the direction γ although it also includes specific information about the change in weights.
” =⇒ ”
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Say that pi is symmetric. We know from (??) that p∗ = p. Consider moving from pi in any direction γ as




























The term in the third line is 0 by the envelope theorem as p∗ is set optimally. The term in the second line
is 0 because pi is symmetric, which implies that λD(pik ||p) = K(pi), ∀k ∈ Ipi . Symmetry also implies that
(U−1(λD(pik ||p))−
λD(pik ||p)
U ′(U−1(K(pi)))), is constant for all k ∈ Ipi . Thus, since ∑k∈Ipi (
dpi(pik )
dγ ) = 0 (because γ is a
feasible change), the term in the first line is also 0.
”⇐= ”
Assume that pi is not symmetric. Take






Because pi is not symmetric p j 6= pi and D(p j||p∗) > D(pi||p∗). Let γ j ≡ p j− pi, and consider perturbing
the posteriors of pi in the direction of γ = (0,0, ...,γ j, ...,0,0), that is, moving p j away from pi and leaving






|pi−p j| ,k = i;
− pi(p j)|pi−p j| ,k = j;
0, ,k 6= i, j.
Now we can express the change in C(pi) with respect to a marginal change in experiment along this






















Rewriting, we can see that this is positive if:
d p j
dγ λD1(p j||p∗)
























This transformation is feasible because D(·||p∗) is convex so d p jdγ D1(p j||p∗) > 0 and so is the denomi-
nator of the ratio in the third line. Because U−1 is convex and D(p j||p∗)> D(pi||p∗) the numerator is also
positive. Moreover, because U−1 is convex,
1
U ′(U−1(λD(p j||p∗))) >
U−1(λD(p j||p∗))−U−1(λD(pi||p∗))
D(pi||p∗)−D(p j||p∗) .
This means that the term in the third line is greater than 1U ′(U−1(λD(p j||p∗))) which is greater than
1
U ′(U−1(K(pi)))
because U ′ is strictly decreasing, and λD(p j||p∗)> K(pi). Thus the inequality holds.
Q.E.D.
”(10) =⇒ (9)”
Take piSB ∈ ΠS ∩ΠSB and assume that piSB /∈ ΠFB. By claim 1, there exists a direction that improves
VFB, and by claim 2 small movements in this direction do not affect implementation cost because piSB is
symmetric. Therefore a small movement in this direction will result in a net benefit in the second best
201
problem. This contradicts the optimality of piSB.
”(11) =⇒ (10)” without the focus on a decision problem.
Now take piSB ∈ ΠSB ∩ΠFB such that Supp(piSB) ⊂ ∪iA˚i. Also suppose that piSB /∈ ΠS. By claim 1,
a small movement in any direction will not affect VFB. By claim 2 there exists a direction that benefits
implementation cost because piSB is not symmetric. Thus a small movement in this direction will have a net
benefit in the second best problem. This contradicts the optimality of piSB in the second best problem, and
so piSB ∈ΠS.
The only thing that remains to be shown is that Supp(piSB)⊂ ∪iA˚i for a decision problem. Assume not.
Then there exists some beliefs p˜ such that p˜ ∈ ∪i∂Ai. Fix p∗ at its optimal value. In choosing the optimal
experiment, the principal solves a concavification problem as in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), where the
function to concavify is: f (p) = b(p)+U−1(λD(p||p∗)). Hence at the belief p˜, there exists a hyperplane
that is supported by the surface of f at p˜.
First, because of our Inada conditions on H, p˜ cannot be on the boundary of the simplex ∆Ω. Therefore
it is an interior point of the simplex, at the intersection of (at least) two action sets, Ai. As the problem is a
decision problem, b is convex and continuous, and is not differentiable at p˜. Because it is not differentiable,
and it is convex, it does not admit a super gradient, and therefore cannot support any hyperplane. Q.E.D.
E.9. Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Because of Proposition 7 we know that piSB is symmetric if and only if piFB is symmetric. Thus we
only need to prove that piFB alt (null) asymmetric implies piSB alt (null) asymmetric. We prove the case for
alt asymmetry and omit the analogous proof for null asymmetry.
Now assume that piFB is alt asymmetric, and that piSB is null asymmetric, i.e. D(p1(piFB)||p)<D(p2(piFB)||p),
and D(p1(piSB)||p)> D(p2(piSB)||p). Let piα ≡ piSB⊕α piFB. By applying the intermediate value theorem to
the function f (α)≡ D(p1(piα)||p)−D(p2(piα)||p), ∃α ∈ (0,1) : piα ∈ ΠS. From the discussion in Subsec-
tion A.1, VFB(piα)>VFB(piSB)
But since piα ∈ΠS, Lemma 1 implies VFB(piα) =VSB(piα) and hence VSB(piα)>VSB(piSB), which contra-
dicts the optimality of piSB.
Q.E.D.
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E.10. Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Because of the argument in Subsection A.1 we know that for any experiment pi there exists pi ′ such
that VFB(pi ′)≥VFB(pi) and |Supp(pi ′)| ≤ |A| with equality only if |Supp(pi)| ≤ |A|. This means that we only
need to consider distributions that have |Supp(piFB)|= |IpiFB |.
If U is linear then Lemma 2 directly applies.
Suppose U is strictly concave. Now take pi ∈ ΠFB and take another experiment pi ′ whose support is
contained in the support of pi , and such that K(pi) = K(pi ′). Note that VFB(αpi ′+ (1−α)pi) ≤ VFB(pi).
Becasuse Supp(pi ′)⊂ Supp(pi) this inequality must hold for α ∈ (−ε,ε) for some small ε . Differentiating
with respect to α , this implies that




Because K(pi) = K(pi ′), we have that B(pi) = B(pi ′). But this means that VFB(pi) = VFB(pi ′). Because
any optimal experiment has at most |A| posteriors in its support there must be a maximal such pi , let this
experiment be piFB.
Now suppose that some experiment pi ′ /∈ {pi ′ : Supp(pi ′) ⊂ Supp(piFB) and K(pi ′) = K(piFB)} is also
optimal. But then VFB(αpi ′+(1−α)piFB)≥VFB(piFB) for any α ∈ (0,1), is weakly better by the concavity
of VFB. If K(pi ′) 6= K(pi), then the inequality above is strict contradicting maximality. If not, then the
inequality is weak but the support is a strictly larger set contradicting the maximality of piFB in this sense.
Q.E.D.
E.11. Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Consider first the relaxed problem in which we ignore (IR) (alternatively set U = −∞). Then the
cost minimizing wage schedule is given by Proposition 5, and spans a hyperplane tangent to gr(ML) at p∗.
We note p∗ to be the solution of (??).
If ML is equal to its concavification at p∗, then such wage contract will still be feasible under the (IR)
constraint. Moreover, by construction this wage contract dominates all other incentive compatible wage
contracts in the constrained problem. Therefore, in this case (IR) is not binding. This establishes the first
case in the Proposition 10.
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If ML is not equal to its concavification at p∗, the above unconstrained optimal wage contract is infeasible.
Now take the cost minimizing wage contract in the constrained problem and assume that the hyperplane
spanned byMw,pi is supported by gr(ML) at p∗c 6= p. Denote M˜L the concavification of ML. (p∗c ,ML(p∗c)) is
in the relative interior of gr(U(L)+λH(p))∩ gr(M˜L). By convexity of D in its second argument, the cost
minimization problem is convex in p∗. Thus, for any λ ∈ (0,1), using the hyperplane supported by gr(ML)
at belief pλ = λ p∗+(1−λ )p∗c will lower the wage bill, and implements pi for λ small enough. Therefore,
the hyperplane must be supported by gr(ML) at p. This completes the proof that case (1) or case (2) hold.
Now suppose that pi is optimal and the agent is strictly risk averse. Given the optimal wage schedule for




Because pi is optimal, pi must be optimal under its optimal wage contract. Moreover, any experiment pi ′:
Supp(pi ′) ⊂ Supp(pi) is also optimal due to Lemma 2. Thus we can take an extreme experiment pi ′ that is
optimal under w.
Consider the following constant on path wage contract for pi ′, wc(p) =U−1(K(pi ′)+U), ∀p∈ Supp(pi ′).
Because pi ′ is an extreme point Mwc,pi ′ is contained in a hyperplane. If this hyperplane is supported by
gr(ML) then it implements pi ′ at first best cost and is thereby optimal. This is case (2a).
If it is not feasible consider the following wage contract
wα(p)≡U−1(αU(wc(p))+(1−α)U(w(p))),∀p.
Since both Mw,pi ′ and Mwc,pi ′ lie in hyperplanes, Mwα ,pi ′ also lies in a hyperplane. If the associated hyper-
plane with Mw,pi ′ is not tangent to gr(U(L)+λH(p)) then the associated hyperplane with Mwλ ,pi ′ will lie
above ML for small λ , and thereby implement pi ′. Moreover the wage bill is lower for wα contradicting the
minimality of w. ThusMw,pi ′ lies in a hyperplane tangent to gr(U(L)+λH(p)). This is case (2b). Q.E.D.
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E.12. Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Recall that M˜L is the concavification of ML. For every p˜ ∈ ∆Ω, define: Tp˜ : ∆Ω→ R, by:
Tp˜(p) =

U(L)+λD(p||p˜) , if ML(p˜) = M˜L(p˜);
(λH(p)+U)+λ∇H(p˜)(p− p)−λH(p) , otherwise.
Consider the wage contracts of the form w(p) =U−1(Tp˜(p)). By Proposition 4 these contain the set of
cost minimizing wage contracts. Because we know that the wages will be bounded, we can restrict ourselves
to a subset of functions associated with a compact set of beliefs- C ⊂ ˚∆Ω. Call the set of all such functions
T . Notice that Tp˜(p) is continuous in p˜ for all p. We will proceed by choosing the optimal experiment
given a cost minimizing wage contract, and then optimize this process over the set of cost minimizing wage




exists because of Lemma 2. Let the maximized value be Vp˜ and the set of maximizers be Π p˜. Moreover,
by the theorem of the maximum, the maximized value Vp˜, is continuous in p˜, and thereby also admits a
maximum V ∗SB, and a maximizing set of experiments ΠSB. Take the associated wage contract that makes
pi ′ ∈ ΠSB optimal. Given Lemma 2 there exists an extreme experiment that is optimal under this wage
contract and thus optimal in the second best problem, hence ∃piSB ∈ΠSB : |Supp(piSB)| ≤ |Ω|.
Q.E.D.
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